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ABSTRACT 
A diverse array of empirical research posits a general tendency for people to 
prefer the status quo over change, all else being equal. In two experiments, we explore 
the status quo preference phenomenon from a motivated cognition, uncertainty 
management perspective. Extending the precepts of several related empirical traditions 
(e.g. terror management theory, system justification theory and related topics), we 
explore the premise that uncertainty management processes activate social cognitive 
mechanisms directly favoring the status quo, similar to previously established process 
mechanisms such as terror management. Across two studies, we find support for the idea 
that both uncertainty and mortality salience magnify peoples’ pre-existing ideological 
preferences. 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The status quo delineates that which is, in contrast to that which is not. We know 
that which is, while that which is not remains unknown. Change in the field of everyday 
life can be daunting; it is often associated with cost, risk and danger. Regardless of its 
fruits, change is necessarily more laborious than maintaining the status quo. Change 
requires action, whereas the status quo does not. An individual is responsible for his or 
her actions, whereas no such responsibility can be conferred on account of an individual’s 
non-actions. In this way, the status quo implicitly suggests a low level of personal risk, 
while endorsing change suggests the opposite. The status quo tacitly indicates the known 
or certain, while the alternative indicates the unknown or uncertain. Conceptual and 
semantic linkages pair the status quo with favorability, while pairing it’s opposite with 
unfavorability. Such are just some of the many forms and manifestations of status quo 
preference.  
A large and established body of empirical literature demonstrates that all else 
being equal, individuals prefer extant status quo realities to alternatives (Eidelman & 
Crandall, 2009; Eidelman, Crandall, and Pattershall, 2009). This may occur even when 
status quo realities appear to be, from a rational choice perspective, non-optimal. The 
status quo preference literature suggests that at an individual as well as a societal level,   
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humans accept or justify status quo realities which are far from ideal, preferring the 
“devil they know” over uncertainties associated with change. 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) established that when a choice between 
endorsing the status quo vs. an alternative is presented to an individual, the status quo 
tends to be preferred (for reviews, see Anderson, 2003; Eidelman, et al., 2009). People 
may prefer the status quo because the potential risks or costs of change are perceived to 
outweigh the perceived benefits, as suggested by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) and the associated principle of loss aversion. Furthermore, people may 
prefer the status quo because of cognitions or feelings that the status quo ultimately 
serves them or the greater good, a psychological mechanism postulated by theoretical 
perspectives including System Justification Theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994) and Belief in a 
Just World Theory (Lerner, 1980). People may rationalize the status quo in order to make 
the best of extant realities via self-serving cognitive construals. That is to say, people may 
hold beliefs and worldviews that the universe is generally fair and good, in effect 
producing just outcomes, manifested in status quo realities. Psychological processes 
lending favor to the status quo may all operate in concert to varying degrees, dependent 
upon the salient features of the judgment at hand and the individual characteristics of the 
perceiver. In any case, the resultant phenomenon is an enduring psychological preference 
for the status quo. 
Evaluative Advantages of the Status Quo 
The status quo indicates “the way things are,” which tends to be psychologically 
connected to “the way things ought to be.” With intellectual roots tracing back to the Age 
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of Reason, scholars have long posited that the connection between existence and 
goodness is embedded in our worldviews and unspoken assumptions regarding the laws 
that govern the universe. David Hume (1739/1978) referred to this seemingly irrational 
psychological confound as the is-ought fallacy, terminology which remains in use today 
in describing the phenomena, while G.E. Moore (1903), in his magnum opus Principia 
Ethica, coined the term naturalistic fallacy to refer to an essentially identical principle. In 
both cases, such “fallacies”1 are described as biasing evaluative judgments in favor of 
that which is, that which does exist; in other words, the status quo. Observe that the term 
status quo conjures something of a historical, political or cultural significance; this is not 
happenstance, but rather a marker of its social-cognitive underpinnings. Individuals 
assume that extant reality exists for a reason, a purpose, or by some natural or divine law. 
As such, the perceived status quo holds an advantage against its contenders by means of 
its implied benevolent structural integrity, and through this process the association 
between goodness and existence is forged. This inference appears to be active rather than 
passive, causing individuals to zealously dismiss, disregard or devalue status quo 
alternatives, particularly in matters of choice (for reviews of this literature, see Anderson, 
2003; Eidelman et al. 2009). I shall now specify several sub-structural mechanisms which 
have been empirically demonstrated to confer an evaluative advantage upon the status 
quo. 
                                               
1 Philosophical debate ensues as to whether or not the is-ought/naturalistic fallacies can be 
properly referred to as fallacious in a strict definitional sense; See, Frankena (1939) for an in depth 
discussion of this issue. 
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The familiarity/mere exposure effect. A substantial body of empirical research 
demonstrates that all else being equal, repeated exposure to a stimulus facilitates a 
positive attitude toward it (For a meta-analytic review, see Bornstein, 1989). This effect 
has been found to occur in respect to a wide array of judgment stimuli including persons, 
words, visual images, and musical pieces (Eidelman et al., 2009). Generally, this line of 
research stipulates that that which is oft encountered is well known, and that which is 
well known is perceived as safe and good. Therefore, by processes of mere exposure, the 
stimulus increases in evaluative favor while simultaneously becoming the status quo. 
Dissonance reduction effects. Much dissonance reduction research demonstrates 
that the desirability of chosen options is enhanced, while the desirability of foregone 
options is devalued (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001; Kay, Jiminez, and Jost, 2002; Shultz and 
Lepper, 1996). The commitment to our own choices causes us to exaggerate the 
difference between the desirability of that which is chosen compared to the desirability of 
that which is rejected. This motivated cognition serves to reduce the post decision 
cognitive dissonance that occurs subsequent to a choice based selection, and manifests as 
both a valuation of the selected choice in addition to an even greater (in relative 
magnitude) devaluation of the non-selected choice (Brehm, 1956). This valuation of 
chosen options coupled with a devaluation of rejected options has been referred to as the 
“spreading of alternatives” effect (Eidelman et al., 2009).  
In regards to the enhancement of chosen selections, the less positive features of 
the chosen selection are enhanced by being mentally transformed from unfavorable to 
favorable, as opposed to, for instance, an evaluative boost regarding the most desirable 
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aspects of the choice (Gerard and White, 1983). Additionally noteworthy is the consistent 
finding that enhancement of selected choices is greatest when the spread of available 
options is relatively unattractive (Shultz and Lepper, 1996; Shultz, Leveille, and Lepper, 
1999). As suggested by Hume (1739/1978) and Lerner (1980), the status quo usually 
indicates a “chosen” alternative in the arena of everyday life, if not by the individual, 
then by society or natural law. Return now to my previous assertion that the term status 
quo is politically or socio-culturally connotative in nature. The supposition is that current 
social and political entities (persons, institutions, and cultural norms) are perceived as 
chosen (at least relative to nonexistent entities), and thus their desirability is magnified, 
lending further advantage to the status quo.  
Kay et al.’s (2002) study on post-election candidate evaluation discovered that 
winning candidates are enhanced in value following their victory, while losing candidates 
are devalued following their loss. Prior to an election decision, the candidates are seen as 
much closer in terms of desirability, yet after the results are tallied, this spreading of 
alternatives effect results in a sharp devaluation of the non-elected, accompanied by an 
evaluative enhancement of the elected. Scholarship on the incumbency advantage appears 
to corroborate this general premise, demonstrating a particularly potent advantage for 
previously victorious candidates, controlling for a large host of other factors relevant to 
electability (for a review, see Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002).  
Insofar as an election represents a collective choice, then cognitive dissonance 
theory can be applied to interpret the empirical effects just described. That is to say, 
subsequent to the nation’s choice for president, collective evaluations shift such that the 
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winner comes to be perceived as relatively more favorable while the loser comes to be 
perceived as relatively less favorable. Analogously, the longstanding literature in 
cognitive dissonance theory demonstrates that with respect to a wide variety of personal 
choices, individuals’ post-choice evaluations shift towards favoring the chosen alternative 
(Beasley and Joslyn, 2001; Shultz and Lepper, 1996, Brehm, 1956, Lyubomirsky and 
Ross, 1999; For a review, see Kay, Jiminez, and Jost, 2002). 
Ironically, the effects of cognitive dissonance as just described may potentially 
self-contradict at the individual and group levels. Consider, for instance, a person who 
votes for the candidate who will eventually lose. After voting for their candidate, both 
dissonance theory and status quo preference theories predict an evaluative boost for the 
chosen (voted for) candidate. When this individual finds that their candidate has lost the 
election, however, both dissonance theory and status quo preference theories would 
predict a relative evaluative boost for the elected candidate. Whether the final net effect 
for this voter would be that of growing favor or disfavor for the elected candidate, 
however, is subject to a smorgasbord of extraneous factors. Nonetheless, both dissonance 
theory and status quo preference theories tend to converge on similar predictions 
regarding how individuals react to and evaluate stimuli which come to be interpreted as 
the status quo. 
Negative perception of reformers. Thus far I have posited that alternatives to the 
status quo are generally devalued, which can have a net effect of bolstering the status 
quo. Relatedly, research demonstrates that reformers (those who seek to change the status 
quo) are viewed more negatively than those who endorse the status quo. This is in part 
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due to evaluations that those who seek to change the status quo are “extremists” with 
difficult personalities and unreasonable reform goals. Robinson, Keltner, Ward, and Ross 
(1995), for instance, found that individuals who support status quo sociopolitical norms 
view the magnitude of disagreement between supporters of the status quo vs. change as 
much more extreme than do the reformers themselves. In other words, status quo 
supporters view reformers as “further way” from the proper position than reformers view 
status quo supporters. The resultant effect is that reformers are less likely to demonize 
their political enemies, in comparison to those who oppose reform. Since the status quo 
already holds an evaluative advantage amongst political centrists, further fuel is added to 
the flame of change devaluation via this novel mechanism.  
People and ideas are guilty by association; ideas are measured by the characters 
who proffer them, and individuals are assessed by the values and ideas they endorse. A 
biased negative perception of reformers’ ideas transfers to a biased perception of the 
personality characteristics and moral character of the reformers themselves. Robinson et 
al. (1995) notably found that those seeking to change the status quo regarding abortion 
laws are seen as unreasonable and extreme by both sides of the abortion debate. 
Similarly, Keltner and Robinson (1997) found that “revisionist” faculty within an English 
department (those who challenged the status quo perspective), were judged by people on 
both sides of the issue as less reasonable and more extreme individuals, indicating an 
overall devaluation of reformers, even by those who are initially not particularly 
antagonistic toward the reforms themselves. If issue stances endorsed by reformers are 
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seen as more extreme in a systematically biased fashion, then they may also be viewed as 
undesirable and/or unattainable. 
O’Brien and Crandall (2005) further exhibit the presence of prejudicial attitudes 
toward reformers with empirical evidence indicating that reformers are viewed as more 
self-interested than status quo supporters. As such, reformers are viewed as being 
relatively selfish, unscrupulous individuals looking out for their own best interests as 
opposed to those of society. The implications of such prejudicial attitudes towards 
reformers (and by extension the reforms they advocate) are clear. If it is believed that 
reforms are spearheaded by relatively selfish and untrustworthy individuals, then the 
reforms for which they advocate are also to be viewed with suspicion. 
Mere existence bias. Perhaps the most distilled mechanism of evaluative 
preference for the status quo is the recently coined mere existence bias. Scholarship on 
the mere existence bias indicates that even under meticulously stringent laboratory 
conditions in which the contributing effects of other status quo preference mechanisms 
(e.g. those discussed thus far) are controlled for or eviscerated, preference for the status 
quo remains (Eidelman et al. 2009). This recent line of empirical investigation suggests 
that evaluations of positive value are directly derived from a particular position being 
labeled as the status quo, complementing the more circuitous processes such as those 
presented earlier, in addition to the yet to be discussed rational choice mechanisms. 
This direct evaluative association further reinforces shared networks of semantic 
activation, grouping the concept of status quo with positivity and its alternatives with 
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negativity. In other words, thoughts of the status quo automatically activate value 
judgments, due to their relation to that which is known, secure, safe and natural. 
Eidelman et al. (2009), for instance, find that a seemingly value absent distinction 
between a status quo reality and an alternative still garners preference for the status quo, 
even when: the substantive content of the status quo is counterbalanced over multiple 
conditions, the effects of perceived cost are statistically controlled for, the participants 
have no personal stake in the issue, and pre-existing attitudes toward the two options are 
nonexistent or minimized to the point of practical irrelevance. In these studies, 
participants rated the status quo as more “good,” “right” and “the way things ought to 
be,” regardless of the substantive content of the status quo position.  
Numerous cognitive processing mechanisms stack the deck in favor of positive 
evaluations regarding the status quo. Rooted in a characteristically cognitive perspective, 
Fishbein & Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of Planned Behavior, for example, posits that factors 
such as biased accessibility and belief strength will each influence evaluative outcomes in 
their respective stages of cognitive processing. Biased accessibility, for instance, may 
render positive outcomes associated with the status quo more accessible than positive 
outcomes associated with choosing alternatives. Likewise, negative outcomes associated 
with the status quo may be less accessible than negative outcomes associated with 
choosing alternatives. Another relevant factor from Fishbein & Ajzen’s (1975) theoretical 
model is belief strength, in this case regarding the likelihood of outcomes expected to 
result from going with the status quo vs. an alternative. Specifically, positive outcomes 
associated with the status quo may be viewed as more likely to ensue than positive 
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outcomes associated with an alternative. Likewise, negative outcomes associated with the 
status quo might be viewed as less likely to ensue than negative outcomes associated with 
an alternative. Hailing from a similar perspective, Krosnick (1988) demonstrated that 
attitude importance weighting is related to the spreading of alternatives effect, such that 
higher levels of importance predict exaggerated evaluative differences among competing 
alternatives, potentially serving as a multiplier effect in terms of the status-quo’s 
evaluative advantage.  
Eidelman et al. (2009) describe the existence bias as a heuristic; and like other 
heuristics, it serves to enhance processing efficiency, if not accuracy. Models concerning 
biased information processing at various stages from encoding to retrieval offer a 
valuable lens through which to understand the roots of status quo bias. A central premise 
of the mere existence bias, however, is that the association between existence and 
goodness requires no supposition of rational inputs in order to manifest, though 
rationalizations are to be expected. In the words of Eidelman et al. (2009), pp. 73, 
“Although assumed reasons may undergird some forms of existence bias, they do not 
seem necessary…” I shall further elaborate on the nature of these “assumed reasons” in 
the following section. 
Rational Choice Perspectives 
In many cases, status quo preference can be accounted for by invoking principles 
of behavioral economics. That is to say, the magnitude of costs associated with change 
may, in the eyes of the perceiver, counteract and offset the expected magnitude of its 
potential benefits. Consider this principle from a strictly mathematical perspective. If the 
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utility of the status quo is rated as a three (with higher numbers denoting greater 
desirability), and the utility of the alternative is rated as five, a rational individual would 
be expected to engage in change only if the expected cost associated with the change is 
less than two. Cost in this sense does not merely refer to money. Rather it denotes a 
perceived loss of any sort, whether it be time, personal security, mental effort, et cetera. 
Change necessarily requires action, even in the most minimal sense of mentally 
considering its adoption. The status quo alternative must therefore necessarily invoke 
some kind of extra cost, serving to balance the utilitarian equation in favor of the status 
quo.  
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) coined the term status quo bias to refer to this 
general tendency to evaluate the status quo as superior for reasons pertaining to its 
perceived advantage in utility. Rational choice, utilitarian, considerations are also a key 
component of theoretical perspectives including Social Dominance Theory and System 
Justification Theory, which posit that those who benefit the most from the status quo in 
society tend to be its most formidable defenders. Such individuals tend to further 
promulgate what Jost and colleagues might deem a “legitimizing myth”: the belief that 
that excessive societal costs tend to accompany social change. Rational choice 
approaches tend to construe status quo justification as a generally rational endeavor, 
serving the interests of the self or group. It is critical to note that such cognitive inputs 
need not be formed in a “rational” manner for rational choice models to apply. Rather, 
similar to the cognitive process models described previously, rational choice models aim 
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to describe how such inputs (whatever their origin) enter into a cognitive equation in 
order to produce predictable evaluative outcomes. 
Loss aversion is key component of status quo bias, as first conceptualized by 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). In experiment one of this series of studies, 
participants were asked to rate the attractiveness of a variety of financial investment 
strategies. Preference for the status quo was observed, controlling for the substantive 
content of the status quo vs. the alternative. Additionally, Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
found that university employees held a biased preference toward accepting the university 
healthcare plan in which they were already enrolled, while no preference was observed 
for individuals who were not already enrolled in any plan (and thus, had no status quo 
enrollment status). In other words, when a particular plan had the opportunity to be seen 
as the status quo, it was preferred against an alternative, yet such an effect did not emerge 
when neither option was perceived as the status quo. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were perhaps the first to empirically establish that 
people tend to disproportionally weigh losses against gains. Further research establishes 
that all else being equal, people evaluate losses as more severe than gains of the same 
magnitude (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). As such, the perceived costs of 
switching from the status quo to an alternative may be unduly magnified, resulting in 
status quo preference. Other experimental research establishes that in respect to financial 
decisions, people imagine greater regret for action than inaction, even when the outcomes 
of each option are essentially identical (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Landman, 
1988; for a review, see Anderson, 2003).  
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In a popular experimental template which may be referred to as the “lottery tick et 
paradigm,” participants are given a lottery ticket and then offered an opportunity to 
exchange it with another participant. In these studies, participants overwhelmingly 
choose not to trade their ticket for another of equal value and probability of winning, 
even when enticed with additional incentives to switch. Such findings elucidate the 
imbalanced psychological consequences of counterfactual regret; a person with a losing 
ticket who failed to switch would of course experience regret, but not nearly as much as a 
person who possessed a winning ticket and traded it away. For a review of empirical 
studies which utilize the lottery ticket paradigm, see Van de Ven and Zeelenberg (2011). 
Such findings accord with a lay understanding of attributional responsibility, by which 
people are generally held responsible (blamed) for their actions, but not their non-actions. 
For this reason, a non-action (which functionally serves as an implicit endorsement of the 
status quo) is tacitly preferred. 
I again note that inputs to rational choice “equations” may be derived from 
processes of biased motivated cognition, and that hot cognitive theoretical models of 
status quo preference may harbor rational choice components. The categorical distinction 
between purely rational choice explanations for status quo preference versus those rooted 
in cognitive and/or evaluative biases can at times be blurry. For example, Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser (1988), in their formulation of the status quo bias, focus heavily on principles 
of aversion toward risk, loss, and regret as explanatory mechanisms. Status quo 
preference rooted in such human tendencies may be viewed as relatively rational or 
irrational, depending upon how one wishes to define rationality. If one were to author a 
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decision making algorithm with the goal of maximizing total utility, it would appear 
nonsensical to specify special tendencies toward risk, loss and regret aversion; choices 
should be based solely on the expected value of decision outcomes. 
Some theorists would define “rationality” in a manner that leads them to conclude 
that it is rational to diverge from expected utility when dealing with events which occur 
extremely rarely, for a variety of reasons, including societal norms and values which 
dictate that people act carefully, without risking the wellbeing of themselves or others.  
Unlike expected utility theory, factors such as subjective norms are taken into account by 
the theory of reasoned action and similar perspectives (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
According to such theories, the effect of expected utility (i.e. attitude toward the 
behavior) can be overshadowed by the effect of internalized societal norms when 
individuals formulate an attitude or behavioral decision.  
Furthermore, if one takes into account anticipated counterfactual regret, it can be 
construed as “rational” to make decisions which knowingly do not align with expected 
value maximization. Consider for example that a benevolent stranger approaches you and 
offers you a choice: a $5 million dollar gift now, or the chance to flip a coin to win more. 
If the coin comes up heads, you win $20 million, but if it comes up tails, you win 
nothing. The coin-flip option has an expected value of $10 million, which is twice the 
expected value of the foregone option, exceeding the expected value of that option by $5 
million. Yet, one can plainly see that it is not at all irrational to take the $5 million dollar 
option. Considering the effects of anticipated counterfactuals, the “psychological 
expected value” of each of the potential outcomes can often diverge from mathematical 
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calculations of expected value, as illustrated by the above case. In a similar fashion, loss 
and risk aversion might generally be considered symptoms of a rather sophisticated sense 
of rationality. In any case, rational choice theories of status quo preference focus 
primarily upon relatively “cold” cognitive inputs, as opposed more motivational or 
emotional “hot” factors. 
General Conclusions 
As examined in this chapter, a variety of psychological processes lend to the 
phenomenon known as status quo preference. I have thus far overviewed some of the key 
explanatory mechanisms by which cognitive and evaluative tendencies bolster the status 
quo. In this dissertation, I focus on the components of status quo preference hypothesized 
to originate in motivations of a highly abstract, symbolic and primordial nature. 
Fundamental human drives to escape existential darkness and find one’s place in the 
universe harbor implications for understanding status quo preference. Existential, 
humanistic, affective and motivational schools of thought have long posited that a large 
array of human cognitions and behaviors are shaped by underlying epistemic and 
existential drives. Status quo preference is a phenomenon congenial to this thesis, such 
that the status quo implies that which is known, safe, secure, and good. The alternative 
implies that which is epistemically ambiguous and existentially frightening. I herein posit 
that affective and motivational forces of this nature play a direct role in the psychological 
phenomena of status quo preference. I shall now shift the discussion toward the nature of 
such “forces,” namely, the psychological need to manage uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE UNCERTAINTY MOTIVE 
Humanity strives to progress from a position of uncertainty toward certainty, from 
ignorance toward knowledge, from insecurity toward security, and, ultimately, from 
negativity toward positivity. This principle is embodied in western mythological 
symbolism, whereby the unknown is represented by darkness, and the known represented 
by light. The physical act of shining a flashlight into a dark forest illuminates the contents 
of that forest, allowing one to successfully navigate the terrain. Allegorically, that which 
is known is relatively certain, secure and good; while that which is unknown is relatively 
uncertain, insecure and bad. The certainty, security, and predictability that knowledge 
brings “illuminates” us, separating dark from light.2  
In the psychological literature, the term “uncertainty” describes an experience 
which occurs when individuals face incompatibility between different cognitions, 
between cognitions and behaviors, between cognitions and experiences, or when one 
faces an inability to predict the future or know the world (Van den Bos and Lind, 2002; 
Hogg, 2000). This wide reaching definition captures several qualitatively distinct social 
aspects of the uncertainty experience. We may orient the concept of uncertainty in 
relation to the future, the world, or the self. In each case, uncertainty denotes a state of 
                                               
2 These remarks should be viewed as a description of social cognitive linkages, and should not be 
interpreted as representing the author’s worldview. 
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ignorance, of not knowing. It is the position of humankind to attempt to convert the 
unknown into the known, to move from a state of certainty toward uncertainty. Through 
such processes people find meaning, which brings comfort and security. 
Uncertainty Harbors Both Epistemic and Existential Implications 
I use the term epistemic motivation to indicate the human drive to seek 
knowledge, including the need to verify that one’s mode of knowledge acquisition is 
valid. I use the term existential motivation to indicate the human drive to seek meaning, 
particularly meaning relevant to the self. We use the term “meaning” in the sense of 
Heine & Proulx (2006), progenitors of the Meaning Maintenance Model, who state, 
“…people have a need for meaning; that is, a need to perceive events through a prism of 
mental representations of expected relations that organizes their perceptions of the 
world.” (Heine & Proulx, 2006, p. 88). Stated otherwise, meaning refers to systems of 
“expected cognitive associations” (Proulx & Heine, 2006). These cognitive associations 
encompass “anything that one might expect to be related to anything else—people, 
places, objects, events—in any way that they could be construed as related—causally, 
spatial-temporally, teleologically,” (Proulx & Heine 2006, p. 310). Interestingly, Proulx 
& Heine (2006) suggest that when people encounter a stimulus in which they cannot find 
meaning (i.e. expected relations are violated), a fluid compensation occurs in which 
meaning is sought. Often this meaning takes the form of “cultural worldviews” which 
function as schemas informing one as to proprietary relations among people, objects, and 
concepts encountered in the social world.  
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When expected relations between inanimate objects or concepts not relevant to 
the self are violated, such cases should be most accurately described as “epistemic,” if 
they primarily challenge knowledge frameworks. When expected relations relevant to the 
self are violated, such cases should be most accurately described as “existential,” if they 
primarily challenge ideas pertaining to the understanding of the self and human 
experience. As an example of this distinction, consider what people’s reactions would be 
to news of confirmed intelligent extraterrestrial contact in outer space. For many, this 
news would be existentially challenging, since it would almost certainly force individuals 
to confront sacred beliefs regarding the self, humankind, and God. The primary alarm to 
the psyche resulting from such news has less to do with a mere violation of non-self-
relevant knowledge structures, and more to do with metaphysical, spiritual, existential 
issues. Now contrast this with another hypothetical scenario that beyond light-speed 
travel is discovered to be possible. Encountering this news would likely be epistemically 
challenging for many, as this news contradicts information which has been wholly 
accepted and taught as scientific fact for many years in classrooms worldwide. The 
thought of beyond light speed travel, however, does not readily conjure the kinds of 
uncertainties as those which would be expected by the former (extraterrestrial encounter) 
case described above. This is because any self-relevant implications of the latter (beyond 
light speed travel) case are not readily apparent, at least by comparison with the former 
case. Of course, the psychological impact of any expected-relations violating information 
will vary widely by individual and culture. Epistemic and existential motivations are 
expected to share a great deal of overlap in terms of psychological impact, since 
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knowledge is determined by our meaning frameworks, and our sense of meaning is 
determined by our knowledge frameworks.  
William James (1890) was perhaps the first psychologists to posit that uncertainty 
reduction is motivated by a need to “simplify psychological experiences.” Other notable 
early psychologists, such as Ernst Jentsch (1906/1995), who expounded upon the 
psychological phenomena to which he referred to as “the uncanny,” found inspiration in 
James’ early hypotheses in this domain. Other emerging schools of thought, including 
psychoanalysis, took on a somewhat different perspective (e.g. Freud, 1919/1958). 
Empirical evidence has now been garnered in favor this general “epistemic simplicity” 
perspective, including studies which demonstrate that uncertainty reduction processes are 
partially motivated by a need to reach cognitive closure (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). 
Such research suggests that when people do not have the cognitive capacity to 
systematically process, they seek certainty. This frees up cognitive resources allocated to 
uncertainty management and simplifies psychological experiences. 
Sigmund Freud (1919/1958), Frederic Barlett (1932) (a predominant forerunner of 
social cognitive psychology), and other emerging schools of psychological thought also 
became interested in the construct of “uncertainty,” and posited an uncertainty reduction 
drive mechanism conceptually distinct from the search for epistemic knowledge as touted 
by James (1890). They posited that uncertainty management was fundamentally rooted in 
a quest for meaning rather than knowledge. That is to say, uncertainty management was 
hypothesized to be motivationally driven by man’s need to “connect” with the world 
around him, as opposed to being motivated by mere intellectual curiosity. Thus, the 
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orientation of Bartlett (1932), Freud (1919/1958) and others toward uncertainty 
management can be characterized as existentially situated, in contrast to James’ (1890) 
and Jentsch’s (1906/1995) more epistemically oriented point of view.  
The term epistemic refers to certainty regarding one’s knowledge about the world, 
while existential refers to certainty regarding one’s relational connection to the reality of 
existence, or the perception of being self-aware. Epistemic uncertainty may harbor 
existential concerns, and existential uncertainty in turn may harbor epistemic concerns. 
One could reasonably argue that existential issues are the ultimate source of uncertainty’s 
negative valence, insofar as it is not lack of knowledge itself which individuals find 
disturbing, but rather what that lack of knowledge stands to imply about existential 
meaning and value. In any case, these two subconscious motivational sources of 
uncertainty may operate in conjunction to produce a negative affective experience, and, 
due to the negative valence associated with psychological uncertainty, individuals are 
generally motivated to reduce it. 
As a brief demonstration regarding the difference between epistemic and 
existential psychological domains, I offer some examples of characteristically epistemic 
and existential questions. “Is oxygen necessary to breathe?” “Does inflation decrease the 
value of the dollar?,” “Are carbon dioxide emissions a cause global warming?,” “Is the 
world flat?” are primarily epistemic questions, though may harbor varying degrees of 
existential implication. Questions such as “What is the purpose of my life?,” “Does 
everything “happen for a reason”?,” “Why am I living?,” and “Who am I? What is my 
place in the universe?” would be more accurately characterized as primarily existential. 
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Generalized Worldview Defense as a Mechanism of Uncertainty Reduction 
When an individual is faced with uncertainty, affirming one’s worldview can be 
palliative. This is because worldviews effectively function to address core existential 
questions. A plethora of empirical research indeed demonstrates that the affirmation or 
defense of cultural worldviews reduces negative feelings associated with subjective 
uncertainty (Hogg, 2000; Hogg, 2005; Hogg, 2007; Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, 
Miedema, and Van den Ham, 2005; for a review see, Van Den Bos, 2009). Personally 
and culturally valued worldviews convert the world into a predictable place and help 
individuals navigate reality, therefore satisfying epistemic needs. Worldviews are largely 
shaped by life experiences of an epistemological nature. Hence, individuals naturally 
draw upon their worldviews in order to resolve or interpret epistemic uncertainties. When 
worldviews do not offer an acceptable level of epistemic uncertainty reduction, one will 
engage in information seeking until epistemic needs have been satisfied. Epistemically, 
worldviews buffer against threats by suggesting that uncertainty can be resolved via the 
acquisition, retrieval, or reconceptualization of information. Worldviews also help secure 
an appraisal of meaning in the world, and in doing so satisfy existential needs. 
Worldviews can attenuate existential anxiety by providing a mechanism through which 
people may symbolically transcend existential despair, as suggested by Terror 
Management Theory and related perspectives (Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2008). 
Extreme feelings of existential despair often culminate in an attraction toward 
totalistic worldviews (for a comprehensive review, see Hogg and Blaylock, 2012). 
Markedly totalistic worldviews, including various forms of religious fundamentalism and 
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sociopolitical utopianism, leave little or no room for existential doubt or despair. This 
perhaps accounts for the particularly seductive nature of these worldviews, which 
ultimately manifest in the form of political and religious cults. Totalistic worldviews 
declare absolute and inerrant certainty regarding the nature of the ideologies contained 
within them, and also tend to firmly stake a claim on the nature of existential purpose, or 
the meaning of life. As such, the upholding of cultural worldviews helps to ward off 
existential uncertainty and assuage its associated negative affect (Van den Bos, Heuven, 
Burger, and Fernández Van Veldhuizen, 2006). Consequently, when individuals are 
exposed to situations which magnify uncertainty, the implicit goal of worldview 
affirmation is automatically activated (Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2005). 
For example, Van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet and Maas (2007), found that 
priming uncertainty salience caused exaggerated negative affective responses toward 
individuals criticizing their home country (a worldview threat). In a second study, Van 
den Bos, et al. (2007) found that individuals who tend to perceive uncertainty as very 
emotionally upsetting condemned homeless people to a particularly large degree. 
Homelessness is implicitly seen as a symptom of cultural deviancy and/or sociopolitical 
failure. In either case, the prevalence of homelessness is implicitly worldview 
threatening. Hence, Van den Bos, et al. (2007) argue that the negative reactions exhibited 
by uncertainty sensitive individuals elucidate a direct connection between subjective 
uncertainty and the condemnation of worldview violators, or those who challenge the 
normative status quo. 
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A religion is a unique worldview system which ties the natural world to 
supernatural or metaphysical concepts. Religion, generally speaking, attempts to answer 
life’s deep existential and epistemic questions including the “meaning of life” and the 
proper relation among objects and beings within the universe. A review by Hogg, 
Adelman & Blagg (2010) corroborates this perspective, offering the case that religions 
are “…entitative groups that provide a moral compass and rules for living that pervade a 
person’s life, making them particularly attractive in times of uncertainty.” Uncertainty is 
diminished by reducing complexity to simplistic forms. Shades of grey are reduced to 
black and white, evil and good et cetera. Total faith in an inerrable leader and simple 
solutions to life’s problems tend to be markers of more dangerous religious cults, whose 
doctrinal attempts to address uncertainty become as extreme as the cultists’ need to 
squelch it. In the words of Jason Begue, former high ranking member of the cult of 
Scientology, “One of the major things they that sell to get people to buy their services is: 
certainty. You will have certainty in your life, which is very seductive. People want to 
know. People want to know. It’s difficult, I think, for people to wonder, to not know. And 
so, they’re seduced, by this certainty. But when you think about it, it can be quite 
dangerous.”  
Epistemic ideologies proffered by religion are generally thought of as coming 
from a divine being or principle, and therefore must be epistemically correct, in effect 
eviscerating epistemic doubts and uncertainties. Van den Bos, Van Ameijde, and Van 
Gorp (2006) found in a nationally representative sample including more than 1,500 
participants, that personal uncertainty concerns were positively related to negative 
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affective reactions toward statements critical of religion. Importantly, this effect emerged 
strongest among individuals who viewed personal uncertainty as emotionally threatening. 
Further along these lines, the individual difference variable of uncertainty avoidance has 
been found to be negatively correlated with both tolerance of diversity and openness to 
experience (Hofstede, 2001). Other experimental evidence demonstrates that people who 
are made to feel uncertain more zealously defend threats to their worldviews, in 
comparison to individuals not made to feel uncertain (McGregor, 2004; McGregor and 
Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer, 2001). Furthermore, Hogg 
(2000; 2004; 2005) demonstrates that the experience of personal uncertainty elevates the 
attractiveness of strict orthodox worldviews and ideologies. With these statements, I do 
not intend to paint religion as psychologically undesirable. Rather, I suggest that religion 
easily lends itself to the task of epistemic and existential uncertainty reduction. 
Uncertainty and Negative Valence 
The empirical literature firmly establishes that uncertainty tends to be associated 
with negative affect, at either or both implicit and explicit levels (Kruglanski, 2004; Van 
Den Bos, 2009; Van Den Bos, et al., 2005; Hogg, 2000; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; 
Sorrentino and Roney, 1986). In fact, some psychological definitions of uncertainty have 
gone so far as to work the negative valence associated with uncertainty into its very 
definition, such as Monat, Averill and Lazarus (1972, pp. 237), who define uncertainty as 
“the period of anticipation prior to confrontation with a potentially harmful event.” 
Similarly, prominent contemporary uncertainty scholar Kees Van den Bos (2009, pp. 
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186), defines personal uncertainty as “subjective sense of doubt or instability in self-
views, worldviews, and the interrelations between the two.”  
Studies on the physiological effects of uncertainty have demonstrated that 
experiencing uncertainty coincides with a physical stress response characteristic of 
perceived threat, including hormonal changes, raised blood pressure, and immune 
response activation (see Zakowski, 1995; Mason et al., 1973). Individuals exhibiting high 
levels of emotional uncertainty (as measured by the emotional uncertainty scale) are 
thought to demonstrate a maladaptive coping strategy in which subjective uncertainty is 
particularly emotionally upsetting. Individuals scoring high on this measure are likely to 
respond to subjective uncertainty with particularly high levels of frustration and anxiety. 
Additionally, highly emotionally uncertain individuals tend to score high on measures of 
neuroticism and emotional rumination (negatively valenced). They also tend to be more 
preoccupied with stressful situations, and tend to exhibit relatively low self-esteem 
(Greco and Roger, 2001). 
The Uncertainty Management Drive 
Philosophers of mind have long posted a universal human need to find certainty in 
life. The discussion of such ideas traces at least as far back as classical antiquity, but can 
more recently be traced to the intense 19th psychological philosophizing which predated 
the psychological sciences, notably that of Søren Kierkegaard. In the early 20th century, 
scholars who would prove to be incalculably influential at the crossroads of philosophy 
and psychology, such as Theodor Adorno and Martin Heidegger, produced writings 
which spoke to the psychology uncertainty and its sociopolitical implications. 
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When psychology began to emerge as a distinct discipline in the late 19th century, 
ideas surrounding subjective psychological uncertainty and its epistemic existential 
implications were explored by early psychological theorists of diverse perspectives 
including William James, Erich Fromm, and of course, Sigmund Freud. The rise and fall 
of Behaviorism and its antithesis, Cognitivism, shifted the focus of the psychological 
sciences away from phenomena of this nature during the latter half of the 20th century. 
Leading contemporary scholars, however, have begun to revitalize scholarship on this 
and related topics with an exciting abundance of empirical evidence consistent with an 
existentialist account of uncertainty management. See Hogg & Blaylock (2012), for a 
general survey of the burgeoning cotemporary research in this content domain. 
Indeed, a plethora of research firmly establishes the connection between 
uncertainty and negatively valenced affect (for reviews of this extensive literature, see 
Hogg, 2000; Van den Bos, 2009a). Uncertainty would not need to be “managed” 
(reduced) if it tended to be positively valenced. The valence of uncertainty, however, is 
not necessarily always negative in connotation. The affective valence of uncertainty may 
be moderated by context and situation. The emotionally optimal or desired level of 
uncertainty is likely to systematically vary across both persons and situations. Empirical 
research does indeed demonstrate that the experience of personal uncertainty may foster 
awe, curiosity, and other positively valenced cognitive and affective experiences under 
the right conditions (e.g. McGregor and Marigold, 2003; Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, 
Olson, and Hewitt, 1988; Weary and Jacobson, 1997). The idea that uncertainty may 
arouse positive emotions related to awe is not new to the field of psychology. In the 
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words of Erich Fromm (1949), “The quest for certainty blocks the search for meaning. 
Uncertainty is the very condition to impel man to unfold his powers.” Despite the 
apparent assertion here that uncertainty is inspiring, Fromm (perhaps unwittingly) 
suggests a relationship between uncertainty and a search for meaning congenial to the 
present thesis. Certainty may be accompanied by the lack of a search for meaning 
(lacking not because individuals do not desire meaning, but because this desire has been 
satisfied by certainty).  
In conclusion, the uncertainty management assumption has received a great deal 
of empirical support (for a review of this literature, see Van den Bos, 2009a). The core 
underlying assertion of the uncertainty management literature posits that people carry a 
deep seated drive to feel certainty pertaining to their general knowledge structures 
(epistemic certainty) and self-relevant knowledge structures (existential certainty). 
Certainty lends meaning to existence, sets expectations for future events, and guides 
behavior (Hogg, 2007). As previously discussed, experiencing uncertainty is generally 
aversive, and therefore, the psychological reaction to the experience of uncertainty is to 
move away from it.  
Uncertainty Management Perspectives: Points of Agreement and Contention  
As with all families of interrelated theoretical perspectives, uncertainty 
management models harbor a set of shared premises which unite them under common 
themes. Here I use the term uncertainty management to refer to social psychological 
theoretical perspectives which focus on the human motivation to reduce uncertainty.  
Uncertainty management models find common ground in the assertion that uncertainty is 
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tends to be experienced as aversive. Thus, people generally exhibit a drive toward 
uncertainty reduction (Festinger, 1954; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Hogg and Mullin, 1999; 
Lopes, 1987; Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, and Tobin, 2001 Van den Bos, 2009a, Van Den 
Bos, 2009b; Van Den Bos, 2004, Van Den Bos, 2012; Hogg & Blaylock, 2012). 
Such perspectives generally posit that uncertainty is closely tied to insecurity, 
control, and threat. Some models, such as Jost et al.’s (2003) uncertainty threat model of 
system justification, tie uncertainty and threat specifically to political conservatism. Other 
models, such as Hogg’s (2007) uncertainty identity theory, suggest that uncertainty 
motivates rigid ideological views of any kind (for a similar perspective, see Greenberg 
and Jonas, 2003).  
Most uncertainty management perspectives suggest that some form of fluid 
compensation or compensatory conviction process occurs in order to psychologically 
reduce uncertainty (Hogg 2007; Jost et al., 2003; McGregor et al., 2001). According to 
uncertainty identity theory, this is accomplished primarily by identification of the self 
with a group, since they assert that the self is the critical reference point, or integrative 
framework, of perception (Hogg, 2007). Other models, however, allow for fluid 
compensation to occur with equal zealousness in any domain with which certainty about 
expected relations between people, things, and ideas (e.g. meaning) can be affirmed, 
including through the affirmation of cognitive schemata and cultural worldviews. In the 
present thesis, I suggest that cognitively defaulting to the status quo is a predictable 
psychological reaction to conditions of uncertainty, as a consideration of alternatives 
opens the psychological gateway to uncertainty.  
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Uncertainty management models may also differ in the specific type and scope of 
uncertainty they intend to study. Some theorists prefer to focus on certainty of a highly 
personal and self-relevant nature, directly related to chronic insecurity and anxiety, and 
therefore place an emphasis upon the need to reduce personal as opposed to 
informational uncertainty, or a more encompassing global uncertainty. Different models 
may focus upon specific facets of uncertainty (e.g. death thoughts) or closely related 
constructs (e.g. control, threat, anxiety), which overlap with the concept of uncertainty to 
varying degrees (Van den Bos, 2009a, Van Den Bos, 2012, Hogg & Blaylock, 2012). 
Early scholarship at the crossroads of psychology and economics, however, did not 
specify any such hot cognitions for empirical effects which could now be described as 
evidence of the uncertainty management assumption. Hence, I remain hesitant to narrow 
the scope from which I am to investigate psychological uncertainty’s relation to the status 
quo. A more global uncertainty might, for instance, activate a “fight, flight or freeze” 
response which affects multiple fluid compensation processes simultaneously. 
Related Theoretical Perspectives 
The uncertainty management perspective proffered herein stems from a collage of 
related theoretical conceptualizations. All uncertainty management models share the 
common assumption that experiencing uncertainty causes individuals to seek or affirm 
certainty through available means. This draws similarly with the central tenet of cognitive 
dissonance theory, which posits that a cognitive inconsistency provokes the need to be 
resolved or reduced. Some uncertainty theorists conceptualize cognitive dissonance as a 
type of personal uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009a). Though they employ markedly 
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different terminology, cognitive dissonance theory and uncertainty management theories 
serve to explain many of the same phenomena in a strikingly similar manner.  
Self Affirmation Theory (Steele, 1988) posits that people cope with dissonance by 
engaging in a process of fluid compensation, whereby the negative effects of an 
inconsistency in one domain can be ameliorated by psychologically emphasizing 
consistency in another self-relevant domain. This “hydraulic” compensatory model is 
also endorsed by most uncertainty management theorists and provides a cogent 
conceptual mechanism for how uncertainty is managed. The premise of fluid 
compensation applies to uncertainty management such that the negative effects of 
uncertainty in one domain can be ameliorated by affirming certainty in another domain. 
The compensatory conviction model of uncertainty reduction (McGregor et al., 2001), 
presents the idea of fluid compensation, which states that individuals respond to 
uncertainty threats by holding stronger to the worldviews which provide structure, 
meaning, and comfort in their lives (see Hogg and Blaylock, 2012, for a review).  
The affirmation of cultural worldviews and values ameliorates the negative 
experience associated with uncertainty because cultural worldviews and values are, in a 
generalized fashion, affirmative of epistemic and existential certainty. That is to say, 
cultural worldviews and values convey knowledge and meaning regarding relations 
between the self, others, and experiences in the social world, and are therefore 
epistemically and existentially palliative. This perspective is deeply influenced by the 
Meaning Maintenance Model (Proulx, 2012), pp. 82, which posits that “when mental 
representations of expected associations are violated by unexpected experiences, people 
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experience an uncomfortable arousal state that evokes the affirmation of alternative 
expected associations.”  
The uncertainty threat model was formulated as an account of what motivates 
individuals to cling to political conservatism and endorse system justifying behavior, and 
its hypotheses can be seen as an extension of system justification theory. Therefore, 
theories which focus directly on uncertainty management share much common with a 
system justification perspective. Indeed, many such ideas are incorporated into the 
current model, in which I assert that uncertainty directly relates to status quo preference 
(which is, according to system justification theorists, one of the two core components of 
political conservatism). Similarly, terror management theory was formulated as an 
account of the psychological reaction to existentially threatening thoughts of one’s own 
death. As will soon be discussed in the subsequent section, mortality salience can in some 
respects be conceptualized as a special case manifestation of global uncertainty. The 
above discussed theoretical models are perspectives which help us understand the 
mechanics of uncertainty management models and how uncertainty might ultimately 
relate to our dependent variable of interest: status quo preference. 
Uncertainty and Related Constructs 
Uncertainty’s close synonyms. Unpredictability and uncontrollability are two 
words which share a great deal of conceptual overlap with uncertainty, so much so that 
we consider them to be relatively core aspects of the construct of uncertainty. It is 
difficult to imagine a stimulus which invokes uncertainty without also invoking 
unpredictability or uncontrollability, and their social cognitive connotations are thus 
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jointly overlapping. Unpredictability and controllability may be considered as categorical 
features or subsets of uncertainty. A plethora of social psychological research 
demonstrates that people are motivated to perceive the world as predictable and 
controllable, and much of this research comfortably merges with the extant research on 
uncertainty (Allport, 1966; Kay et al. 2007; Van den Bos, 2009a, Plaks, Grant & Dweck, 
2005).  
Since unpredictability and uncontrollability are so intimately grafted to the 
construct of uncertainty in this way, we shall therefore not attempt to demonstrate that 
uncertainty influences outcomes independent of unpredictability and uncontrollability in 
the present experiments. Doing so would likely engender difficult to interpret data, as 
manipulating a construct and then statistically controlling for the effects of the 
manipulation is typically not recommended. In future research, the task of empirically 
and disentangling uncertainty from unpredictability and uncontrollability may be of 
interest, though such a task would be a relatively minor point in the context of the 
theoretical goals of the present studies. 
Unpredictability is a narrower subset within the broader construct of uncertainty. 
It is the future oriented aspect of uncertainty, as the word “predict” suggests an appraisal 
about future events, while the more global uncertainty can pertain to the present or past, 
and may therefore exclude notions of predictability. Uncontrollability is a narrower 
subset within the broader construct of unpredictability (and therefore, also uncertainty). 
There exist events which cannot be controlled by the perceiver yet can be predicted with 
scientific exactitude, such as political outcomes, weather outcomes, and the outcomes of 
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scientific research studies themselves. Control suggests the appraisal that one can affect 
outcomes. Some theorists suggest that that lack of control is associated with feelings of 
personal uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; Van den Bos, 2001). 
Control, however, may not be necessary or sufficient for uncertainty management 
effects to manifest. Many extreme uncertainty reducing ideologies and worldviews, for 
instance, relinquish personal control to external institutions and/or supernatural entities, 
while others emphasize agentic individualism. The psychological drive toward 
uncertainty management may be part of an evolutionarily ingrained mindset, set in 
motion by humanity’s quest for knowledge in the service of bettering one’s odds of 
survival. More directly, such processes may be seen as products of classical conditioning 
and/or the combined effect of various social, cognitive, and behavioral mechanisms. 
Social cognitive appraisals associated with uncertainty. Insecurity, threat, and 
anxiety are three constructs which may share a great deal of conceptual an experiential 
overlap with uncertainty, yet remain conceptually distinct from it. First it is important to 
note that each of these terms is unavoidably negative in connotation. The word insecurity 
has a long history in psychology, and tends to hold a personal connotation regarding 
expected relations between the self and others. In the attachment theory literature, 
insecure attachment styles tend to result from inconsistent caregiving behaviors, and may 
ultimately induce self-directed uncertainty and associated negative traits, such as low 
self-esteem (Bowlby 1969; 1973). Thus, insecurity appears to be both self-directed (e.g 
.personal), negative, and associated with uncertainties. Van den Bos (2009b) additionally 
asserts that insecurity has a more “chronic connotation” and that, “In a new social 
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context, most people would feel uncertain about what to do, but those with strong self-
security would probably be thinking they could learn what was needed and then be fine, 
whereas those with low levels of self-security might think that others were looking down 
on them.” Insecurity is more emotional compared to personal uncertainty (and therefore 
also global uncertainty) (Sverke & Hellgren, 2002).An insecure person might be 
described as harboring doubts about their skills and abilities (Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 
2006). Like insecurity, threat, is also connotatively negative, and often accompanies the 
experience of uncertainty (Jost et al 2003a; Van den Bos, 2009a, 2009b).  
Threat tends to be construed as a situational appraisal while insecurity tends to be 
construed as a personality level appraisal, though some individuals may be chronically 
threatened, just as insecurity may be situation-specific. Threat is likely to elicit safety 
seeking behavior. Indeed, need for safety is activated by threat appraisals (Sloan, & 
Telch, 2002). Some programs of uncertainty management research focus on “personal 
uncertainty,” in which threat is more directly implicated (relative to global uncertainty; 
Van den Bos, 2009). Anxiety is an affective state which many theorists implicate as 
related to, insecurity, threat, and uncertainty (Anson et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2003a). 
Uncertainty may elicit threat appraisals, which cause anxiety.  
Anxiety is a negatively valenced emotional state which includes fear, 
apprehension, and worry (Rosen & Schulkin 1998). Anxiety can be described as 
exhibiting cognitive, emotional, behavioral and physiological components. Anxiety is 
closely related to threat, as diffuse elements of danger tend to be present in the experience 
of anxiety (Seligman, Walker, & Rosenhan, 2001). Developmental psychology research 
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also indicates that anxiety disorders are related to a sense of control (Barlow, 2000). 
Freud (1936) recognized anxiety as a threatening "signal of danger" which causes 
individuals to engage in defense mechanisms. See Table 1 for a chart of key 
distinguishing features among the concepts described above. 
Table 1. Uncertainty and Related Constructs 
Related constructsa Distinguishing points 
  
 
Relatively proximal to global uncertainty 
Unpredictability  Unpredictability may be looked at as a component or subset within the 
broader construct of uncertainty.  
 It is the future/outcome oriented aspect of uncertainty.  
  
Uncontrollability  Uncontrollability may be looked at as a component or subset within the 
broader construct of unpredictability.  
 There are cases when one can accurately predict, but not control an 
outcome. 
  
Relatively more distal to global uncertainty 
Threat 
 
 Situational connotation.  
 Acutely experienced.  
 Relatively intense and stimulus specific.  
  
Insecurity  Self-emotional connotation.  
 Often analyzed at the personality-level. 
 A cognitive-emotional evaluation of a feeling state.  
 This includes components of “uncertainty or anxiety about oneself; 
lack of confidence” (Merriam-Webster, 2015). 
 Insecurity implies feelings of being “not protected,” “nervous and 
uncomfortable.” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015) 
  
Mortality salience/Death 
thought accessibility 
 Stimulus specific towards thoughts about death.  
 Narrower (more local as opposed to global) theoretical breadth 
compared to Uncertainty Management literature.  
 
  
Anxiety 
 
 Primarily thought of as an affective state, yet exhibits all of cognitive, 
emotional, behavioral and physiological components.  
 Anxiety correlates with a breadth of negative affective states, including 
of fear, apprehension, and worry.  
 Exhibits a range of presentations from acute to diffuse; across varying 
situations, times, and persons.  
  
a We shall not attempt to demonstrate that uncertainty influences outcomes independent of these constructs.
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Uncertainty and mortality salience. Due to Uncertainty Management and Terror 
Management perspectives’ shared theoretical territory (namely, their relation to the above 
constructs, as well Meaning Maintenance and System Justification perspectives), some 
scholarship has taken a look at the relation between the constructs of uncertainty and 
mortality salience (Van den Bos 2004, Van den Bos, 2009a, Anson et al. 2009). Both 
camps would be in agreement that uncertainty is to be considered a broader and more 
inclusive construct than the narrower construct of mortality salience. Terror Management 
theorists suggest that a key consequence of uncertainty salience is the activation of death 
related thought (Anson et al., 2009). Conversely, Uncertainty Management theorists 
suggest that a key consequence of mortality salience is the activation of uncertainty 
related thoughts (Van den Bos 2004; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).  
Both death thoughts and uncertainty salience are tied to each of the related 
constructs discussed in the previous section, in extremely similar ways. From an 
Uncertainty Management perspective, primes of mortality salience can be viewed as a 
kind of indirect manipulation of uncertainty, which is believed to be the more central 
psychological construct of the two in respect to dependent phenomena of their mutual 
interest. Van den Bos (2004) reasoned that if this were the case, then it naturally would 
follow that compared to a mortality salience manipulation, an uncertainty salience 
manipulation should more directly affect the dependent variable of mutual interest, in this 
case “cultural worldviews.” 
Indeed, when comparing the effects of an uncertainty salience versus mortality 
salience manipulation upon an identical dependent variable assessing cultural 
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worldviews, using identical methods and procedure, uncertainty salience tends to produce 
the strongest effects (Van den Bos 2004; Van den Bos et al. 2005, Van den Bos 2004). 
Such research provides empirical support for the claim that the relatively “local” 
psychological processes implicated in terror management theory are superseded or 
engulfed by more global ones (i.e. uncertainty management). Van den Bos (2004) make 
important note that, “I hasten to note that, in my opinion, all this should not necessarily 
be taken as a refutation of terror management theory, but, rather, an attempt to 
incorporate at least some elements of it into a broader framework.”  
Van den Bos (2004) further states, 
I would like to stress that I am not saying here that the research findings that were 
reviewed in this chapter imply that uncertainty concerns underlie all terror 
management effects. In all likelihood, I would predict that future research will 
show that nonexistence does have a motivational force, over and beyond the 
uncertainty aspects that may be related to reminders of mortality, and I am 
therefore not arguing that fear of termination of life, nonexistence, and decay are 
just side effects of uncertainty with no motivational properties. There are no data 
that speak to this latter position, and personally I think that it would be 
unreasonable to expect that in the future there will be data that will show this.  
(p. 178) 
Some elements of terror management theory may be part of a broader theoretical 
framework related to uncertainty management, while other elements of the theory are 
uniquely associated with the psychology of death. Both terror management and 
uncertainty management perspectives address issues related to the veneration of cultural 
worldviews, system justification, and a host of related constructs (such as those discussed 
in the previous sections). These similar elements may therefore harbor shared 
implications regarding their effects upon status quo preference. Both conceptually and 
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empirically, it appears that the uncertainty management framework may be better suited 
to describe the present phenomena of interest. 
General Conclusions 
The diverse array of theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence reviewed 
above appears to advance a theoretical position which asserts that humans harbor a deep 
seated need to manage uncertainty. Uncertainty management models assert that since 
uncertainty tends to accompany negative experiential cognitive and affective states, it 
must be psychologically reduced. From a symbolic perspective, “uncertainty” represents 
the unknown or other, and is associated with negative qualities. Conversely, certainty 
represents the known or similar, and is associated with positive qualities. According to 
uncertainty management models, individuals are motivated to invoke a variety of social 
and cognitive mechanisms in order to reduce feelings of uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OVERVIEW OF THEORY, HYPOTHESES,  
AND METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY  
Theoretical Assertions and Goals 
I hypothesize that psychological support for the status quo is a direct and potent 
mechanism of subjective uncertainty reduction. Reality (that which exists, the status quo) 
is psychologically connected with “the known” in contrast to its alternative, which is 
connected with “the unknown.” Knowledge and meaning can be derived from that which 
is known or certain; while these qualities cannot be derived from that which is unknown 
or uncertain. Thus, a challenge to one’s sense of certainty is poised to result in an 
increased preference for the status quo, in the service of motivated uncertainty reduction.  
In its most skeletal form, my theoretical framework posits the following 
premises.1) Humans fundamentally seek the affirmation of expected relations (meaning) 
in the social and material world, rooted in an innate desire to know the world (epistemic 
motivation) and the self’s relation to it (existential motivation). 2) Uncertainty is 
antithetical to this goal. 3) The experience of heightened uncertainty, therefore, produces 
a psychological response which motivates the individual to reduce it by affirming 
meaning (expected relations) by available psychological means. Extending from a 
conceptual synthesis of these premises, I uniquely posit that 4) in the face of uncertainty, 
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individuals experience a heightened desire to affirm the status quo (that which signifies 
tangible reality, without which meaning would be impossible to conceive). 
Herein, I adopt a theoretical perspective which proposes that the need to maintain 
certainty compels people to cling to ideologies and worldviews which bolster the known 
and certain; the binding thread of which is best captured by the term status quo. I should 
also note that due to variation in terminology over time, some theorists (Fromm 1949; 
1994) might prefer to use the term existential in describing this uncertainty, while more 
recent scholarship speaks of nearly identical principles in terms of epistemic certainty 
(Hogg & Blaylock, 2012). Regardless, most if not all parties engaged in this line of 
inquiry would agree that epistemic and existential certainty shine from the same source 
and/or represent different approaches toward understanding the same root phenomena of 
humankind’s search for knowledge and meaning in the social world. I do not set out to 
empirically distinguish between epistemic vs. existential uncertainty in the present 
research project, in part due to the idiosyncratic nature of how these terms relate to one 
another in the lexicon of social psychology, though this issue may attract further 
investigation by interested parties. 
Distinction Between Present Approach and Previous Work 
I intend to establish a direct cause-effect relationship between uncertainty 
management needs and status quo preference by empirically demonstrating that 
experimental manipulations of uncertainty foster heightened endorsements of the status 
quo, as manifested by several measures.  
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A variety of studies suggest that “epistemic” and “existential” needs compel 
people toward system justifying policies and movements, yet this line of research is 
correlational, not experimental (Hennes et al. 2012). Moreover, existing research 
demonstrates that challenging one’s cultural worldviews causally relates to status quo 
reference (Jost, Chaikalis-Petritsis, Abrams, Sidanius, van der Toorn, & Bratt, 2012; for a 
review, see Jost & Napier, 2012), yet the focus of these studies is unrelated to either 
uncertainty management or mortality salience. 
The empirical research reviewed in the previous chapters strongly suggests a link 
between psychological uncertainty and conservative (or “system justifying”) values, of 
which preference for the status quo can be considered a central component (Jost et al. 
2003). Notably however, the (Jost et al. 2003) review made its case almost entirely based 
upon correlational evidence. Additionally, there exists research demonstrating that 
mortality salience and uncertainty salience each independently affect attitudes toward 
cherished cultural norms and values, though the authors fail to mention any tie ins to the 
concept of status quo preference (For a review, see Van den Bos, 2004). Moreover, the 
theoretical implications of these studies are hotly contested; even over a decade after the 
inception of theoretical claims within the field regarding the conceptualization of, and 
interrelation between, the constructs of uncertainty, mortality salience, and cultural 
worldviews.  
There are a variety of explanations for why this might be the case. As argued by 
Jost et al. (2004), various conceptual perspectives regarding both the constructs and 
formulation of the specific research questions of interest make it “Extremely difficult to 
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empirically distinguish between proximal fears that are related versus unrelated to the 
fear of death,” (p. 268) in relation to political ideology and cultural worldviews. The 
“extreme difficulty” of this task is debatable, but may require methods other than those 
used by Jost and colleagues, such as utilizing true experiments, comparing side by side 
manipulations of the focal constructs, or controlling for the effects of the purportedly 
lesser variable, to name a few possible strategies. Various theorists conceptualize and 
define these constructs differently, often opting for the conceptual definition and 
overarching theoretical perspective which aligns most harmoniously with their own body 
of empirical findings. Unfortunately, when a large majority of evidence in favor of a 
theory is offered by the researchers who conceptualized it, it is difficult to divorce this 
self-interested aspect of one’s perspective when careers and scientific legacies are on the 
line. Thus, outsider perspectives proffered by researchers who don’t have a personal stake 
in the outcome of these debates stand to contribute greatly to the understanding of such 
concepts, which are rather wide in breadth and difficult to pin down with succinct 
conceptual definitions fully accepted by all interested parties.  
In the process of synthesizing such empirical and theoretical observations, 
questions naturally arise pertaining to 1) the specification of the fundamental construct(s) 
underlying the need to seek meaning and 2) how the quest to seek meaning tangibly 
affects social judgments of real consequence. To address the former question, I have 
suggested that uncertainty plays a central role in motivating individuals to seek meaning. 
To address the latter question, I have suggested that the status quo, which connotes the 
known and certain, is a direct conduit by which individuals move away from uncertainty 
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and towards certainty. Insofar as the status quo is a particularly direct mode of 
uncertainty reduction, it is no coincidence then that evaluations of the status quo are both 
deeply affected by uncertainty and also are of weighty societal consequence. In order to 
demonstrate such a theoretical proposition, the primary task is to empirically demonstrate 
a cause-effect relationship between experimentally manipulated uncertainty (and 
mortality salience) and various indices of status quo preference (a methodology which to 
my knowledge no researcher has yet attempted).  
The prior scholarship reviewed strongly implies such a relationship, linking 
uncertainty to the status quo by degrees of separation with respect to related constructs. 
Yet, a direct conceptual tie between the two constructs lacks to be established 
empirically, despite the recognition of this connection enjoying a rich theoretical history 
in the philosophical tradition of existentialism, corroborated by contemporary empirical 
evidence consistent with its premises. Therefore, a direct causal link begs to be 
established with regards to thoughts about uncertainty and status quo preference.  
I discussed earlier how Van den Bos and colleagues applied their broader, more 
global theoretical perspective to synthesize and interpret previous empirical research 
conducted in the name of terror management theory. They posited that uncertainty, being 
the more central construct, would outpace mortality salience with respect to the predicted 
effect shared by both theories. This is because mortality salience, they hypothesized, was 
to some extent an indirect prime of uncertainty. Van den Bos and colleagues posited 
uncertainty itself (and not specifically death uncertainty) to be the core construct of 
interest with regards to meaning maintenance via the endorsement of cultural 
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worldviews. In this way, their theoretical framework offered itself as broader in 
application and more direct in effects produced when compared to terror management 
theory. Van den Bos and colleagues suggest that some evidence offered in support terror 
management theory can also be construed as indirect evidence of uncertainty 
management perspectives. An experiment was then concocted in order to establish a case 
for direct causal evidence in support of their account. Analogously, the heretofore 
reviewed evidence which we interpret to be in support of our uncertainty account of 
status quo preference is at present only indirect evidence of its existence. A direct causal 
demonstration remains to be empirically established.  
Specifically, in relation to the extant studies, there are currently no known studies 
in which both uncertainty and mortality salience are manipulated experimentally, with 
dependent variables addressing the construct of status quo preference. This sets the 
current experiments apart from previous studies which: a) do not employ experimental 
manipulations b) investigate the relation between mortality salience and death with no 
reference to status quo preference and c) investigate status quo preference without 
reference to one of the variables (mortality salience or uncertainty). Our most 
fundamental theoretical claim is that heightened uncertainty salience causes an increase 
in preference for the status quo, and that such an effect is not due solely to other 
psychological constructs potentially activated by uncertainty salience manipulations, such 
as mortality salience, but also feelings such as insecurity, threat, and anxiety potentially 
triggered by these constructs.  
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Hypothesis 1: Uncertainty Engenders Preference for Status Quo 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that heightened uncertainty salience (situationally 
manipulated) causes an increase in preference for the status quo, broadly construed. 
While a variety of heretofore reviewed empirical evidence can be interpreted as 
consistent with this general hypothesis, this core proposition awaits to be directly 
empirically tested in the context of the theoretical perspective expounded upon herein, 
with status quo preference as the outcome variable. This model uniquely proposes that 
motivated status quo preference is directly tied to psychologically deep-seated 
uncertainty management drives, such that manipulating uncertainty salience should result 
in heighted status quo preference. 
Hypothesis 2: Multiplicative Dispositional Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) further posits that various moderating factors, including 
generalized individual differences in general appraisals of uncertainty, system justifying 
attitudes and worldviews, and non-ideological sociopolitical indicators will magnify the 
core effects as predicted by hypothesis 1. That is to say, I hypothesize that high levels of 
chronic uncertainty will increase participant sensitivity to the experimental manipulation, 
magnifying the size of the predicted effect of the uncertainty manipulation (H1).  
However, it is alternately possible that individuals possessing high levels of 
chronic uncertainty may be relatively less affected by the experimental manipulation as 
specified by H1, if such individuals’ uncertainty already resides at a near-ceiling level. 
Herein lie two complementary sets of hypotheses regarding the size and direction of the 
effects of H1, when entering moderators into the equation. The former hypothesis (H2) is 
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that which is expected, while the latter (H2’s) subordinate hypothesis may provide a 
fruitful explanation if evidence for H2 is not garnered.  
Hypothesis 2(x). The three sets of Hypotheses 2(x, y, z) are essentially analogous 
in structure, with each (x, y, z) indicating the different conceptual categories of the 
moderators (appraisals of uncertainty, system justifying attitudes and worldviews, and 
non-ideological sociopolitical indicators respectively). Thus, nested within H2 is H2(x), 
which specifically posits that individual differences in generalized appraisals of 
uncertainty will magnify the core effects predicted by H1. Stated otherwise, H2(x) 
predicts that individuals for whom uncertainty and closely related concepts are 
chronically accessible and/or highly negative, the effects of situationally induced 
uncertainty upon status quo preference will be magnified. 
I have presently chosen two crucial, well established measures to assess different 
aspects of this larger construct (uncertainty appraisals). The first is the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS), which measures a generalized intolerance or aversion toward 
uncertainty (Buhr, & Dugas, 2002). The IUS exhibits a four-factor structure representing 
the degree to which uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, uncertainty leads to the 
inability to act, uncertain events are negative and should be avoided, and uncertainty is 
associated with unfairness. Sample items include: “Uncertainty makes me uneasy, 
anxious, or stressed.” and “It’s unfair having no guarantees in life.” Second is the highly 
similar Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (IAS), which was designed to assess self-report 
attitudes toward ambiguity, defining “ambiguous” situations as those which cannot be 
“adequately structured or categorized due to of insufficient cues” (Budner, 1962). Sample 
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items include, “An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't 
know too much.” and “People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how 
complicated things really are.”  
Hypothesis 2(y). Analogously, nested within H2 is H2(y), which specifically 
suggests that system justifying attitudes and worldviews will magnify the core effects 
predicted by H1. It is this hypothesis which underlies the theoretical core of this 
dissertation. I have presently chosen six measures to assess different aspects of this larger 
construct. First is a basic measure of left-right political ideology. Next is the American 
System Justification Scale (SJS) (Kay & Jost, 2003). The SJS was designed to indicate 
"perceptions of the fairness, legitimacy, and justifiability of the prevailing social system" 
(Kay & Jost, 2003, p. 828). Sample items include: “In general, the American political 
system operates as it should.” and “American society needs to be radically restructured. 
Additionally, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was measured with the SDO-6 scale, 
which includes items such as: “It would be good if groups could be equal.” (reverse 
coded) and “It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups 
are at the bottom.” Additionally, I include the most recent version of the Belief in a Just 
World (BJW) scale, which is intended to measure the extent to which individuals believe 
in a just world (i.e. a world where people get what they deserve, a fair and just world; 
Lucas, Zhdanova, & Alexander, 2011). This scale contains items such as: “I feel that 
other people generally earn the rewards and punishments they get in this world.” “Other 
people usually use fair procedures in dealing with others.” “I generally deserve the things 
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I am accorded.” and “I feel that people generally use methods that are fair in their 
evaluation of me.” 
Hypothesis 2(z). Analogously, nested within H2 is H2(z), which specifically 
suggests that non-ideological sociopolitical factors will moderate the core effects 
predicted by H1. This set of hypotheses is primarily exploratory in nature, and this 
variable grouping consists of items such as political participation and attention to politics. 
Each of these measures has been previously validated, and each scale mentioned consists 
of only one or two items. Thus, though this list sounds time consuming, this section 
consists of no more than 13 items, the typical length of a single scale. 
The “interactive” approaches heretofore described under the heading 
“Multiplicative Dispositional Hypotheses” posit that individual differences with regards 
to a variety of thematically connected psychological construct groupings interact with 
situational primes of uncertainty in a non-additive, but rather multiplicative manner. For 
example, individuals high in aversion toward uncertainty are hypothesized to be more 
“reactive” to situational conditions priming uncertainty, thus magnifying their pre-
existing attitudes and proclivities. 
Summarizing the above, we hypothesize that the effects described in Hypothesis 1 
will be strongest among those for whom uncertainty and ambiguity are particularly 
distressing, since these individuals are expected to possess a greater innate need to 
engage in palliative, uncertainty reducing cognitive processes (i.e. those resulting in 
greater status quo preference) [H2(x)]. Analogously, adherence to system justifying 
worldviews is hypothesized to magnify the effects of primed uncertainty upon status quo 
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preference H2(y); our primary variable grouping of interest. Similarly, we hypothesize 
that non-ideological socio political indicators, may moderate the relation between the 
primes and dependent variables in an analogous fashion, though predictions in this 
variable grouping [H2(z)] are primarily exploratory, lacking previous theoretical 
establishment. The basic prediction here is that individuals who feel more politically 
involved (high attention, interest, et cetera) should exhibit a magnification/polarization of 
attitudes since they have the largest personal stake/self-identification with the content 
area at hand. 
Hypothesis 3: Additive Dispositional Hypotheses 
Alternatively, whereas the hypotheses outlined above presume an interaction of 
the dispositional variables with the situationally manipulated independent variable 
(uncertainty and mortality salience primes), Hypotheses 3(x), 3(y), and 3(z) predict that 
the effects of the dispositional variables will combine additively (but not multiplicatively) 
with the effect of the prime to produce status quo preference). While the “additive” vs. 
“multiplicative” distinction may seem tedious, it is specified here in order to thoroughly 
characterize the structure of the underlying process mechanisms generating the effects of 
interest. I gauge the underlying mechanisms as being more consistent with a 
multiplicative structure as described in the previous section, though the possibility of a 
merely additive model may also be noted. In other words, the additive hypotheses are not 
specifically predicted, but serve as a counterpoint to the multiplicative hypotheses 
outlined above. 
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H3 and subsequent nested hypotheses are directionally consistent with the H2 
hypotheses stated above, yet predict only simple effects of the situational and 
dispositional IV’s, without significant interaction effects (in the context of a hierarchical 
linear regression data analysis approach, significance at Step1[main effects], but not Step 
2[interactive/multiplicative effects]). If the additive (non-interactive) perspective is 
correct, each of these simple effects (corresponding to the variables in the three families 
of dispositional effects [the moderator variables], and the uncertainty prime) would exert 
themselves independently of one another. Thus, the moderator would not 
magnify/polarize attitudinal differences resulting from the prime, but rather contribute in 
an additive manner with the influence of the primes in predicting the dependent variables. 
Hypothesis 3(x). Nested within H3 is H3(x), which specifically posits that 
individual differences in generalized appraisals of uncertainty will be directly correlated 
with status quo preference, while not affecting the magnitude of any effects produced by 
the uncertainty prime.  
Hypothesis 3(y). Nested within H3 is H3(y), which specifically posits that 
individual differences in system justifying attitudes and worldviews will be directly 
correlated with status quo preference, while not affecting the magnitude of any effects 
produced by the uncertainty prime. 
Hypothesis 3(z). Nested within H3 is H3(z), which specifically posits that 
individual differences in sociopolitical indicators will be directly correlated with status 
quo preference, while not affecting the magnitude of any effects produced by the 
uncertainty prime. 
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Control and Mediating Variables 
All previously mentioned predictions will first be tested for the raw effect, 
without entering control variables or testing for mediation. Second, these hypotheses will 
be tested controlling for the four “Thoughts and Feelings Measures” (see Appendix) in 
the regression model. Note that “controls” refers to these measures, while “control 
condition” refers to participants randomly assigned to the control prime. These four 
measures entail asking the participants the degree to which they thought about or felt: 
“death and dying,” “anxious,” “insecure,” and “threatened.” Lastly, each of the 
moderational regression models was tested for mediated moderation criteria with the 
“thoughts and feelings measures.” Since it is not possible to test for mediated moderation 
when the same variable serves both as a control and a mediator, the mediational tests of 
moderation were performed without controls.  
The initial reason for including the “thoughts and feelings measures” was for 
them to be looked at as control variables, with the mediational tests largely being an 
afterthought. We expect the “with controls” analyses to demonstrate that any effects of 
uncertainty on status quo preference remain significant even after controlling for these 
measures. Additionally, replicating prior research, the Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS) will be measured “to find out whether unintended effects of the salience 
manipulation on the positive and negative subsets are found.” (Van den Bos et al. 2005, 
p. 96). The inclusion of this scale following the prime can also be said to operate as both 
a time delay, and possible filler task. 
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Hypotheses Overview 
Core hypotheses.  
H1.  Uncertainty/Mortality Salience (situationally manipulated) →Status Quo 
Preference 
H2.  Multiplicative Dispositional Hypotheses. Moderating factors expected to 
magnify the effect specified by H1.  
Interactive hypotheses.  
H2x.  Uncertainty Salience * Generalized appraisals of uncertainty → Status 
Quo Preference 
H2y.  Uncertainty Salience * System justifying attitudes and worldviews 
→Status Quo Preference 
H2z.  Uncertainty Salience * (non- ideological) sociopolitical indicators 
→Status Quo Preference 
Additive dispositional hypotheses.  
H3x.  Uncertainty Salience + Generalized appraisals of uncertainty → Status 
Quo Preference 
H3y.  Uncertainty Salience + System justifying attitudes and worldviews → 
Status Quo Preference 
H3z.  Uncertainty Salience + (non- ideological) sociopolitical indicators→ 
Status Quo Preference 
Following from these hypotheses, I shall perform two experiments. Experiment 1 
will employ a manipulation with three conditions: uncertainty salience, mortality 
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salience, and control group salience (essentially identical to the setup employed by Van 
den Bos et al., 2005, utilizing the Life Event Inventory (LEI) method (see Appendix). 
The moderating variables previously discussed will be additionally included, along with 
the controls and tests of mediation to be described. After Experiment 1, a pilot test will be 
performed to field different methods of priming the experimentally manipulated mental 
states in a manner different from the LEI. Experiment 2 will then utilize this different 
method of uncertainty, mortality salience, and control induction, testing the same 
hypotheses as Experiment 1; a near replication with variation in the independent variable 
priming method. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was primarily conceived to test core hypothesis (H1) and variations, 
which state that uncertainty (situationally manipulated) triggers heightened levels of 
status quo preference. This hypothesis remains to be conceived and tested as such. 
Furthermore, the moderational/interactive hypotheses will demonstrate the degree to 
which individual difference variables related to the three moderator variable groupings of 
uncertainty appraisals (H2x), system justifying attitudes and worldviews (H2y) and other 
non-ideological social and political variables (H2z) influence any relation between our 
prime and the dependent variables, representing various facets of status quo preference. 
Such research questions and their methodological operationalization as described herein 
build upon the previous studies cited, yet are in themselves novel and a logical step 
forward in the investigation of such issues, allowing for new insights into established 
theoretical perspectives such as the Uncertainty Management and System Justification 
theories. 
Design 
This experiment included one manipulated categorical independent variable with 
three between subject levels (uncertainty salience, mortality salience, control), a battery 
of the thirteen continuous moderators to be fielded as second independent variable in 
successive models, and a hybrid measure of “thoughts and feelings” pertaining to threat, 
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insecurity, death, and anxiety serving as controls in the appropriate “with controls” 
models (see Appendix for these measures as they appear). The dependent variable 
consisted of three distinct assessments of status quo preference as gauged via three scales 
triangulating the construct; including Status Quo Preference Scale (higher values 
indicating higher preference), Attitudes Towards Reformers (higher values indicating 
more negative attitudes) and Support for Regime Change (higher values indicating more 
support). 
Independent variable manipulation. In the first experiment, I manipulated 
uncertainty in a manner operationally identical to that of the uncertainty salience priming 
procedure introduced by Van den Bos (2001), based on prior uncertainty management 
studies (For a review, see Van den Bos, 2005, 2009). According to this procedure, 
participants are asked the following: a) “Please briefly describe the emotions that the 
thought of being uncertain arouses in you” and (b) “Please write down, as specifically as 
you can, what you think physically will happen to you as you feel uncertain.” This 
manipulation has been extensively utilized within the uncertainty management literature 
and has firmly demonstrated itself to be a valid and effectual method for inducing state 
uncertainty. In addition to the uncertainty condition, I manipulated mortality salience in 
the same manner as Van den Bos et al. (2005), who was the first to compare the effects of 
manipulations of uncertainty salience and mortality salience side by side. 
The uncertainty manipulation introduced by Van den Bos (2001) was structurally 
based upon the mortality salience prime most commonly found in the terror management 
literature (Greenberg et al. 1997). The original terror management manipulation asked 
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participants the following: (a) “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of 
your death arouses in you” and (b) “Please write down, as specifically as you can, what 
you think physically will happen to you as you die.” The Van den Bos et al. (2001) 
uncertainty manipulation simply reads “(a) Please briefly describe the emotions that the 
thought of your being uncertain arouses in you. (b) Please write down, as specifically as 
you can, what you think physically will happen to you as you feel uncertain. The control 
condition reads (a) “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your 
watching TV arouses in you. (b) Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you 
think physically will happen to you as you watch TV.” 
This mortality salience manipulation pairs well with the uncertainty manipulation, 
as explained by van Den Bos et al. (2005),  
By thus replacing “death” with “uncertain” in the most commonly used 
manipulation of terror management theory, while leaving everything else the 
same, the uncertainty salience manipulation was constructed in such a way that it 
very closely resembled the mortality salience manipulation. As a result, the 
impact of these two manipulations on people's reactions toward transgressions 
and affirmation of important cultural norms and values could be investigated in a 
way that yielded a very clean and hence meaningful comparison between the two 
manipulations.  
Dependent measures. I employed three dependent variables indexing important 
aspects of status quo preference. First employed is the Status Quo Preference Scale, 
originally developed by myself for use in a separate line of research. It has subsequently 
been modified, with a reduction in the number of items from its original 16 down to 9 
items. This was done by running a reliability analysis (Cronbach, 1951) on the original 16 
items, and removing the item which, if removed, would result in the greatest increase in 
the overall alpha coefficient of the scale. This procedure was recursively applied one item 
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at a time until the scale’s alpha coefficient rose above the .70 level, generally recognized 
as “good” reliability. The resulting status quo preference scale contains 9 items with 
Cronbach’s alpha = .736. Sample items in this scale include: “Change is in life is 
necessary for success.” and “Change in life usually comes with great costs” (see 
Appendix for the scale as it appears).  
The second dependent measure, Attitudes Towards Reformers is included, as 
O’Brien and Crandall (2005) make the case that that negatively judging social actors who 
engage in reform represents a key component in the social cognition of status quo 
preference. This scale contains six short items, including “Those who protest the political 
system are usually looking for handouts and unrealistic quick fixes.” and “Those who 
attempt to reform the system usually have ulterior motives.” The third and final 
dependent measure, Support for Regime Change, contains six items gauging agreement 
with a variety of statements regarding attitudes towards Regime Change. Sample items 
include “I like to see government change their leaders often, rather than rarely.” and 
“When the political rulers of a country become ineffective, they should be removed 
swiftly.” These three scales, including the 9 item status quo preference scale, the 6 item 
attitudes towards reformers scale, and the 6 item support for regime change scale, 
compose the entirety of the dependent variable battery.  
Positive and Negative Affect Scale. As in Van den Bos et al. (2005), the Positive 
Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), were 
measured “to find out whether unintended effects of the salience manipulation on the 
positive and negative subsets are found” (p. 96). This scale is composed of two 10-item 
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subscales addressing the factors of positive and negative affect. As demonstrated by prior 
researchers utilizing this same procedure (e.g. Jost, J. T., Chaikalis-Petritsis, V., Abrams, 
D., Sidanius, J., Toorn, J. van der, & Bratt, C. ,2012; Van den Bos et al., 2006), we 
hypothesized that the uncertainty manipulation will have no effect upon either subscale of 
the PANAS. Thus, in accordance with precedent set by prior research, we predicted that 
this manipulation check would demonstrate that mere positive or negative affect cannot 
be held responsible for any effects of the prime upon the dependent measures. This 
allows us to assert that the experimental manipulation exerts its effects upon the 
dependent variables as a result of uncertainty’s proposed psychological functions as 
outlined in this dissertation, and not simply by uncertainty changing global positive or 
negative affective. 
Manipulation check, control, and potential mediating variables. 
Subsequently, the three manipulation check items were administered, in which 
participants were asked the extent to which they thought about: uncertainty, death, or 
television (the control topic). These three questions served as the manipulation check 
questions, as they reflect thoughts corresponding to the three randomly assigned 
experimental conditions (see Appendix). Next, the four “thoughts and feelings measures” 
were assessed, asking participants the extent to which: “I thought about or felt death and 
dying,” “I thought about or felt anxious.” “I thought about or felt insecure.” and “I 
thought about or felt threatened.” These four variables serve as the control variables for 
the “with controls” regression models; and alternatively serve as potential mediators in 
the mediational models. 
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Measures of moderating variables. The moderators introduced previously 
appear here. These variables tend to cluster into the three conceptual categories, 
“uncertainty appraisals,” “system justifying attitudes and worldviews” and “non-
ideological sociopolitical indicators.” 
Individual difference measures. 
Uncertainty appraisals.  
M1. UIS (Uncertainty Intolerance Scale) 
M2. IAS (Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale) 
System justifying attitudes and worldviews. 
M3. (SJS) System Justification Scale 
M4. SDO (Social Dominance Orientation) 
M5. Belief in a Just World Scale 
M6. Political Ideology (liberal vs. conservative) 
M7. Partisanship (Party Identification) 
Sociopolitical indicators (non-ideological). (Note: Each of the following are 1 or 
2 item measures). 
M8. Trust in Government 
M9. Political Self-Efficacy 
M10. Political Interest 
M11. Political Attention 
M12. Knowledge 
M13. Voting intention 
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Participants and Procedure 
Participants were accessed and recruited via Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online 
research recruitment tool which offers quick access to a representative, non-university 
sample. 194 American individuals participated in the study arranged through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Participants were informed that they will be asked to perform tasks 
such as writing about personal experiences, in addition to reporting a variety of their own 
opinions and attitudes. Experimental materials were administered on participants’ home 
computers, using a securely encrypted third party service for data acquisition and storage 
accessible only to the primary investigator. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions (uncertainty, mortality salience, control). The survey questionnaires were 
presented in the following order: Random assignment to IV condition, PANAS, DVs, 
manipulation checks, controls and mediators, potential moderating variables. 
Experiment 1 Results 
Manipulation check. There was a statistically significant mean difference in the 
uncertainty salience manipulation check item self-report ratings (see Appendix) between 
the three randomly assigned, experimentally manipulated independent variable 
conditions, (F(2, 190) = 40.914, p < .001, η2 = .301). Post-hoc comparisons using 
Tukey’s HSD indicated that the mean rating (with higher numbers indicating higher 
levels of uncertainty) in the uncertainty condition (M = 5.773, SD = 1.796) was 
significantly greater than the mean rating for both the mortality salience condition (M = 
4.419, SD = 2.177; p < .001), and the control topic salience condition (M = 2.692, SD = 
1.879; p < .001). The mortality salience condition was significantly greater than the 
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control topic salience condition on uncertainty salience manipulation check ratings (p < 
.001). Thus, the uncertainty prime produced more uncertainty salience than the control 
and mortality salience conditions. The mortality salience condition produced greater 
uncertainty compared to the control condition, but not as much as in the uncertainty 
condition. For differences between groups, see the items “Uncertainty salience check,” 
“Control topic salience check,” and “Mortality salience check” in Tables 2 and 3. 
There emerged a statistically significant mean difference in the control topic 
salience check ratings between the three manipulated independent variable conditions, F 
(2,190) = 100.417, p < .001, η2 = .514). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the mean rating for the uncertainty condition (M = 2.015, SD = 1.650) was 
significantly less than the mean rating for the control topic salience condition (M = 6.031, 
SD = 1.667; p < .001). The mortality salience condition mean rating (M = 2.194, SD = 
2.126) was also significantly less than the control topic condition on control topic 
salience/manipulation check ratings (p < .001). Thus, the control topic (television) prime 
produced more salience for that particular topic, but not the others. 
 
  
62 
Table 2. ANOVA of Manipulation Check and Thoughts/Feelings Variables by Condition, Study 1 
 Uncertainty  Mortality salience  Control     
Between groups effect M SD  M SD  M SD F p η2 Tukey’s HSD 
 
Uncertainty salience 
check 5.773*** 1.796  4.419*** 2.177  2.692*** 1.879 40.914 
 < 
.001 .301 2, 3 < 1; 3 < 2 
Control topic salience 
check 2.015*** 1.650  2.194*** 2.126  6.031*** 1.667 100.417 
 < 
.001 .514 1, 2 < 3 
Mortality salience 
check 2.530*** 2.017  6.177*** 1.454  1.785*** 1.452 125.351 
 < 
.001 .569 1 < 2; 1, 2 > 3 
Death thoughts 
2.546*** 1.874  5.597*** 1.531  1.769*** 1.389 99.201 
 < 
.001 .511 1 < 2; 1, 2 > 3 
Anxious thoughts 
4.652*** 1.925  4.516*** 1.880  2.415*** 1.731 29.849 
 < 
.001 .239 1, 2 > 3 
Insecure thoughts 
4.500*** 1.947  4.065*** 1.863  2.169*** 1.606 30.445 
 < 
.001 .243 1, 2 > 3 
Threat thoughts 
3.364*** 2.102  3.581*** 1.887  1.831*** 1.409 17.626 
 < 
.001 .156 1, 2 > 3 
Positive affectivity 18.379 4.154  17.677 4.958  17.046 4.862 1.338 .265 .014 — 
Negative affectivity  8.136 4.217  7.855 4.718  6.877 3.243 1.697 .186 .018 — 
Note. ηp2 = partial eta squared. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3. Post Hoc Comparisons From Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference Test, 
Study 1 
Dependent variable/ 
condition (I) 
 
Condition (J) 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
 
SE 
 
p 
     
Uncertainty salience check     
Uncertainty Mortality salience 1.353*** 0.345  < .001 
Uncertainty Control 3.080*** 0.341  < .001 
Control Mortality -1.727*** 0.347  < .001 
 
Control topic salience check     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.178 0.322 .845 
Uncertainty Control -4.016*** 0.318  < .001 
Control Mortality 3.837*** 0.323  < .001 
 
Mortality salience check     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -3.647*** 0.295  < .001 
Uncertainty Control 0.746* 0.291 .030 
Control Mortality -4.393*** 0.296  < .001 
 
Death thoughts     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -3.051*** 0.285  < .001 
Uncertainty Control 0.776 0.282 .018 
Control Mortality -3.828*** 0.286  < .001 
 
Anxious thoughts     
Uncertainty Mortality salience 0.135 0.327 .910 
Uncertainty Control 2.236*** 0.323  < .001 
Control Mortality -2.101*** 0.328  < .001 
 
Insecure thoughts     
Uncertainty Mortality salience 0.435 0.320 .364 
Uncertainty Control 2.331*** 0.317  < .001 
Control Mortality -1.895*** 0.322  < .001 
 
Threat thoughts     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.217 0.322 .779 
Uncertainty Control 1.533*** 0.319  < .001 
Control Mortality -1.750*** 0.324  < .001 
     
     
Uncertainty Mortality salience 0.701 0.825 .672 
Uncertainty Control 1.333 0.815 .234 
Control Mortality -0.631 0.828 .727 
 
Negative affectivity     
Uncertainty Mortality salience 0.282 0.724 .920 
Uncertainty Control 1.259 0.716 .186 
Control Mortality -0.978 0.727 .372 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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There was a statistically significant mean difference in the mortality salience 
check ratings among the three manipulation conditions (F(2, 190) = 125.351, p < .001, η2 
= .569). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the mean rating for 
the uncertainty condition (M = 2.530, SD = 2.017) was significantly less than the mean 
rating for the mortality salience condition (M = 6.177, SD = 1.454; p < .001), but 
significantly greater than the mean rating for the control topic salience condition (M = 
1.785, SD = 1.452; p = .030). The mortality salience condition was significantly greater 
than the control topic salience condition in mortality salience manipulation check ratings 
(p < .001).  
Thus, the life event inventory (LEI) priming method did indeed produce the 
greatest levels of uncertainty salience in the uncertainty condition, and the greatest levels 
of mortality salience in the mortality salience condition. Notably, however, the mortality 
salience prime bolstered uncertainty salience ratings compared to control, and the 
uncertainty salience prime bolstered mortality salience ratings compared to control 
(though in each case, the non-matching rating was significantly lower than the matching 
condition in which it was intended to occur). Thus, this priming method partially 
confounds “uncertainty” with “mortality salience.” Priming uncertainty appears to cause 
some incidental mortality salience, and priming mortality salience appears to cause some 
incidental uncertainty salience. 
Preliminary analyses. Preliminary analyses (in preparation for the regression 
analyses which directly test the experimental hypotheses discussed) were performed 
examining the relation between condition and the moderator variables. Thirteen one-way 
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analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not participants 
in the three experimentally manipulated conditions differed significantly in their scores 
along these variables (see Table 4). As predicted, none of these thirteen variables differed 
by condition. ANOVAs were also performed to determine whether or not participants in 
the three manipulated conditions differed significantly in their scores on the positive 
affect and negative affect subscales of the PANAS (see Table 3). As expected, no group 
differences were found on the PANAS scales. 
Thought and Feeling Measures. Preliminary analyses were also performed 
examining the relation between condition and the “Thoughts and Feeling Measures” 
(Appendix). Note that these four items were administered after the three manipulation 
check items, and they are separate questions from the manipulation check items. The 
previous three manipulation check items were purely “thought content” items, while 
these four items are combined “thoughts/feelings” items which read as follows: “I 
thought about or felt death and dying.” “I thought about or felt anxious.” “I thought about 
or felt insecure.” and “I thought about or felt threatened.” Note that the item “I thought 
about or felt death and dying” is different and separate from the mortality salience 
manipulation check. 
 
  
66 
Table 4. ANOVA of Moderator Variables by Condition, Study 1 
 
 
Uncertainty 
  
Mortality Salience 
 
Control     
 
Between Groups Effect  
 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
 
M 
 
SD 
  
 
M 
 
SD 
 
 
F 
 
 
p η2 
Tukey’s 
HSD 
 
Intolerance of uncertainty 36.364 9.218 
 
36.081 9.081 
 
34.985 8.612 0.429 .652 .004 — 
Intolerance of ambiguity -3.409 7.296  -3.113 8.658  -2.092 5.923 0.574 .564 .006 — 
System justification 
(American) 14.788 4.951 
 
15.016 5.029 
 
13.569 4.448 1.680 .189 .017 — 
Social dominance 
orientation -19.697 18.395 
 
-21.129 22.919 
 
-21.569 19.002 0.154 .857 .002 — 
Belief in a Just World 23.076+ 6.257  23.694+ 6.166  21.277+ 6.209 2.617 .076 .027 — 
Trust in Government 4.667 1.269  4.758 1.743  4.723 1.409 0.062 .940 .001 — 
Political self-efficacy 4.424 1.479  4.597 1.634  4.262 1.661 0.703 .496 .007 — 
Political interest 5.561 1.314  5.661 1.546  5.508 1.416 0.189 .828 .002 — 
Political attention 5.849 1.395  5.774 1.654  5.646 1.363 0.316 .730 .003 — 
Political knowledge 5.485 1.350  5.532 1.617  5.246 1.311 0.740 .478 .008 — 
Voting behavior 1.197 0.728  1.065 0.787  0.985 0.780 1.288 .278 .013 — 
Political ideology 0.075 0.470  -0.034 0.505  -0.043 0.523 1.047 .353 .012 — 
Partisanship 0.081 0.493  -0.033 0.510  -0.049 0.497 1.179 .310 .014 — 
Note. ηp2 = partial eta squared. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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There was a statistically significant mean difference in the death thoughts/feelings 
ratings between the three manipulated conditions (F(2, 190) = 99.201, p < .001, η2 = 
.511) See items “Death thoughts” “Anxious thoughts,” “Insecure thoughts” and “Threat 
thoughts” in Table 2. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the 
death thought/feelings ratings for the uncertainty condition (M = 2.546, SD = 1.874) was 
significantly less than the mean rating for the mortality salience condition (M = 5.597, SD 
= 1.531; p < .001), but significantly greater than the rating for the control topic salience 
condition (M = 1.769, SD = 1.389; p = .018). The mortality salience condition was 
significantly greater than the control topic salience condition on the variable of death 
thoughts (p < .001). Thus, similar to the mortality salience manipulation check item, this 
“death thoughts/feelings” item (a separate item), showcased highest levels in the 
mortality salience condition, but also was bolstered (compared to control) in the 
uncertainty condition. See items “Death thoughts” “Anxious thoughts,” “Insecure 
thoughts” and “Threat thoughts” in Table 3. 
There was a statistically significant mean difference in the anxious 
thoughts/feelings ratings between the three manipulated/randomly assigned independent 
variable conditions (F (2, 190) = 29.849, p < .001, η2 = .239). Post-hoc comparisons 
using Tukey’s HSD indicated that the mean anxious rating for the uncertainty condition 
(M = 4.652, SD = 1.925) was significantly greater than the mean rating for the control 
topic condition (M = 2.415, SD = 1.731; p < .001). The mortality salience condition (M = 
4.516, SD = 1.880) was also significantly greater than the control topic condition (p < 
.001) on this item. The uncertainty and mortality salience conditions did not differ on this 
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item (p > .05). Thus, both uncertainty and mortality salience produced roughly equivalent 
levels of heightened self-reported anxiousness, compared to the control condition. 
There was a statistically significant mean difference for the insecure 
thoughts/feelings ratings among the three manipulated conditions (F(2, 190) = .445, p < 
.001, η2 = .243). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the mean 
insecure rating for the uncertainty condition (M = 4.500, SD = 1.947) was significantly 
greater than the mean rating for the control topic condition (M = 2.169, SD = 1.606; p < 
.001). The mortality salience condition (M = 4.065, SD = 1.863) was also significantly 
greater than the control topic condition (p < .001). The uncertainty and mortality salience 
conditions did not differ on this item (p > .05). Thus, both uncertainty and mortality 
salience produced roughly equivalent heightened levels of insecurity compared to 
control. 
There was a statistically significant mean difference for the threat 
thoughts/feelings ratings among the three manipulated conditions (F(2, 190) = 17.626, p 
< .001, η2 = .156). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the mean 
rating for the uncertainty condition (M = 3.364, SD = 2.102) was significantly greater 
than the mean rating for the control topic condition (M = 1.831, SD = 1.409; p < .001). 
The mortality salience condition (M = 3.581, SD = 1.887) was also significantly greater 
than the control topic condition (p < .001). The uncertainty and mortality salience 
conditions did not differ on this item (p > .05). Thus, both uncertainty and mortality 
salience produced a comparably heightened sense of threat compared to control.  
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In summary, these tests summarized under the “Thoughts and Feeling Measures” 
heading exhibit the difference in ratings on the four “thoughts/feelings” items among the 
three manipulated conditions. Across all four items, the uncertainty and mortality 
salience conditions produced heightened thoughts and feelings ratings compared to the 
control condition. Also, across all four items, the uncertainty and mortality salience 
conditions did not produce significantly different ratings from one another. 
Main analyses. Analyses were performed to examine the relation between 
condition and each of the three dependent variables: status quo preference scale, attitudes 
towards reformers, and support for regime change. Three one-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not participants in the three 
manipulated conditions differed significantly in their scores on these three dependent 
variables respectively (see Table 5).  
Results demonstrated that there were no between groups differences on these 
dependent variables. Additionally, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of condition 
predicting each of the respective dependent variables with the four thoughts/feelings 
measures entered as covariates was performed. In each case, the pattern of means did not 
differ from the equivalent model ANOVA sans covariates, all (p > .2). Thus, Hypothesis 
1 (H1) without interactions was not supported. In addition to these ANOVA and 
ANCOVA models, main effects of condition are tested as factors within each of the yet to 
be discussed regression model results, in both additive (step1) and interactive (step2) 
models. As the regression results shall demonstrate, no main effects of condition emerged 
as significant in any of the regression models, either with or without controls, all (p > .2). 
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Table 5. ANOVA of Three Dependent Variables by Condition, Study 1 
 Uncertainty Mortality salience Control     
Between groups effect  M SD M SD M SD F p η2 
Tukey’s 
HSD 
           
Status quo preference 38.439 7.748 39.371 9.038 37.523 8.437 0.766 .466 .008 — 
 
Attitudes towards reformers 12.410 5.749 12.629 5.692 12.369 5.369 0.039 .961  < .001 — 
 
Support for regime change 8.273 2.704 8.419 3.443 9.123 3.059 1.420 .244 .015 — 
Note. η2 = eta squared. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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In these experiments, the status quo preference and support for regime change 
scales were coded such that higher values delineated more status quo preference and 
more support respectively. The attitudes towards reformers scale was coded such that 
higher values delineated more negative attitudes. Because the main effect was non-
significant, it was not possible to perform analyses that investigate the mediator(s) of this 
non-existent effect.  
Study 1: Two-Way Interaction Models (Moderator by Condition) 
Interaction terms were created by multiplying the variables together and entering 
the products as predictor variables in a hierarchical linear regression model. Each 
moderator was tested separately in two models, where the second model included all four 
control variables of (a) death thoughts, (b) anxious thoughts, (c) insecure thoughts, and 
(d) threat thoughts. To avoid the gratuitous reporting of nonsignificant results, only 
regression models with a significant or marginally significant omnibus result are 
decomposed. 
Main effects of condition and the moderator were tested at step 1, while condition 
by moderator variable (Condition X Moderator) interaction terms were tested at step 2 in 
the regression heirarchy. Control variables were entered with the main effects in step 1 
for the (“with controls” models). Linear transformations were performed on all 
continuous variables before running the regression analyses such that (M = 0, SD = .5). 
That is, all continuous variables were re-scaled from -.5 (low on the moderator variables, 
one standard deviation below the mean) to .5 (high on the moderator variables, one 
standard deviation above the mean.) Stated otherwise, for the regression analyses, scales 
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were transformed into a Z-score, and then divided by 2, such that the mean centered on 0 
and the standard deviation equaled .5. All subsequent references to “low” and “high” 
levels of a continuous variable are coded as above. 
Two, two-way interactions were found to be significant at the p < .05 level: (a) 
MS X Political Ideology, and (b) US X Attention to Politics. The abbreviations “US” and 
“MS” are used here and throughout to refer to the Uncertainty Salience and Mortality 
Salience dummy coded variables. In study 1, only the dependent variable of attitudes 
towards reformers yielded significant regression results, with the dependent variables of 
status quo preference scale and support for regime change failing to yield any significant 
results in experiment 1. 
Political ideology interaction. For all regression models, dummy coding was 
utilized to compare each of the experimental conditions (uncertainty salience, mortality 
salience) against the control condition. The uncertainty salience dummy coded variable 
(US) was scored as 1 for participants in the uncertainty condition, and 0 for participants 
in the other two conditions. The mortality salience dummy coded variable (MS) was 
scored as 1 for participants in the mortality salience condition, and 0 for participants in 
the other two conditions. The control/referent dummy coded variable was scored with a 
value of 0 for both the US and MS conditions. 
Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, in addition to all main effects (and 
controls where applicable) were entered along with the moderator of political ideology 
(abbreviated PIDEO) at step 1. Linear regression results at step 1 revealed no significant 
effect of: US on attitudes toward reformers versus the control dummy code (B = 0.048, β 
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= 0.045, SE = 0.087, t(177) = 0.549, p = .583), without controls, (B = 0.062, β = 0.058, 
SE = 0.097, t(173) = 0.636, p = .526), with all controls); nor for MS (B = 0.007, β = 
0.007, SE = 0.088, t(177) = 0.082, p = .935), without controls (see Table 6); (B = -0.096, 
β = -0.089, SE = 0.123, t(173) = -0.783, p = .435), with all controls (see Table 7). 
Table 6. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Political Ideology, Without 
Controls, Study 1 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
Uncertainty salience (US) .048 .087 .045  .042 .087 .039 
Mortality salience (MS) .007 .088 .007  -.004 .088 -.004 
Political ideology (PIDEO) -.327*** .072 -.324  -.186 .118 -.184 
US * PIDEO — — —  -.138 .177 -.075 
MS * PIDEO — — —  -.308+ .173 -.174 
Constant -.017 .061 —  -.011 .061 — 
R2(R2 Adj) .104 (.089)  .120 (.095) 
F Change in R2 6.834***  1.598 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of political ideology predicting attitudes 
toward reformers in the model without controls (B = -0.327, β = -0.324, SE = 0.072, 
t(177) = -4.527, p < .001), such that leftist/liberals exhibited more positive attitudes 
towards reformers, and right wing/conservative exhibited more negative attitudes towards 
them (an effect well established in prior literature). When controls were entered into the 
model, this effect remained significant, B = -0.326 β = -0.322, SE = 0.071, t(173) = -
4.591, p < .001, with all controls). 
Step 2. Each of the dummy code x moderator interaction terms were entered in 
step 2. Regression analyses revealed a marginally significant interaction between MS and 
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political ideology predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -0.308, β = 
-0.174, SE = 0.173, t(175) = -1.787, p = .076), which emerged as significant when all 
controls were entered into the model (B = -0.360, β = -0.203, SE = 0.169, t(171) = -2.131, 
p = .035). The interaction between US and political ideology predicting attitudes towards 
reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.138 β = -0.075, SE = 
0.177, t(175) = -0.782, p = .436), or with controls (B = -0.156 β = -0.084, SE = 0.175, 
t(171) = -0.888, p = .376). See Tables 6 and 7. 
Table 7. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Political Ideology, With 
Controls, Study 1 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .062 .097 .058  .055 .097 .052 
Mortality salience (MS) -.096 .123 -.089  -.134 .123 -.124 
Political ideology (PIDEO) -.326*** .071 -.322  -.164 .114 -.163 
Death thoughts (DT) .147 .120 .145  .185 .121 .183 
Anxious thoughts (AT) -.275* .111 -.272  -.282* .111 -.279 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.006 .127 -.006  -.006 .127 -.006 
Threat thoughts (TT) .272* .121 .266  .262* .121 .255 
US * PIDEO  — — —  -.156 .175 -.084 
MS * PIDEO — — —  -.360* .169 -.203 
Constant .014 .071 —  .028 .071 — 
R2(R2 Adj) .172 (.139)  .194 (.151) 
F Change in R2 5.150***  2.274 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Simple slopes analyses. Without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for 
Conservatives, those primed with mortality salience exhibited more negative attitudes 
towards reformers, though these effects did not reach the threshold of statistical 
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significance (B = 0.150, β = 0.139, SE = 0.119, t(175) = 1.262, p = .209). For Liberals, 
those primed with mortality salience exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers, 
likewise falling short of statistical significance (B = -0.159, β = -0.147, SE = 0.128, t(175) 
= -1.242, p = .216). 
With controls in the model, however, significant effects did emerge. For 
Conservatives, the mortality salience prime had no effect. (B = 0.046, β = 0.043 SE = 
0.139, t(171) = 0.333, p = .739). For Liberals, however, the mortality salience prime 
caused an increase in favorable attitudes towards reformers (B = -0.314, β = -0.290, SE = 
0.159, t (171) = -1.973, p = .05 exactly). See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Political Ideology, With Controls. Error 
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 1.  
Mediated moderation. Analyses of mediated moderation was conducted to 
determine if any of the thoughts/feelings measures mediate the significant two-way 
interaction reported here. These supplementary mediated moderation analyses are 
exploratory and not tied to any particular theory or a-priori hypotheses core to the 
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theoretical claims made herein. In other words, failure to find support for mediated 
moderation does not impede or affect any evaluations of the previously stated 
hypotheses. As will be demonstrated throughout, analyses demonstrate a complete lack of 
support for any mediated moderation models. Since the thoughts/feelings measures 
cannot simultaneously be treated as control and mediator in the same model, the analyses 
for mediated moderation is done without controls. While criteria for assessing mediated 
moderation are nuanced and varied, the following basic criteria must be met in order to 
suggest mediated moderation via multiple regression. To begin, the analysis can only be 
performed if the potential mediator is correlated with the dependent variable of interest, 
(Bucy & Tao, 2007; Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt, 2005, Hayes (2009), Edwards & Lambert 
(2007). Out of the four thoughts/feelings measures, only “threat” thoughts correlated with 
attitudes towards reformers r (193) = .184, p = .01. Therefore, threat will be tested as a 
mediator. The other three potential mediators are not correlated with the dependent 
variable in the following regression models, anxious: r (193) = -.03, p = .68; death: r 
(193) = .111, p = .13; insecure: r (193) = .070, p = .33) and thus do not meet this 
criterion. Adapting the methods of Muller et al. (2005) and Bucy & Tao (2007) to the 
extant data, it can be said that the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation cannot be 
achieved unless the following three p values from the equations below are statistically 
significant. 
  
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pMSxB = .076 (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pMSxB = .957 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pMsxB = .007 (3) 
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Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
political ideology, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the MSxB interaction (and 
not the USxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p 
values corresponding to the MSxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the 
MSxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(175) = 
0.05, pMSXB = .957, and therefore the “initial criteria”(referring to the 3 significance 
values) for mediated moderation are not met in this case.  
While the above is sufficient to deny mediated moderation, I will continue with 
subsequent mediated moderation procedures for the purposes of illustration. Consider the 
case that the “initial criteria” are met with all three p values achieving statistical 
significance, we would move onto the “secondary criteria” for mediated moderation, 
which states that the significant (or marginally significant) coefficient of βMSxB from 
equation 1 must be reduced in magnitude when the additional factors of equation 3, (βM 
+ βMB) are introduced into the model. That is to say βMSxB35 in equation 3 should be 
reduced in magnitude from βMSxB15 in equation 1. For this MS x Political Ideology 
interaction, the relevant coefficient actually increased (rather than reduced) in magnitude, 
with βMSxB15 = -0.308, and βMSxB35 = -0.484. Thus, we preclude the possibility of 
mediated moderation here. 
Attention to politics interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, 
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the 
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moderator of political attention/attention to politics (abbreviated ATTN) at step 1. Linear 
regression results at step 1 revealed no significant effect of: US on attitudes toward 
reformers (B = -0.002, β = -0.002, SE = 0.088, t(189) = -0.022, p = .983), without 
controls, (B = 0.003, β = 0.003, SE = 0.098, t(185) = 0.033, p = .974), with all controls), 
nor for MS (B = 0.020, β = 0.019, SE = 0.089, t(189) = 0.222, p = .824), without controls 
(see Table 8); (B = -0.058, β = -0.054, SE = 0.123, t(185) = -0.467, p = .641),with all 
controls (see Table 9). 
Table 8. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards Reform 
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Attention to Politics, Without Controls, 
Study 1 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.002 .088 -.002  -.002 .088 -.002 
Mortality salience (MS) .020 .089 .019  .026 .089 .025 
Political attention (ATTN) .079 .073 .079  -.090 .134 -.090+ 
US * ATTN — — —  .373* .187 .206 
MS * ATTN — — —  .135 .176 .086 
Constant -.006 .062 —  -.012 .062 — 
R2(R2 Adj) .007 (-.009)  .028 (.002) 
F Change in R2 .425  2.057 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Step 1 did not reveal a significant main effect of political attention predicting 
attitudes toward reformers in the model without controls (B = 0.079, β = 0.079, SE = 
0.073, t(189) = 1.094, p = .276), or in the model with controls (B = 0.059 β = 0.059, SE = 
0.071, t(185) = 0.828 p = .408, with all controls).  
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Table 9. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards Reform 
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Attention to Politics, With Controls, Study 1 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .003 .098 .003  -.009 .098 -.008 
Mortality salience (MS) -.058 .123 -.054  -.066 .123 -.062 
Political attention (ATTN) .059 .071 .059  -.130 .132 -.130 
Death thoughts (DT) .083 .118 .083  .094 .119 .094 
Anxious thoughts (AT) -.276* .114 -.276  -.274* .113 -.274 
Insecure thoughts (IT) .003 .131 .003  .043 .135 .043 
Threat thoughts (TT) .328** .120 .328  .298* .127 .298 
US * ATTN  — — —  .339+ .187 .188 
MS * ATTN — — —  .208 .175 .132 
Constant .017 .072 —  .020 .072 — 
R2(R2 Adj) .082 (.047)  .098 (.054) 
F Change in R2 2.347*  1.681 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Step 2. Each of the dummy code x moderator interaction terms were entered in 
step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and political 
attention predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = 0.373, β = 0.206, 
SE = 0.187, t(187) = 1.991, p = .048), which became marginally significant when all 
controls were entered into the model(B = 0.339, β = 0.188, SE = 0.187, t(183) = 1.808, p 
= .072). The interaction between MS and political attention predicting attitudes towards 
reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = 0.135, β = 0.086, SE = 
0.176, t(187) = 0.768, p = .444), or with controls (B = 0.208, β = 0.132, SE = 0.175, 
t(183) = 1.190, p = .236). See Tables 8 and 9. 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the significant US x political attention 
interaction, the simple slopes for this interaction failed to reach statistical significance 
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either with or without controls, for both those high and low in political attention. High 
political attention without controls; (B = 0.184, β = 0.175, SE = 0.129, t(187) = 1.433, p = 
.154), and with controls (B = 0.161, β = 0.153, SE = 0.131, t(183) = 1.230, p = .220). 
Low political attention without controls: (B = -0.188, β = -0.179, SE = 0.128, t(187) = -
1.476, p = .142), and with controls (B = -0.178, β = -0.169 SE = 0.141, t(183) = -1.265, p 
= .207). See Figure 2. When exposed to uncertainty, those high in political attention 
exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers, and those low in political attention 
exhibiting more positive attitudes, though, as reported above, these simple slopes did not 
reach statistical significance.  
 
Figure 2. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Attention to Politics, With Controls. Error 
bars represent ±1 standard deviation from the mean, Study 1.  
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and 
throughout) are identical to that described previously. The “initial criteria” for mediated 
moderation cannot be achieved unless the following three p values from the equations 
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below are statistically significant. Accordingly, the significance of the three pertinent 
equations was as follows: 
 
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .048* (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .963 (2) 
Y = Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .063 (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
political attention, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and 
not the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p 
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the 
USxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(187) = 
0.05, pβ USXB = .963, and therefore mediated moderation is disqualified. 
Study 1: Analysis Summary 
The Manipulation Check and Thoughts/Feelings measures demonstrate that the 
primes were effective in eliciting the desired affective response in each condition. 
However, the expected main effects of the prime did not emerge. Two regression models 
did emerge significant, however. The first, MS X Political Ideology interaction, is 
theoretically consistent with a-priori hypothesis H2(y) as originally formulated, except 
that the effect occurred in the mortality salience condition, as opposed the uncertainty 
salience condition. When primed with mortality salience, conservatives’ dislike of 
reformers became relatively more polarized in the direction of disliking, and liberals’ 
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preference for reformers became relatively more pronounced. The US x Attention 
interaction as described (with those high in attention harboring more negative attitudes 
towards reformers under conditions of uncertainty) did not appear to be consistent with 
any of the a-priori hypotheses. Regression models were assessed with and without 
controls, as reported in the correspondingly labeled tables throughout the analysis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PILOT STUDY 
In order to avoid mono-operation bias and other potential problems associated 
with staking one’s theoretical claims on a single operationalization of independent 
variable, the aim of experiment 2 was to replicate experiment 1 using a different priming 
method. A pilot study was conducted in order to determine which new priming method 
should be used in experiment 2: a list recall prime or a word search prime. In the pilot 
study, the uncertainty priming materials utilizing the following methods of a) list recall 
uncertainty b) word search uncertainty c) life event inventory uncertainty [LEI, used in 
study 1], and d) LEI control [also used in study 1] were evaluated with respect to the 
three manipulation check item ratings (Appendix). Whichever new prime demonstrated 
itself to be most efficacious in bolstering uncertain thoughts would be selected as the 
priming method to be implemented in experiment 2. That is to say, participants in the 
uncertainty condition of the selected “most efficacious” priming implementation should 
feel more uncertainty salience compared to mortality salience and control topic salience; 
as well as more uncertainty salience compared to the other priming implementations of 
uncertainty tested. The list recall method consisted of asking participants to memorize 
and then recall a list containing five words with connotations to uncertainty: uncertain, 
shaky, gamble, dicey, and wavering. The word search method 
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consisted of asking the participant to locate these same words hidden in a word search 
puzzle.  
Pilot Test Results 
82 American individuals participated in the study arranged through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Three one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed to 
determine whether or not participants in the four conditions differed significantly in their 
scores on the three dependent variables (see Table 10). Significant findings emerged only 
for the dependent variable of uncertainty salience F(3, 78) = 14.173, p < .001, η2 = .353, 
to be followed up with pairwise comparisons. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD 
indicated that the mean of the word search uncertainty condition (M = 5.273, SD = 1.549, 
was significantly greater than the mean for the control condition ((M = 2.952, SD = 
2.334, p < .001). The mean rating of the LEI uncertainty condition (M = 6.400, SD = 
0.940) was also significantly greater than the mean for the control condition (M = 2.952, 
SD = 2.334, p < .001). The mean rating of the LEI uncertainty condition was significantly 
greater than the mean for the word search uncertainty condition (p < .001). No other 
statistically significant group differences were found (see Table 11). 
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Table 10. ANOVA of Manipulation Check by Condition, Pilot Study 
 List recall Word search Control 
Life event 
inventory     
Dependent 
variable 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
F 
 
p η2 Tukey’s HSD 
 
Uncertainty 
salience check 4.211*** 1.960 5.273*** 1.549 2.952*** 2.334 
 
6.400*** 
 
0.940 14.173  < .001 .353 1, 3 < 4; 3 < 2 
 
Control topic 
salience check 3.316 2.540 2.046 1.812 2.191 2.040 2.400 2.137 1.413 .245 .052 — 
 
Mortality 
salience check 2.158 1.864 1.955 1.430 1.238 0.889 2.350 1.872 2.016 .119 .072 — 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 11. Post Hoc Comparisons from Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference Test, 
Pilot Study 
 
Dependent variable / condition (I) 
 
Condition (J) 
 
Mean 
difference  
(I-J) 
 
SE 
 
p 
Uncertainty     
List recall Word search -1.062 0.555 .231 
List recall Control 1.258 0.561 .121 
List recall Life event inventory -2.189** 0.568 .001 
Word search List recall 1.062 0.555 .231 
Word search Control 2.320*** 0.541  < .001 
Word search Life event inventory -1.127 0.548 .176 
Control List recall -1.258 0.561 .121 
Control Word search -2.320*** 0.541  < .001 
Control Life event inventory -3.448*** 0.554  < .001 
Life event inventory List recall 2.189** 0.568 .001 
Life event inventory Word search 1.127 0.548 .176 
Life event inventory Control 3.448*** 0.554  < .001 
 
Control topic salience check     
List recall Word search 1.270 0.668 .236 
List recall Control 1.125 0.676 .349 
List recall Life event inventory 0.916 0.684 .541 
Word search List recall -1.270 0.668 .236 
Word search Control -0.145 0.651 .996 
Word search Life event inventory -0.355 0.659 .950 
Control List recall -1.125 0.676 .349 
Control Word search 0.145 0.651 .996 
Control Life event inventory -0.210 0.667 .989 
Life event inventory List recall -0.916 0.684 .541 
Life event inventory Word search 0.355 0.659 .950 
Life event inventory Control 0.210 0.667 .989 
 
Mortality salience check     
List recall Word search 0.203 0.486 .975 
List recall Control 0.920 0.491 .249 
List recall Life event inventory -0.192 0.497 .980 
Word search List recall -0.203 0.486 .975 
Word search Control 0.716 0.473 .435 
Word search Life event inventory -0.395 0.479 .843 
 
Mortality salience check (cont’d)     
Control List recall -0.920 0.491 .249 
Control Word search -0.716 0.473 .435 
Control Life event inventory -1.112 0.485 .108 
Life event inventory List recall 0.192 0.497 .980 
Life event inventory Word search 0.395 0.479 .843 
Life event inventory Control 1.112 0.485 .108 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Pilot Test Discussion 
These results suggest that both the LEI and Word Search manipulations produced 
greater uncertainty than the control condition, although this effect was more strongly 
pronounced for the LEI (already deployed in experiment 1). Thus, the comparison among 
priming methods demonstrates that against the control condition, the LEI and the word 
search conditions both primed uncertainty thoughts to a greater degree compared to 
control, while the list priming method did not. The word search prime was not quite as 
effective as the LEI in eliciting uncertainty salience. In other words, the word search 
prime elicited more uncertainty salience than the control condition, but not more than the 
LEI condition. Since the LEI was already deployed in experiment 1, this left only the 
word search prime as a viable option for experiment 2. In the pilot, none of the various 
uncertainty primes exhibited any effect on participants’ mortality salience or control topic 
salience ratings (see Table 11). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Between experiment 1 and experiment 2, theoretical rationale and hypotheses are 
exactly identical. Save for the change from LEI to Word Search, the methods, procedure, 
and analysis protocol run on study 2 are the same as that of study 1. In experiment 2, 
there was a different puzzle for each of the three conditions. In each condition, 
participants were asked to look at the word search puzzle in which five words were 
hidden. In the uncertainty salience condition, words in the first puzzle include: uncertain, 
shaky, gamble, dicey, and wavering. In the mortality salience condition, words will 
include: death, mortal, grave, tombs, demise. In the control condition, words in the first 
puzzle include: television, dust, goggles, afternoon, spot (see Appendix). After being 
randomly assigned to one of the puzzle three conditions, participants were challenged to 
find all the words in the puzzle in under two minutes, at which point a timer expired and 
participants were asked to go on to the subsequent questionnaire. 
With this new manipulation method (word search prime), some potential validity 
threats idiosyncratic to the thought generation LEI uncertainty-prime can be said to be 
guarded against. In experiment 1, it was found that recalling moments where one feels 
uncertain tangentially activates mortality salience to some extent. The problem 
potentially exists because participants in the uncertainty condition might generate 
memories pertaining to death, and therefore, the uncertainty and mortality salience 
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conditions become blurred in this manner. The priming method in experiment 2 addresses 
this issue further by removing the idea of generated memories and their associated 
confounds which may be present with the life event inventory (LEI) methodology. The 
psychological effects of recalling autobiographical memories meant to elicit particular 
emotions (experiment 1) may differ from implicit concept activation via a word search 
prime (experiment 2). This may occur as a result of a self-referencing effect inherent in 
the generation of autobiographical information, or any number of other consequences of 
that particular manipulation which may subtly influence the relation between the 
independent variable construct (uncertainty) and our inevitably imperfect 
operationalization of it. Hence, replication of design with the word search manipulation 
offers some protection against the dangers of mono-operation bias. 197 American 
individuals participated in the study arranged through Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Manipulation Check  
There was a statistically significant mean difference in the mortality salience 
manipulation check item self-report ratings between the three randomly assigned, 
experimentally manipulated independent variable conditions F(2, 194) = 9.196, p < .001, 
η2 = .087. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
manipulation check rating for the mortality salience condition (M = 2.861, SD = 1.878) 
was significantly greater than that of the uncertainty condition (M = 1.776, SD = 1.346; p 
< .001). The mortality salience condition was also significantly greater than the control 
topic salience condition (M = 1.877, SD = 1.536; p = .002).  
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Notably, there were no differences among conditions on the other two 
manipulation check items (uncertainty salience, and control topic salience). For 
differences between groups, see the items “Uncertainty salience check,” “Control topic 
salience check,” and “Mortality salience check” in Tables 12 and 13. Unlike in the pilot 
study, the uncertainty puzzle prime failed to produce heightened levels of self-reported 
thoughts about uncertainty compared to control.  
Contrasting the manipulation check item analyses of experiment 1 with 
experiment 2, there are some key differences to note. In experiment 1, both LEI primed 
uncertainty and LEI primed mortality salience produced greater levels of their respective 
manipulation check item rating; with respect to the control condition as well as each 
other. LEI primed uncertainty also caused an increase in mortality salience manipulation 
check ratings, but not as high as in the mortality salience condition. LEI primed mortality 
salience also caused an increase in uncertainty salience manipulation check ratings, but 
not as high as in the uncertainty salience condition.  
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Table 12. ANOVA of Manipulation Check and Thoughts/Feelings Variables by Condition, Study 2 
 
 
Uncertainty 
  
Mortality Salience 
 
Control     
Between groups effect  M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
F p η2 
Tukey’s 
HSD 
 
Uncertainty salience check 3.508 1.972  3.308 2.015  3.262 1.881 0.296 .744 .003 — 
Control topic salience check 2.015 1.728  2.446 2.031  2.631 2.176 1.679 .189 .017 — 
Mortality salience check 1.776*** 1.346  2.862*** 1.878  1.877*** 1.536 9.196  < .001 .087 1, 3 < 2 
Death thoughts 1.716** 1.216  2.692** 1.758  1.939** 1.638 7.128 .001 .068 1, 3 < 2 
Anxious thoughts 2.687 1.500  3.046 1.849  2.754 1.803 0.808 .447 .008 — 
Insecure thoughts 2.299 1.467  2.800 1.752  2.262 1.670 2.216 .112 .022 — 
Threat thoughts 1.881+ 1.503  2.508+ 1.778  2.062+ 1.694 2.481 .086 .025 — 
Positive affectivity 18.642 4.773  19.200 4.262  19.185 4.531 0.327 .722 .003 — 
Negative affectivity  8.164 4.433  9.062 4.815  7.846 4.210 1.281 .280 .013 — 
Note. ηp2 = partial eta squared. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 13. Post Hoc Comparisons from Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference Test, 
Study 2 
 
Dependent variable / condition (I) 
 
Condition (J) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
 
SE 
 
p 
Uncertainty salience check     
Uncertainty Mortality salience 0.200 0.341 .828 
Uncertainty Control 0.246 0.341 .751 
Control Mortality -0.046 0.343 .990 
 
Control topic salience check     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.431 0.346 .426 
Uncertainty Control -0.616 0.346 .178 
Control Mortality 0.185 0.348 .857 
 
Mortality salience check     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -1.085*** 0.278  < .001 
Uncertainty Control -0.101 0.278 .930 
Control Mortality -0.985** 0.281 .002 
 
Death thoughts     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.976** 0.270 .001 
Uncertainty Control -0.222 0.270 .690 
Control Mortality -0.754* 0.272 .017 
 
Anxious thoughts     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.360 0.300 .455 
Uncertainty Control -0.067 0.300 .973 
Control Mortality -0.292 0.302 .598 
 
Insecure thoughts     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.501 0.284 .184 
Uncertainty Control 0.037 0.284 .991 
Control Mortality -0.538 0.286 .147 
 
Threat thoughts     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.627+ 0.289 .079 
Uncertainty Control -0.181 0.289 .806 
Control Mortality -0.446 0.291 .278 
     
Positive affectivity     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.558 0.789 .759 
Uncertainty Control -0.543 0.789 .771 
Control Mortality -0.015 0.794 1.000 
 
Negative affectivity     
Uncertainty Mortality salience -0.897 0.782 .486 
Uncertainty Control 0.318 0.782 .913 
Control Mortality -1.215 0.788 .274 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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In experiment 2, word search primed mortality salience produced the greatest 
levels of mortality salience manipulation check item ratings compared to each of the 
other two conditions. Notably, however, it did not produce greater levels of uncertainty 
salience as well (as it did in experiment 1 with LEI). Similarly, the word search primed 
uncertainty did not produce heightened levels of mortality salience. This could be seen as 
positive, as the potential confound of experiment 1(uncertainty condition priming 
incidental mortality salience, and mortality condition priming incidental uncertainty 
salience) appears not to be an issue in experiment 2. Surprisingly however, the 
experiment 2 word search uncertainty priming condition failed to produce heightened 
levels of self- report uncertainty salience, as assessed via ratings on the uncertainty 
salience manipulation check item. 
Given that the pilot test and experiment 2 deployed the same manipulation of 
word-search uncertainty, we naturally expected manipulation check results from the pilot 
to replicate in experiment 2, but they did not. It is possible that this is because in 
experiments 1 and 2, the PANAS and dependent variable measures were administered 
subsequent to the prime and before assessing these three manipulation check items. In the 
pilot, participants were exposed to the manipulation, given the three manipulation check 
items, and then dismissed (No PANAS). Thus, in experiment 2, more time and 
conceptual interference may have occurred between priming and the assessment of the 
manipulation checks, eliminating the effects showcased in the pilot test for the 
uncertainty crossword prime. 
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It could be the case that the prime failed to activate the relevant cognitive-
emotional constructs in experiment 2 necessary for producing effects on the dependent 
variable(s); Alternatively, it could be the case that participants exposed to the word 
search were less self-aware of the effects of the prime upon their cognitions and 
emotions, yet the prime still exerted its effects below the level of awareness necessary to 
manifest via the manipulation check self-report items. As will soon be discussed, the 
latter case seems likely, as various US X Moderator interactions did indeed produce a 
variety of significant results in experiment 2 regression models despite lackluster results 
on the uncertainty salience manipulation check. In the studies of Schwarz & Clore 
(1983), participants expressed a more positive mood on sunny days, but the effect was 
eliminated when the possible influence of the weather upon their mood was made salient 
by the researcher. In a similar vein, the PANAS introduced between the prime and the 
manipulation check item in study 2 (and not the pilot) may have obscured participant 
awareness with respect to the effects of the prime on the participants’ mental state, 
allowing the prime to exhibit effects on the dependent variables, yet show no differences 
on the manipulation check items (Lombardi et al. 1987; Strack et al., 1993). Such 
research suggests that the most direct or blatant primes are often consciously discounted, 
while subtler primes may exert their influence undetected. “Filler tasks” are often 
deployed in such a manner within survey research so that participants’ awareness is 
directed away from the effects of the prime (See, Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, Loresch et al. 
2011) for a discussion of this and similar effects in priming and automaticity research. 
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Preliminary Analyses 
Preliminary analyses (in preparation for the regression analyses which directly 
tests the experimental hypotheses discussed) were performed examining the relation 
between condition and the moderator variables. Thirteen one-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not participants in the three 
manipulated conditions differed significantly on these variable ratings (see Table 4). 
Significant group differences were found for one out of the thirteen variables: trust in 
government, F(2, 194) = 3.511, p = .032, η2 = .035. Post-hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the uncertainty condition (M = 4.552, 
SD = 1.449) was significantly less than the mean score for the control topic condition (M 
= 5.200, SD = 1.449; p = .027). Thus, random assignment to condition was not achieved 
on this singular moderating variable. As with experiment 1, we hoped that these 13 
individual difference variables would be randomly distributed across randomly assigned 
experimentally manipulated conditions. There are two ways to interpret such an outcome, 
however; one interpretation being that random assignment failed, the other being that the 
uncertainty prime caused decreased trust in government in experiment 2 (i.e. trust in 
government acted as a dependent variable, rather than a more stable individual difference 
moderator as expected). Therefore, two significant regressions (yet to be presented) 
which arose in experiment 2 involving trust in government as the moderator should be 
viewed with a high degree of caution, as a key assumption of interactive regression 
models (moderator should be independent of the remaining independent variable(s)) has 
been violated in this case. ANOVAs were also performed to determine whether or not 
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participants in the three manipulated conditions differed significantly in their scores on 
the positive affect and negative affect subscales of the PANAS; they did not (see Table 
14). 
Thought and Feeling Measures 
Identical to experiment 1, these consisted of the four questions, after the 
manipulation check, asking participants: “I thought about or felt death and dying.” “I 
thought about or felt anxious.” “I thought about or felt insecure.” “thought about or felt 
threatened.” Out of these four thoughts/feeling ratings, only ratings on the item “I thought 
about or felt death and dying” differed by condition, with the other three items showing 
no differences by condition.  
There was a statistically significant mean difference in the death thoughts/feelings 
ratings between the three manipulated conditions, F(2, 194) = 7.128, p = .001, η2 = .068. 
See items “Death thoughts” in Table 2. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the mean rating for the mortality salience condition (M = 2.692, SD = 
1.758) was significantly greater than the mean rating for the uncertainty condition (M = 
1.716, SD = 1.216; p = .001. The mortality salience condition (M = 2.692, SD = 1.758) 
was also significantly greater than the control topic condition (M = 1.939, SD = 1.638; p 
= .017). There were no significant differences between uncertainty and control conditions 
on this item (p = .69). See item “Death thoughts” in Table 3. 
  
  
97 
Table 14. ANOVA of Moderator Variables by Condition, Study 2 
 
 
Uncertainty 
  
Mortality salience 
 
Control     
 
Between Groups Effect  
 
 
M 
 
SD 
  
 
M 
 
SD 
  
 
M 
 
SD 
 
 
F 
 
 
p η2 
Tukey’s 
HSD 
 
Intolerance of uncertainty 34.851 11.162 
 
35.092 9.839 
 
34.739 9.553 0.020 .980  < .001 — 
Intolerance of ambiguity -0.851 8.543  -2.446 7.278  -1.492 7.351 0.706 .495 .007 — 
System justification (American) 14.403 5.595  14.723 4.939  16.200 4.822 2.284 .105 .023 — 
Social dominance orientation -17.791 21.891  -15.446 19.503  -20.292 20.568 0.892 .412 .009 — 
Belief in a just world 22.119+ 6.951  23.769+ 6.547  24.677+ 6.293 2.548 .081 .026 — 
Trust in government 4.552* 1.449  4.985* 1.397  5.200* 1.449 3.511 .032 .035 1 < 3 
Political self-efficacy 4.343 1.572  4.831 1.654  4.631 1.577 1.548 .215 .016 — 
Political interest 5.313 1.716  5.631 1.485  5.539 1.631 0.677 .509 .007 — 
Political attention 5.463 1.439  5.708 1.400  5.769 1.412 0.868 .422 .009 — 
Political knowledge 5.328 1.284  5.523 1.382  5.631 1.306 0.887 .414 .009 — 
Voting behavior 0.761 0.720  0.892 0.732  0.892 0.710 0.732 .482 .007 — 
Political ideology -0.056 0.551  0.019 0.487  0.035 0.464 0.579 .561 .006 — 
Partisanship -0.057 0.487  -0.058 0.555  0.099 0.454 1.928 .149 .023 — 
Note. η2 = eta squared. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Unlike in experiment 1, none of the other “thoughts and feelings” measures 
(anxious, insecure, threat) differed by condition in experiment 2, according to the self-
reported ratings for these items. As mentioned previously, we speculate either that the 
priming method in experiment 2 (word search) was either less effective than the LEI; or 
that it is comparably effective but subtler (less “blatant”) and thus less likely to be 
recognized and reported via these self-report items, a possibility recognized by 
automaticity and priming scholars including, Bargh & Chartrand, (2000); Lombardi et al. 
(1987); Loresch et al. (2011).  
Main Analyses 
As with the procedures reported above for experiment 1, the main analyses for 
experiment 2 were performed in an identical fashion. Analyses were performed to 
examine the relation between condition and each of the three dependent variables: status 
quo preference scale, attitudes towards reformers, and support for regime change. Three 
one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed to determine whether or not 
participants in the three experimentally manipulated conditions differed significantly in 
their scores on these three dependent variables respectively.  
Results demonstrated that there were no between groups differences on these 
dependent variables (see Table 15). Additionally, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of 
condition predicting each of the respective dependent variables with the four 
thoughts/feelings measures entered as covariates was performed. In each case, the pattern 
of means did not differ from the equivalent model ANOVA sans covariates, all (p > .2). 
As with experiment 1, Hypothesis 1 (H1) without interactions was not supported in 
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experiment 2. In addition to these ANOVA and ANCOVA models, main effects of 
condition were tested as factors within each of the yet to be discussed experiment 2 
regression model results, in both additive (Step 1) and interactive (Step 2) models. As 
with experiment 1, the regression results in experiment 2 shall demonstrate no main 
effects of condition in any of the regression models, either with or without controls, all (p 
> .2). 
Study 2: Two-Way Interaction Models (Moderator by Condition) 
Interaction terms were created by multiplying the variables together and entering 
the products as predictor variables in a hierarchical linear regression model as described 
previously. Identical to experiment 1, each moderator was tested separately for each 
dependent variable in two models, where the second model included all four control 
variables of (a) death thoughts, (b) anxious thoughts, (c) insecure thoughts, and (d) threat 
thoughts. All coding procedures are exactly identical to those in experiment 1. 
Two-way interactions significant for the dependent variable of status quo 
preference scale included: (a) US X Political Ideology, and (b) US X Party Identification. 
Several two-way interactions were found to be significant at the p < .05 level for the 
dependent variable of attitude towards reformers: (a) MS X Political Ideology, and (b) 
MS X Social Dominance Orientation, (c) MS X System Justification, (d) US X 
Intolerance of Uncertainty, (e) US X Political Self-Efficacy, and (f) US X Trust in 
Government. Two-way interactions significant for the dependent variable of regime 
change included: (a) US X Belief in a Just World, and (b) US X Trust in Government. 
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Table 15. ANOVA of Three Dependent Variables by Condition, Study 2 
 
 
Uncertainty 
 
Mortality salience Control     
 
Between groups effect  M SD M SD M SD F p η2 
Tukey’s 
HSD 
 
Status quo preference 38.761 9.232 38.246 10.047 37.062 9.791 0.531 .589 .005 — 
 
Attitude toward reform 12.015 6.285 13.277 6.279 12.708 5.528 0.722 .487 .007 — 
 
Regime change 9.448 3.831 8.923 3.768 8.985 3.595 0.391 .677 .004 — 
Note. η2 = eta squared. 
+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Interactions: Predicting Status Quo Preference 
Political ideology. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, in addition to all 
main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the moderator of 
political ideology (abbreviated PIDEO) at step 1. Linear regression results at step 1 
revealed no significant effect of US on status quo preference, (B = 0.085, β = 0.081, SE = 
0.088, t(180) = 0.967, p = .335), without controls, (B = 0.095, β = 0.091, SE = 0.079, 
t(176) = 1.201, p = .231), with all controls), nor for MS (B = 0.048, β = 0.046, SE = 
0.088, t(180) = 0.552, p = .581), without controls; (B = 0.001, β = 0.001, SE = 0.080, 
t(176) = 0.012, p = .991), with all controls (see Tables 16 and 17). 
Table 16. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Status Quo Preference 
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Political Ideology, Without Controls, 
Study 2 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .085 .088 .081  .082 .087 .079 
Mortality salience (MS) .048 .088 .046  .057 .087 .055 
Political ideology 
(PIDEO) -.142+ .072 -.145  .117 .131 .119 
US X PIDEO — — —  -.469** .173 -.300 
MS X PIDEO — — —  -.243 .183 -.137 
Constant -.051 .061 —  -.060 .060 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .028 (.011)  .066 (.040) 
F Change in R2 1.702  3.675* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 17. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Status Quo Preference 
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Political Ideology, With Controls, Study 2 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B 
SE 
B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .095 .079 .091  .091 .077 .087 
Mortality salience (MS) .001 .080 .001  .013 .079 .012 
Political ideology (PIDEO) -.200** .065 -.204  .021 .117 .021 
Death thoughts (DT) .017 .098 .018  -.009 .096 -.009 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .208* .094 .210  .204* .093 .206 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.179 .117 -.180  -.196+ .115 -.198 
Threat thoughts (TT) .435*** .121 .445  .467*** .120 .477 
US X PIDEO — — —  -.435** .155 -.278 
MS X PIDEO — — —  -.154 .163 -.087 
Constant -.041 .055 —  -.050 .054 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .247 (.217)  .282 (.244) 
F Change in R2 8.254***  4.166* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Step 1 revealed a marginally significant main effect of political ideology 
predicting status quo preference in the model without controls (B = -0.142, β = -0.145, SE 
= 0.072, t(180) = -1.964, p = .051), such that leftist/liberals actually exhibited slightly 
more status quo preference(opposite of the expected pattern, See rightmost column of 
Figure 3). When controls were entered into the model, this effect became statistically 
significant, (B = -0.200 β = -0.204, SE = 0.065, t(176) = -3.067, p = .003, with all 
controls). The control variable of anxious thoughts was statistically significant in the step 
1 control model (B = 0.208, β = 0.210, SE = 0.094, t(176) = 2.203, p = .029), such that 
increases in anxious thoughts were associated with a greater status quo preference. The 
control variable of threat thoughts was also statistically significant in the step 1 control 
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model (B = 0.435, β = 0.445, SE = 0.121, t(176) = 3.588, p < .001), such that increases in 
threat thoughts were associated with a greater status quo preference. 
 
Figure 3. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Status Quo Preference, Moderated by Political Ideology, With Controls. Error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and 
political ideology predicting status quo preference, without controls (B = -0.469, β = -
0.300, SE = 0.173, t(178) = -2.707, p = .007), which remained significant when all 
controls were entered into the model(B = -0.435, β = -0.278, SE = 0.155, t(174) = -2.809, 
p = .006). The interaction between MS and political ideology predicting status quo 
preference did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.243, β = -0.137, SE = 
0.183, t(178) = -1.327, p = .186), or with controls (B = -0.154, β = -0.087, SE = 0.163, 
t(174 ) = -0.944, p = .347). The control variable of threat thoughts was statistically 
significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.467, β = 0.477, SE = 0.120, t(174) = 3.895, 
p < .001), and so was the control variable of anxious thoughts in the step 2 control model 
(B = 0.204, β = 0.206, SE = 0.093, t(174) = 2.195, p = .029. See Table 17. 
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Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Political Ideology interaction, 
without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for Conservatives, those primed 
with uncertainty salience exhibited a greater status quo preference (B = 0.317, β = 0.303, 
SE = 0.122, t(178) = 2.595, p = .010). With controls in the model, the remained 
statistically significant (B = 0.308 β = 0.295, SE = 0.109, t(174) = 2.825, p = .005). 
Statistical significance was not achieved for Liberals primed with uncertainty salience 
without controls (B = -0.152, β = -0.146, SE = 0.123, t(178) = -1.234, p = .219), or with 
controls (B = -0.126, β = -0.121, SE = 0.110, t(174) = -1.150, p = .252). See Figure 3. 
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and 
throughout) are exactly identical to that described previously, in Bucy & Tao (2007), 
Muller et al. (2005), and are only pursued if the same basic criteria are met among 
variables. As mentioned previously, throughout the text empirical support for models of 
mediated moderation are completely lacking throughout; yet this fact does not affect the 
evaluation of any of the formally stated hypotheses. Accordingly, the significance of the 
Bucy & Tao (2007), Muller et al. (2005) equations is as follows: 
 
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .007** (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .723 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .0071** (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
political ideology, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of status quo preference. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and not 
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the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p 
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the 
USxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(178) = -
0.36, pβ USXB = .723, and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not 
met and we cannot proceed further down this line of inquiry. Furthermore, the relevant 
coefficient was not reduced from equation 1 to equation 3, disqualifying mediated 
moderation. 
Party identification. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, in addition to 
all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the moderator of 
party identification (abbreviated PPARTY) at step 1. Linear regression results at step 1 
revealed no significant effect of US on status quo preference, (B = 0.064, β = 0.065, SE = 
0.083, t(164) = 0.766, p = .445), without controls, (B = 0.078, β = 0.079, SE = 0.078, 
t(160) = 0.995, p = .321), with all controls), nor for MS (B = -0.001, β = -0.001, SE = 
0.085, t(164) = -0.012, p = .991), without controls; (B = -0.021, β = -0.021, SE = 0.080, 
t(160) = -0.257, p = .797), with all controls (see Tables 18 and 19). 
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Table 18. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Status Quo Preference 
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Party Identification, Without Controls, 
Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .064 .083 .065  .068 .083 .070 
Mortality salience (MS) -.001 .085 -.001  .018 .085 .018 
Party identification 
(PPARTY) -.244** .070 -.265  -.076 .125 -.083 
US X PPARTY — — —  -.378* .175 -.228 
MS X PPARTY — — —  -.131 .168 -.087 
Constant -.035 .057 —  -.052 .057 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .077 (.060)  .104 (.076) 
F Change in R2 4.585**  2.403+ 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 19. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Status Quo Preference 
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Party Identification, With Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .078 .078 .079  .082 .078 .084 
Mortality salience (MS) -.021 .080 -.021  -.002 .080 -.002 
Party identification (PPARTY) -.155* .068 -.169  -.010 .117 -.011 
Death thoughts (DT) -.011 .105 -.011  -018 .104 -.018 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .214* .094 .227  .216* .093 .229 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.187 .117 -.196  -.196+ .117 -.205 
Threat thoughts (TT) .353** .122 .382  .356** .122 .385 
US X PPARTY — — —  -.340* .163 -.206 
MS X PPARTY — — —  -.109 .156 -.072 
Constant -.035 .053 —  -.050 .054 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .227 (.193)  .249 (.206) 
F Change in R2 6.719***  2.285 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of party identification predicting status 
quo preference in the model without controls (B = -0.244, β = -0.265, SE = 0.070, t(164) 
= -3.495, p = .001), such that Democrats exhibited less negative attitudes towards the 
status quo, and Republicans exhibited more negative attitudes towards the status quo. 
When controls were entered into the model, this effect remained statistically significant, 
(B = -0.155 β = -0.169, SE = 0.068, t(160) = -2.275, p = .024, with all controls). The 
control variable of anxious thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control 
model (B = 0.214, β = 0.227, SE = 0.094, t(160) = 2.285, p = .024), such that increases in 
anxious thoughts were associated with a greater status quo preference. The control 
variable of threat thoughts was also statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B 
= 0.353, β = 0.382, SE = 0.122, t(160) = 2.887, p = .004), such that increases in threat 
thoughts were associated with a greater status quo preference. 
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and 
party identification predicting status quo preference, without controls (B = -0.378, β = -
0.228, SE = 0.175, t(162) = -2.152, p = .033), which remained significant when all 
controls were entered into the model (B = -0.340, β = -0.206, SE = 0.163, t(158) = -2.086, 
p = .039). The interaction between MS and party identification predicting status quo 
preference did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.131, β = -0.087, SE = 
0.168, t(162) = -0.778, p = .438), or with controls (B = -0.109, β = -0.072, SE = 0.156, 
t(158) = -0.694, p = .489). The control variable of threat thoughts remained statistically 
significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.356, β = 0.385, SE = 0.122, t(158) = 2.927, 
p = .004). Moreover, the control variable of anxious thoughts returned significance in the 
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step 2 control model (B = 0.216, β = 0.229, SE = 0.093, t(158) = 2.316, p = .022). See 
Tables 18 and 19. 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Party Identification 
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for Republicans, those 
primed with uncertainty salience exhibited a greater status quo preference (B = 0.257, β = 
0.263, SE = 0.124, t(162) = 2.082, p = .039). With controls in the model, the effect 
remained statistically significant (B = 0.252 β = 0.257, SE = 0.115, t(158) = 2.186, p = 
.030). Statistical significance was not achieved for Democrats primed with uncertainty 
salience without controls (B = -0.120, β = -0.123, SE = 0.118, t(162) = -1.019, p = .310), 
or with controls (B = -0.088, β = -0.090, SE = 0.110, t(158) = -0.801, p = .424). See 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Status Quo Preference, Moderated by Party Identification, With Controls. Error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
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Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here are 
identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of the three equations 
is as follows: 
 
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .033* (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .525 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .045* (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
party identification, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of status quo preference. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and not 
the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p 
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the 
USxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(162) = 
0.64, pβ USXB = .525 and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not 
met. Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced in magnitude, 
disqualifying mediated moderation. 
Predicting Attitudes Towards Reformers 
Political ideology interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, in 
addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the 
moderator of political ideology (abbreviated PIDEO) at step 1. Linear regression results 
at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes toward reformers: B = -0.050, β 
= -0.048, SE = 0.087, t(180) = -0.568, p = .571), without controls, (B = -0.039, β = -
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0.038, SE = 0.081, t(176) = -0.482, p = .631), with all controls), nor for MS (B = 0.018, β 
= 0.017, SE = 0.087, t(180) = 0.201, p = .841), without controls; (B = -0.019, β = -0.019, 
SE = 0.083, t(176) = -0.234, p = .815),with all controls (see Tables 20 and 21).  
Table 20. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitudes Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Political Ideology, Without 
Controls, Study 2 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.050 .087 -.048  -.043 .087 -.041 
Mortality salience (MS) .018 .087 .017  .028 .087 .027 
Political ideology (PIDEO) -.177* .072 -.180  .033 .131 .034 
US * PIDEO — — —  -.226 .173 -.145 
MS * PIDEO — — —  -.395* .184 -.223 
Constant .007 .061 —  .000 .060 — 
R2(R2 Adj) .034 (.018)  .059 (.033) 
F Change in R2 2.135+  2.325 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of political ideology predicting attitudes 
toward reformers in the model without controls (B = -0.177, β = -0.180, SE = 0.072, 
t(180) = -2.455, p = .015), such that leftist/liberals exhibited more positive attitudes 
towards reformers, and right wing/conservative exhibited more negative attitudes towards 
them(concordant with study 1, as well as previously established literature). When 
controls were entered into the model, this effect remained significant, (B = -0.222 β = -
0.227, SE = 0.067, t(176) = -3.298, p < .001, with all controls). The control variable of 
threat thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.459, β = 
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0.471, SE = 0.125, t(176) = 3.668, p < .001), such that increases in threat thoughts were 
associated with more negative attitudes towards reformers. 
Table 21. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitudes Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Political Ideology, With 
Controls, Study 2 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.039 .081 -.038  -.035 .081 -.033 
Mortality salience (MS) -.019 .083 -.019  -.009 .083 -.008 
Political ideology (PIDEO) -.222** .067 -.227  -.037 .123 -.038 
Death thoughts (DT) -.023 .101 -.024  -.031 .101 -.031 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .090 .098 .091  .078 .097 .079 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.148 .120 -.150  -.139 .120 -.140 
Threat thoughts (TT) .459*** .125 .471  .457*** .125 .469 
US * PIDEO  — — —  -.209 .162 -.134 
MS * PIDEO — — —  -.330+ .171 -.186 
Constant .014 .057 —  .007 .056 — 
R2(R2 Adj) .193 (.161)  .211 (.170) 
F Change in R2 6.028***  1.906 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between MS and 
political ideology predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -0.395, β = 
-0.223, SE = 0.184, t(178) = -2.150, p = .033), which became marginally significant when 
all controls were entered into the model(B = -0.330, β = -0.186, SE = 0.171, t(174) = -
1.928, p = .055). The interaction between US and political ideology predicting attitudes 
towards reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.226 β = -
0.145, SE = 0.173, t(178) = -1.301, p = .195), or with controls (B = -0.209 β = -0.134, SE 
= 0.162, t(174) = -1.291, p = .198). The control variable of threat thoughts remained 
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statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.457, β = 0.469, SE = 0.125, 
t(174) = 3.649, p < .001). See Tables 20 and 21. 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the significant MS X Political Ideology 
interaction, the simple slopes for this interaction failed to reach statistical significance 
either with or without controls for both Liberals and Conservatives. Liberals: without 
controls; (B = -0.169, β = -0.162, SE = 0.123, t(178) = -1.378, p = .170), and with 
controls (B = -0.173, β = -0.166, SE = 0.115, t(174) = -1.506, p = .134). Conservatives: 
without controls; (B = 0.266, β = 0.217, SE = 0.130, t(178) = 1.738, p = .084), and with 
controls (B = 0.156, β = 0.150, SE = 0.123, t(174) = 1.273, p = .205). See Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Political Ideology, With Controls. Error 
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here are 
identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of the three equations 
is as follows: 
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Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pMSxB = .033* (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pMSxB = .457 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pMsxB = .012* (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
political ideology, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the MSxB interaction (and 
not the USxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p 
values corresponding to the MSxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the 
MSxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(178) = -
0.75, pβ MSXB = .457. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not 
met. Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced in magnitude, 
disqualifying mediated moderation. 
Social dominance orientation interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS 
dummy codes, in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were 
entered along with the moderator of social dominance orientation (abbreviated SDO) at 
step 1. Linear regression results at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes 
toward reformers, (B = -0.096, β = -0.091, SE = 0.067, t(193) = -1.430, p = .154), without 
controls, (B = -0.085, β = -0.081, SE = 0.066, t(189) = -1.297, p = .196), with all 
controls), nor for MS (B = -0.028, β = -0.026, SE = 0.068, t(193) = -0.410, p = .682), 
without controls; (B = -0.020, β = -0.019, SE = 0.068, t(189) = -0.299, p = .765),with all 
controls (see Tables 22 and 23).  
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Table 22. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards Reform 
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Social Dominance Orientation, Without 
Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.096 .067 -.091  -.091 .066 -.087 
Mortality salience (MS) -.028 .068 -.026  -.038 .067 -.036 
Social dominance 
orientation (SDO) .641*** .055 .641  .562*** .095 .562 
US * SDO — — —  -.046 .130 -.028 
MS * SDO — — —  .327* .138 .177 
Constant .042 .048 —  .037 .047 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .414 (.405)  .440 (.425) 
F Change in R2 45.449***  4.407* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 23. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards Reform 
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Social Dominance Orientation, With 
Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.085 .066 -.081  -.081 .065 -.077 
Mortality salience (MS) -.020 .068 -.019  -.032 .067 -.030 
Social dominance 
orientation (SDO) .609*** .059 .609  .538*** .097 .538 
Death thoughts (DT) -.093 .082 -.093  -.065 .082 -.065 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .228** .081 .228  .219** .080 .219 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.146 .100 -.146  -.145 .099 -.145 
Threat thoughts (TT) .169 .108 .169  .143 .107 .143 
US * SDO — — —  -.032 .127 -.020 
MS * SDO — — —  .296* .136 .160 
Constant .036 .047 —  .032 .047 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .456 (.436)  .476 (.451) 
F Change in R2 22.630***  3.535* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of social dominance orientation in the 
model without controls (B = 0.641, β = 0.641, SE = 0.055, t(193) = 11.572, p < .001), 
such that participants who were high in social dominance orientation exhibited more 
negative attitudes towards reformers, and those who were low in social dominance 
orientation exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers. When controls were 
entered into the model, this effect remained significant, (B = 0.609 β = 0.609, SE = 0.059, 
t(189) = 10.261, p < .001, with all controls). The control variable of anxious thoughts was 
statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.228, β = 0.228, SE = 0.081, 
t(189) = 2.803, p = .006), such that increases in anxious thoughts were associated with 
more negative attitudes towards reformers.  
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between MS and 
social dominance orientation predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = 
0.327, β = 0.177, SE = 0.138, t(191) = 2.364, p = .019), which remained significant when 
all controls were entered into the model(B = 0.296, β = 0.160, SE = 0.136, t(187) = 2.167, 
p = .031). The interaction between US and social dominance orientation predicting 
attitudes towards reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.046, 
β = -0.028, SE = 0.130, t(191) = -0.357, p = .722), or with controls (B = -0.032, β = -
0.020, SE = 0.127, t(187) = -0.255, p = .799). The control variable of anxious thoughts 
remained statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.219, β = 0.219, SE = 
0.080, t(187) = 2.719, p = .007). See Tables 24 and 25. 
116 
 
Table 24. Condition Regressed Onto Attitude Towards Reformers for Participants High 
and Low on Social Domination Orientation, Without Controls, Study 2 
  
Uncertainty 
salience 
  
Mortality 
salience 
  
Control 
 
Participant group M SE M  M SE M  M SE M 
 
High social dominance 
 
.204 
 
.064 
  
.444 
 
.065 
  
.318 
 
.071 
 
Low social dominance 
 
-.312 
 
.064 
  
-.445 
 
.073 
  
-.244 
 
.063 
 
Table 25. Condition Regressed Onto Attitude Towards Reformers for Participants High 
and Low on Social Domination Orientation, With Controls, Study 2 
  
Uncertainty 
salience 
  
Mortality 
salience 
  
Control 
 
Participant group M SE M  M SE M  M SE M 
 
High social dominance 
 
.204 
 
.063 
  
.417 
 
.066 
  
.301 
 
.071 
 
Low social dominance 
 
-.301 
 
.065 
  
-.416 
 
.074 
  
-.237 
 
.063 
 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the significant MS X Social Dominance 
Orientation interaction, the simple slopes analyses revealed that for those low in social 
dominance orientation, those primed with mortality salience exhibited more positive 
attitudes towards reformers without controls (B = -0.201, β = -0.190, SE = 0.097, t(191) = 
-2.085, p = .038). With controls in the model, the effect reached marginal significance (B 
= -0.179, β = -0.169, SE = 0.096, t(187) = -1.860, p = .065). Statistical significance was 
not achieved for participants high in social dominance orientation when primed with 
mortality salience without controls (B = 0.126, β = 0.119, SE = 0.096, t(191) = 1.311, p = 
.191), or with controls (B = 0.116, β = 0.110, SE = 0.095, t(187) = 1.226, p = .222). When 
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primed with mortality salience, participants high in social dominance orientation 
showcased more negative attitudes towards reformers; while those low in social 
dominance orientation showcased more positive attitudes towards reformers. See Figure 
6.  
 
Figure 6. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Social Dominance Orientation, With 
Controls. Error bars represent ± 1standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and 
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of 
the three equations is as follows: 
 
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pMSxB = .019* (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pMSxB = .582 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pMsxB = .020* (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
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social dominance orientation, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the 
dependent variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the MSxB 
interaction (and not the USxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we 
look only at the p values corresponding to the MSxB interactions here. In this case, the 
coefficient of the MSXB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical 
significance t(191) = 0.55, pβ MSXB = .582. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated 
moderation are not met and we cannot proceed further. 
System justification interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, 
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the 
moderator of system justification (abbreviated SJS) at step 1. Linear regression results at 
step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes toward reformers (B = 0.009, β = 
0.009, SE = 0.082, t(193) = 0.113, p = .910), without controls, (B = 0.014, β = 0.013, SE 
= 0.079, t(189) = 0.172, p = .864), with all controls), nor for MS (B = 0.102, β = 0.096, 
SE = 0.082, t(193) = 1.243, p = .215), without controls; (B = 0.064, β = 0.061, SE = 
0.081, t(189) = 0.792, p = .430),with all controls (see Table 26 and 27). 
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Table 26. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of System Justification, Without 
Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .009 .082 .009  -.011 .080 -.011 
Mortality salience (MS) .102 .082 .096  .110 .080 .104 
System justification (SJS) .383*** .067 .383  .337** .121 .337 
US X SJS — — —  -.185 .158 -.117 
MS X SJS — — —  .398* .169 .218 
Constant -.037 .058 —  -.032 .057 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .151 (.138)  .210 (.189) 
F Change in R2 11.447***  7.073** 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 27. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of System Justification, With 
Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .014 .079 .013  -.003 .077 -.003 
Mortality salience (MS) .064 .081 .061  .076 .080 .071 
System Justification (SJS) .296*** .068 .296  .273* .118 .273 
Death thoughts (DT) -.043 .098 -.043  -.035 .095 -.035 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .087 .096 .087  .074 .094 .074 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.121 .119 -.121  -.130 .116 -.130 
Threat thoughts (TT) .360** .126 .360  .344** .123 .344 
        
US X SJS — — —  -.181 .154 -.114 
MS X SJS — — —  .339* .166 .186 
Constant -.026 .056 —  -.024 .056 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .231 (.203)  .277 (.242) 
F Change in R2 8.117***  5.897** 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of system justification in the model 
without controls (B = 0.383, β = 0.383, SE = 0.067, t(193) = 5.715, p < .001), such that 
participants who were low in system justification exhibited more positive attitudes 
towards reformers, and those who were high in system justification exhibited more 
negative attitudes towards reformers. When controls were entered into the model, this 
effect remained significant, (B = 0.296 β = 0.296, SE = 0.068, t(189) = 4.385, p < .001, 
with all controls). The control variable of threat thoughts was statistically significant in 
the step 1 control model (B = 0.360, β = 0.360, SE = 0.126, t(189) = 2.850, p = .005), 
such that increases in threat thoughts were associated with more negative attitudes 
towards reformers.  
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between the MS and 
system justification predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = 0.398, β 
= 0.218, SE = 0.169, t(191) = 2.361, p = .019), which remained significant when all 
controls were entered into the model(B = 0.339, β = 0.186, SE = 0.186, t(187) = 2.047, p 
= .042). The interaction between the US and system justification predicting attitudes 
towards reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.185, β = -
0.117, SE = 0.158, t(191) = -1.166, p = .245), or with controls (B = -0.181, β = -0.114, SE 
= 0.154 t(187) = -1.176, p = .241). The control variable of threat thoughts remained 
statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.344, β = 0.344, SE = 0.123, 
t(187) = 2.795, p = .006). 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the MS X System Justification 
interaction, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those high in system justification, 
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those primed with mortality salience exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers 
(B = 0.309, β = 0.291, SE = 0.112, t(191) = 2.763, p = .006). With controls in the model, 
the effect remained significant (B = 0.245 β = 0.231, SE = 0.111, t(187) = 2.203, p = 
.029). Statistical significance was not achieved for participants low in system justification 
when primed with mortality salience, without controls (B = -0.089, β = -0.084, SE = 
0.121, t(191) = -0.739, p = .461); with controls (B = -0.094, β = -0.088, SE = 0.118, 
t(187) = -0.793, p = .429). See Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by System Justification, With Controls. Error 
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here are 
identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of the three equations 
is as follows: 
  
122 
 
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pMSxB = .019* (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pMSxB = .140 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pMsxB = .048* (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
system justification, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the MSxB interaction (and 
not the USxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p 
values corresponding to the MSxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the 
MSxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = 
1.48, pβ MSXB = .140. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not 
met and we do not proceed further down this line of inquiry. 
Intolerance of uncertainty interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy 
codes, in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along 
with the moderator of intolerance of uncertainty (abbreviated IUS) at step 1. Linear 
regression results at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes toward 
reformers, (B = -0.059, β = -0.056, SE = 0.084, t(193) = -0.700, p = .485), without 
controls, (B = -0.037, β = -0.035, SE = 0.081, t(189) = -0.450, p = .654), with all 
controls), nor for MS (B = 0.042, β = 0.040, SE = 0.085, t(193) = 0.501, p = .617), 
without controls; (B = 0.017, β = 0.016, SE = 0.084, t(189) = 0.203, p = .839),with all 
controls (see Tables 28 and 29).  
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Table 28. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Intolerance of Uncertainty, 
Without Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.059 .084 -.056  -.061 .083 -.058 
Mortality salience (MS) .042 .085 .040  .040 .084 .038 
Intolerance of uncertainty 
(IUS) .272*** .069 .272  .426** .127 .426 
US X IUS — — —  -.378* .166 -.241 
MS X IUS — — —  -.005 .177 -.003 
Constant .006 .060 —  .007 .059 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .081 (.067)  .115 (.092) 
F Change in R2 5.684**  3.662* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 29. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Intolerance of Uncertainty, With 
Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.037 .081 -.035  -.040 .081 -.038 
Mortality salience (MS) .017 .084 .016  .019 .083 .018 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IUS) .121 .077 .121  .279* .132 .279 
Death thoughts (DT) -.051 .102 -.051  -.064 .101 -.064 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .063 .103 .063  .033 .103 .033 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.124 .124 -.124  -.112 .124 -.112 
Threat thoughts (TT) .414** .133 .414  .404** .132 .404 
US X IUS — — —  -.315+ .164 -.201 
MS X IUS — — —  -.045 .173 -.025 
Constant .007 .058 —  .007 .058 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .164 (.133)  .184 (.144) 
F Change in R2 5.292***  2.274 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
124 
 
Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of intolerance of uncertainty predicting 
attitudes toward reformers in the model without controls (B = 0.272, β = 0.272, SE = 
0.069, t(193) = 3.937, p < .001), such that participants with high levels of intolerance of 
uncertainty exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers, and those with low 
levels of intolerance of uncertainty exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers. 
When controls were entered into the model, this effect was not significant, (B = 0.121, β 
= 0.121, SE = 0.077, t(189) = 1.573, p = .117, with all controls). The control variable of 
threat thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.414, β = 
0.414, SE = 0.133, t(189) = 3.111, p = .002), such that increases in threat thoughts were 
associated with more negative attitudes towards reformers.  
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and 
intolerance of uncertainty predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -
0.378, β = -0.241, SE = 0.166, t(191) = -2.277, p = .024), which became marginally 
significant when all controls were entered into the model(B = -0.315, β = -0.201, SE = 
0.164, t(187) = -1.926, p = .056). The interaction between the MS and intolerance of 
uncertainty predicting attitudes towards reformers did not yield significant results without 
controls (B = -0.005, β = -0.003, SE = 0.177, t(191) = -0.027, p = .979), or with controls 
(B = -0.045, β = -0.025, SE = 0.173, t(187 ) = -0.261, p = .794). The control variable of 
threat thoughts remained statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.404, β 
= 0.404, SE = 0.132, t(187) = 3.058, p = .003). 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Intolerance of Uncertainty 
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those high in 
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intolerance of uncertainty, those primed with uncertainty salience exhibited more positive 
attitudes towards reformers (B = -0.249, β = -0.237, SE = 0.118, t(191) = -2.115, p = 
.036). With controls in the model, the effect became marginally significant (B = -0.198 β 
= -0.188, SE = 0.116, t(187) = -1.702, p = .090). Statistical significance was not achieved 
for participants low in intolerance of uncertainty when primed with uncertainty salience 
without controls (B = 0.128, β = 0.122, SE = 0.117, t(191) = 1.099, p = .273), or with 
controls (B = 0.117, β = 0.112, SE = 0.114, t(187) = 1.031, p = .304). See Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, With 
Controls. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and 
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of 
the three equations is as follows: 
  
126 
 
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .024* (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .184 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .007** (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
intolerance of uncertainty, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the 
dependent variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the USxB 
interaction (and not the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we 
look only at the p values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the 
coefficient of the USxB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical 
significance t(191) = -1.33, pβ USXB = .184. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated 
moderation are not met. Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced 
in magnitude, disqualifying mediated moderation. 
Political self-efficacy interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, 
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the 
moderator of political self-efficacy (abbreviated PSE) at step 1. Linear regression results 
at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on attitudes toward reformers, (B = -0.046, β 
= -0.044, SE = 0.087, t(193) = -0.528, p = .598), without controls, (B = -0.034, β = -
0.033, SE = 0.082, t(189) = -0.417, p = .677), with all controls), nor for MS (B = 0.039, β 
= 0.037, SE = 0.087, t(193) = 0.448, p = .655), without controls; (B = 0.014, β = 0.013, 
SE = 0.084, t(189) = 0.168, p = .866),with all controls (see Tables 30 and 31). 
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Table 30. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Political Self-Efficacy, 
Without Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.046 .087 -.044  -.063 .086 -.060 
Mortality salience (MS) .039 .087 .037  .040 .087 .038 
Political self-efficacy (PSE) .128+ .072 .128  .354** .125 .354 
US X PSE — — —  
-
.471** .176 -.270 
MS X PSE — — —  -.204 .173 -.121 
Constant .003 .062 —  .000 .061 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .024 (.008)  .059 (.035) 
F Change in R2 1.553  3.613* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 31. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Political Self-Efficacy, With 
Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.034 .082 -.033  -.052 .081 -.049 
Mortality salience (MS) .014 .084 .013  .022 .083 .020 
Political self-efficacy (PSE) -.020 .073 -.020  .234+ .121 .234 
Death thoughts (DT) -.059 .102 -.059  -.090 .101 -.090 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .103 .101 .103  .118 .099 .118 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.143 .124 -.143  -.137 .123 -.137 
Threat thoughts (TT) .471*** .132 .471  .478*** .131 .478 
US X PSE — — —  -.487** .166 -.279 
MS X PSE — — —  -.266 .165 -.158 
Constant .007 .058 —  .004 .057 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .153 (.122)  .191 (.152) 
F Change in R2 4.888***  4.313* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Step 1 revealed a marginally significant main effect of political self-efficacy 
predicting attitudes toward reformers in the model without controls (B = 0.128, β = 0.128, 
SE = 0.072, t(193) = 1.788, p = .075), such that participants with high levels of political 
self-efficacy exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers, and those with low 
levels of political self-efficacy exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers. When 
controls were entered into the model, this effect was not significant, (B = -0.020, β = -
0.020, SE = 0.073, t(189) = -0.273, p = .785, with all controls). The control variable of 
threat thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.471, β = 
0.471, SE = 0.132, t(189) = 3.554, p < .001), such that increases in threat thoughts were 
associated with more negative attitudes towards reformers.  
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant US by political self-efficacy 
interaction predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -0.471(Yes, this 
coefficient is also .471, not a typo), β = -0.270, SE = 0.176, t(191) = -2.678, p = .008), 
which remained significant when all controls were entered into the model(B = -0.487, β = 
-0.279, SE = 0.166, t(187) = -2.934, p = .004). The interaction between MS and political 
self-efficacy predicting attitudes towards reformers did not yield significant results 
without controls (B = -0.204, β = -0.121, SE = 0.173, t(191) = -1.180, p = .239), or with 
controls (B = -0.266, β = -0.158, SE = 0.165, t(187) = -1.617, p = .108). The control 
variable of threat thoughts remained statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B 
= 0.478, β = 0.478, SE = 0.131, t(187) = 3.661, p < .001). 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Political Self-Efficacy 
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those high in 
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political self-efficacy, those primed with uncertainty salience exhibited more positive/less 
negative attitudes towards reformers (B = -0.299, β = -0.284, SE = 0.127, t(191) = -2.346, 
p = .020). With controls in the model, the effect remained significant (B = -0.295 β = -
0.280, SE = 0.120, t(187) = -2.454, p = .015). Statistical significance was not achieved for 
participants low in political self-efficacy when primed with uncertainty salience without 
controls (B = 0.172, β = 0.164, SE = 0.119, t(191) = 1.452, p = .148), and was marginally 
significant with controls (B = 0.192, β = 0.182, SE = 0.111, t(187) = 1.720, p = .087). See 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Attitude Towards Reformers, Moderated by Political Self-Efficacy, With Controls. Error 
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and 
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of 
the three equations is as follows: 
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Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .008** (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .969 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .005** (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
political self-efficacy, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and 
not the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance), we look only at the p 
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the 
USXB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = -
0.04, pβ USXB = .969, and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not 
met. Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced in magnitude, 
disqualifying mediated moderation. 
Trust in government interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, 
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the 
moderator of trust in government (abbreviated TG) at step 1. Linear regression results at 
step 1 revealed no significant effect of uncertainty condition versus the control dummy 
code on attitudes toward reformers, (B = -0.018, β = -0.017, SE = 0.088, t(193) = -0.023, 
p = .839), without controls, (B = -0.016, β = -0.015, SE = 0.083, t(189) = -0.189, p = 
.851), with all controls), nor for the mortality salience versus control dummy code (B = 
0.060, β = 0.057, SE = 0.087, t(193) = 0.694, p = .488), without controls; (B = 0.025, β = 
0.024, SE = 0.084, t(189) = 0.296, p = .768), with all controls (see Tables 32 and 33). 
131 
 
Table 32. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Trust in Government, 
Without Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.018 .088 -.017  -.033 .087 -.032 
Mortality salience (MS) .060 .087 .057  .075 .086 .070 
Trust in government (TG) .177* .072 .177  .348** .122 .348 
US X TG — — —  -.438* .171 -.259 
MS X TG — — —  -.059 .176 -.033 
Constant -.014 .062 —  -.031 .062 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .038 (.023)  .075 (.051) 
F Change in R2 2.522+  3.843* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 33. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Attitude Towards 
Reformers Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Trust in Government, With 
Controls, Study 2 
 Step 1  Step 2 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) -.016 .083 -.015  -.028 .082 -.026 
Mortality salience (MS) .025 .084 .024  .045 .084 .043 
Trust in government (TG) .086 .071 .086  .262* .118 .262 
Death thoughts (DT) -.074 .102 -.074  -.095 .102 -.095 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .098 .100 .098  .113 .099 .113 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.135 .124 -.135  -.132 .123 .-132 
Threat thoughts (TT) .448** .130 .448  .435** .130 .435 
US X TG — — —  -.403* .163 -.238 
MS X TG — — —  -.096 .170 -.053 
Constant -.003 .059 —  -.022 .059 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .159 (.128)  .188 (.149) 
F Change in R2 5.124***  3.316* 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
132 
 
Step 1 revealed a significant main effect of trust in government predicting 
attitudes toward reformers in the model without controls (B = 0.177, β = 0.177, SE = 
0.072, t(193) = 2.466, p = .015), such that participants with high levels of trust in 
government exhibited more negative attitudes towards reformers, and those with low 
levels of trust in government exhibited more positive attitudes towards reformers. When 
controls were entered into the model, this effect was not significant, (B = 0.086, β = 
0.086, SE = 0.071, t(189) = 1.214, p = .226, with all controls). The control variable of 
threat thoughts was statistically significant in the step 1 control model (B = 0.448, β = 
0.448, SE = 0.130, t(189) = 3.444, p = .001), such that increases in threat thoughts were 
associated with more negative attitudes towards reformers.  
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and 
trust in government predicting attitudes toward reformers, without controls (B = -0.438, β 
= -0.259, SE = 0.171, t(191) = -2.559, p = .011), which remained significant when all 
controls were entered into the model(B = -0.403, β = -0.238, SE = 0.163, t(187) = -2.466, 
p = .015). The interaction between MS and trust in government predicting attitudes 
towards reformers did not yield significant results without controls (B = -0.059, β = -
0.033, SE = 0.176, t(191) = -0.338, p = .736), or with controls (B = -0.096, β = -0.053, SE 
= 0.170, t(187 ) = -0.568, p = .571). The control variable of threat thoughts remained 
statistically significant in the step 2 control model (B = 0.435, β = 0.435, SE = 0.130, 
t(187) = 3.360, p = .001). 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Trust in Government 
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those high in trust 
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in government, those primed with uncertainty salience exhibited more positive attitudes 
towards reformers (B = -0.252, β = -0.240, SE = 0.123, t(191) = -2.049, p = .042). With 
controls in the model, the effect became marginally significant (B = -0.229 β = -0.218, SE 
= 0.117, t(187) = -1.951, p = .053). Statistical significance was not achieved for 
participants low in trust in government when primed with uncertainty salience without 
controls (B = 0.185, β = 0.176, SE = 0.121, t(191) = 1.535, p = .126), or with controls (B 
= 0.174, β = 0.165, SE = 0.115, t(187) = 1.514, p = .132). See Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Attitudes Towards Reformers, Moderated by Trust in Government, With Controls. Error 
bars represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2.  
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and 
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of 
the three equations is as follows: 
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Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .011* (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .436 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .022* (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of trust 
in government, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of attitudes towards reformers. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and 
not the MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p 
values corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the 
USXB interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = -
0.78, pβ USXB = .436. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not 
met. 
Predicting Support for Regime Change 
Belief in a just world interaction. Step 1. The (a) US and (b) MS dummy codes, 
in addition to all main effects (and controls where applicable) were entered along with the 
moderator of belief in a just world (abbreviated BJW) at step 1. Linear regression results 
at step 1 revealed no significant effect of US on regime change, (B = 0.061, β = 0.058, SE 
= 0.089, t(193) = 0.692, p = .490), without controls, (B = 0.067, β = 0.063, SE = 0.089, 
t(189) = 0.744, p = .458), with all controls), nor for MS (B = -0.009, β = -0.008, SE = 
0.088, t(193) = -0.097, p = .923), without controls; (B = -0.015, β = -0.014, SE = 0.091, 
t(189) = -0.161, p = .872), with all controls (see Tables 34 and 35). Step 1 did not include 
a significant main effect of belief in a just world predicting regime change in the model 
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without controls (B = -0.005, β = -0.005, SE = 0.073, t(193) = -0.064, p = .949). When 
controls were entered into the model, this effect remained non-significant, (B = -0.006 β 
= -0.006, SE = 0.077, t(189) = 0.074, p = .941, with all controls).  
Table 34. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Regime Change 
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Belief in a Just World, Without 
Controls, Study 2 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .061 .089 .058  .042 .087 .040 
Mortality salience (MS) -.009 .088 -.008  .001 .087 .001 
Belief in a just world 
(BJW) -.005 .073 -.005  .158 .130 .158 
US X BJW — — —  -.481** .174 -.295 
MS X BJW — — —  .058 .180 .033 
Constant -.018 .063 —  -.032 .062 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .004 (-.011)  .064 (.040) 
F Change in R2 .261  6.159** 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between US and 
belief in a just world predicting regime change, without controls (B = -0.481, β = -0.295, 
SE = 0.174, t(191) = -2.772, p = .006), which remained significant when all controls were 
entered into the model(B = -0.487, β = -0.299, SE = 0.176, t(187) = -2.763, p = .006). The 
interaction between MS and belief in a just world predicting regime change did not yield 
significant results without controls (B = 0.058, β = 0.033, SE = 0.180, t(191) = 0.322, p = 
.748), or with controls (B = 0.070, β = 0.039, SE = 0.183, t(187) = 0.383, p = .702).  
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Table 35. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Regime Change 
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Belief on a Just World, With Controls, 
Study 2 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .067 .089 .063  .047 .087 .044 
Belief in a just world (BJW) -.015 .091 -.014   < .001 .090 .000 
System Justification (SJS) .006 .077 .006  .173 .134 .173 
Death thoughts (DT) .115 .111 .115  .107 .108 .107 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .033 .108 .033  .053 .106 .053 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.052 .134 -.052  -.062 .131 -.062 
Threat thoughts (TT) -.109 .142 -.109  -.130 .138 -.130 
US X BJW — — —  -.487** .176 -.299 
MS X BJW — — —  .070 .183 .039 
Constant -.018 .064 —  -.034 .063 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .013 (-.023)  .076 (.031) 
F Change in R2 .358  6.353** 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the US X Belief in a Just World 
interaction, without controls, simple slopes analyses revealed that for those with a lower 
belief in a just world, those primed with uncertainty salience exhibited a greater support 
for regime change (B = 0.283, β = 0.269, SE = 0.123, t(191) = 2.298, p = .023). With 
controls in the model, the effect was also statistically significant (B = 0.290 β = 0.276, SE 
= 0.124, t(187) = 2.334, p = .021).Statistical significance was not achieved for those with 
a stronger belief in a just world primed with uncertainty salience without controls (B = -
0.198, β = -0.188, SE = 0.122, t(191) = -1.619, p = .107), or with controls (B = -0.197, β 
= -0.187, SE = 0.124, t(187) = -1.586, p = .114). See Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Regime Change, Moderated by Belief in a Just World, With Controls. Error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
Mediated moderation. Procedures for establishing mediated moderation here (and 
throughout) are identical to that described previously. Accordingly, the significance of 
the three equations is as follows: 
 
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .006** (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .527 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .012* (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of 
belief in a just world, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of regime change. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and not the 
MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p values 
corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the USxB 
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interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = 0.63, pβ 
USXB = .527. and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not met. 
Trust in government interaction. Step 1. The two condition dummy codes of (a) 
uncertainty versus control and (b) mortality salience versus control, were entered along 
with trust in government at step 1, as were controls. Linear regression results at step 1 
revealed no significant effect of uncertainty condition versus the control dummy code on 
regime change, (B = 0.056, β = 0.054, SE = 0.089, t(193) = 0.634, p = .527), without 
controls, (B = 0.060, β = 0.057, SE = 0.090, t(189) = 0.673, p = .502), with all controls), 
nor for the mortality salience versus control dummy code (B = -0.010, β = -0.010, SE = 
0.088, t(193) = -0.115, p = .908), without controls; (B = -0.019, β = -0.018, SE = 0.091, 
t(189) = -0.203, p = .839), with all controls (see Tables 36 and 37). 
Table 36. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Regime Change 
Regressed Onto Condition and the Moderator of Trust in Government, Without Controls, 
Study 2 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .056 .089 .054  .043 .089 .041 
Mortality salience (MS) -.010 .088 -.010  .001 .088 .001 
Trust in government (TG) -.026 .073 -.026  .108 .125 .108 
US X TG — — —  -.351* .175 -.208 
MS X TG — — —  -.036 .180 -.020 
Constant -.016 .063 —  -.029 .063 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .005 (-.011)  .029 (.004) 
F Change in R2 .302  2.421+ 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 37. Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Analysis for Regime Change 
Regressed Onto Condition, the Moderator of Trust in Government, With Controls, Study 
2 
 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 
Variable B SE B β  B SE B β 
 
Uncertainty salience (US) .060 .090 .057  .047 .090 .044 
Mortality salience (MS) -.019 .091 -.018  -.002 .091 -.002 
Trust in Government (TG) -.026 .077 -.026  .115 .128 .115 
Death thoughts (DT) .119 .111 .119  .098 .111 .098 
Anxious thoughts (AT) .034 .109 .034  .046 .108 .046 
Insecure thoughts (IT) -.054 .134 -.054  -.054 .134 -.054 
Threat thoughts (TT) -.103 .141 -.103  -.111 .141 -.111 
US X TG — — —  -.354* .178 -.209 
MS X TG — — —  -.040 .185 -.022 
Constant -.014 .064 —  -.030 .064 — 
        
R2 (R2 Adj) .014 (-.023)  .038 (-.008) 
F Change in R2 .374  2.368+ 
Note. Referent group for Condition = Control. 
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Step 1 did not include a significant main effect of trust in government predicting 
regime change in the model without controls (B = -0.026, β = -0.026, SE = 0.073, t(193) 
= -0.354, p = .724). When controls were entered into the model, this effect remained non-
significant, (B = -0.026 β = -0.026, SE = 0.077, t(189) = -0.337, p = .736, with all 
controls).  
Step 2. Regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between the 
uncertainty salience condition dummy code and trust in government predicting regime 
change, without controls (B = -0.351, β = -0.208, SE = 0.175, t(191) = -2.005, p = .046), 
which remained significant when all controls were entered into the model(B = -0.354, β = 
-0.209, SE = 0.178, t(187) = -1.992, p = .048). The interaction between the mortality 
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salience dummy code and trust in government predicting regime change did not yield 
significant results without controls (B = -0.036, β = 0.020, SE = 0.180, t(191) = -0.202, p 
= .840), or with controls (B = -0.040, β = -0.022, SE = 0.185, t(187) = -0.216, p = .829).  
Simple slopes analyses. Following up on the Uncertainty Salience X Trust in 
Government interaction; for those low in trust of government, being primed with 
uncertainty causes an increase in support for regime change, without controls, (B = 0.219, 
β = 0.208, SE = 0.124, t(191) = 1.768, p = .079). With controls in the model, the effect 
remained marginally significant (B = 0.224, β = 0.213, SE = 0.125, t(187) = 1.793, p = 
.075). Statistical significance was not achieved for those with a stronger trust in 
government primed with uncertainty salience without controls (B = -0.133, β = -0.126, SE 
= 0.126, t(191) = -1.051, p = .295), or with controls (B = -0.130, β = -0.124, SE = 0.128, 
t(187) = -1.019, p = .309). See Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Estimated Marginal Means of Each Condition for the Dependent Variable of 
Regime Change, Moderated by Trust in Government, With Controls. Error bars represent 
± 1 standard error from the mean, Study 2. 
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Mediated moderation. Basic criteria for establishing mediated moderation are 
identical to that described previously, as set by Muller et al. (2005), Bucy & Tao (2007). 
Accordingly, the significance of the three equations is as follows: 
 
Y = β10 + βUS11 + βMS12 + βB13 + βUSxB14 + βMSxB15 + ε1 pUSxB = .046* (1) 
M = β20+ βUS21 + βMS22 + βB23 + βUSxB24 + βMSxB25 + ε2 pUSxB = .436 (2) 
Y = β30 + βUS31 + βMS32 + βB33 + βUSxB34 + βMSxB35 + βM + βMB + ε3 pUSxB = .062 (3) 
 
Where “US” denotes the independent variable of uncertainty salience, “MS” 
denotes the independent variable of mortality salience, “B” denotes the moderator of trust 
in goverment, “M” denotes the mediator of threat, and “Y” denotes the dependent 
variable of regime change. In this case, since it is the USxB interaction (and not the 
MSxB) interaction which achieved or neared significance, we look only at the p values 
corresponding to the USxB interactions here. In this case, the coefficient of the USxB 
interaction of the second equation does not reach statistical significance t(191) = -0.78, pβ 
USXB = .436, and therefore the “initial criteria” for mediated moderation are not met. 
Furthermore, the relevant coefficient was not nominally reduced in magnitude, 
disqualifying mediated moderation as a possibility. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1(H1) posited that heightened uncertainty salience, independent of 
other factors, would cause participants to exhibit an increased preference for the status 
quo and related constructs. Contrary to expectations, the predicted main effects of 
uncertainty and mortality salience on status quo preference, attitudes towards reformers, 
and support for regime change, did not emerge in either study.  
Hypothesis 2 
In all cases discussed hereafter, the words “higher” and “more” are spoken with 
reference to the significant effects in the primed condition of interest, compared with the 
control. Hypothesis 2(H2) as described previously denotes a set of hypotheses broken 
down into three parts. The Basic premise of Hypothesis 2 posits that heightened affective 
experiences (as caused by the US and MS primes, but initially predicted a-priori 
primarily for US) interacting with a set of selected moderating factors, would cause 
participants to exhibit an increased preference for the status quo and related constructs in 
a multiplicative manner (producing interaction effects). The three sets of Hypotheses 2(x, 
y, z) represent the unique effects predicted for the different conceptual categories of 
moderators used in this study, with Hypothesis 2(x) denoting individual differences in 
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uncertainty sensitivity, H2(y) denoting differences in system justifying attitudes and 
worldviews, and H2(z) denoting differences in non-ideological sociopolitical factors. 
H2(x). With respect to Hypothesis 2(x), the only statistically significant effect 
occurred in Study 2, with a significant US x IUS (intolerance of uncertainty scale) 
interaction (though this effect dropped to marginal significance when controls were 
entered into the model). The effect was such that in the uncertainty condition, those 
highly intolerant of uncertainty exhibited heightened positive attitudes towards reformers 
compared to baseline. This effect did not emerge in study 1, was not predicted, and so 
any discussion of this effect is merely post-hoc speculation. Our theoretical model 
predicts that if such an interaction were to occur, those who are intolerant of uncertainty 
should exhibit more negative attitudes towards reformers. More research is needed to 
determine whether or not this effect is replicable, or a statistical artifact. In any case, 
Hypothesis 2(x) did not garner evidence in its favor. 
H2(y). Hypothesis 2(y) predicted that variables related to system justifying 
attitudes and worldviews would moderate the effects of H1 in such a way that those high 
on system justifying worldviews should exhibit, under priming conditions, a 
magnification/polarization of baseline attitudinal preferences, sometimes referred to in 
the literature as an “extremity effect.” This in contrast to an effect such as a “conservative 
shift,” which predicts attitudinal preferences pushed in one specific direction.  
Let us examine the following significance effects which emerged, each which 
speak to Hypothesis 2(y). A persistent pattern was found across studies, showcased most 
clearly with the regression model using political ideology (PIDEO) as the moderator and 
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attitudes towards reformers. In both experiments, political ideology interacted with 
experimentally manipulated conditions to predict attitudes towards reformers in an 
identical fashion, establishing the consistency of this effect across multiple priming 
methods (see Figure 1, compare to Figure 5). As expected, both with and without 
controls, political ideology predicted attitudes towards reformers such that liberals 
exhibited heightened positive attitudes towards reformers under conditions of mortality 
salience. The nature and direction of this effect was predicted a-priori, though it was 
expected to occur to a larger degree in the uncertainty condition, as opposed to the 
mortality salience condition. As evidenced by the plot of estimated means, the effect did 
occur in the uncertainty salience condition as well, though effects in that condition are 
not statistically significance in either experiment 1 or 2 with respect to this specific 
regression set. Regarding the significant MS x Political Ideology interaction, the effect is 
driven primarily by leftist/liberals (in experiment 1) at the statistically significant level, 
though, a nonsignificant effect in the predicted direction can be observed for right-
wing/conservatives as well. For this same regression set in experiment 2, none of the 
simple slopes reached the threshold of statistical significance, but the pattern of means 
does replicate experiment 1 quite nicely. This identical pattern was achieved across both 
studies when political ideology was entered as the moderator. 
Similarly patterned effects emerged for other variables in the system justifying 
attitudes and worldviews category, though not replicating across both studies. In 
experiment 2, social dominance orientation (SDO) exhibited a parallel pattern of 
polarization in the mortality salience condition. When exposed to the mortality salience 
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prime, the baseline effect became magnified for both those high and low in SDO (see 
Figure 6). When scores on the region specific (American) System Justification Scale 
(SJS) were entered as a moderator into the regression, again the same pattern, predicted 
by Hypothesis H2(y) emerged. Both generally, and within the control condition, those 
high in SJS disliked reformers more than their low SJS counterparts. When primed with 
MS, the effect became polarized at both ends, though primarily driven by those high in 
SJS (see Figure 7). Additionally, speaking to H2(y), an effect emerged in study 2 with 
regards to the Belief in a Just World (BJW) scale and the dependent variable of support 
for regime change. When this variable was entered into the equation as moderator, a 
significant effect emerged in the uncertainty condition, such that those low in BJW 
exhibited an increase in favorable attitudes towards regime change, the opposite being 
true for those high in BJW (see Figure 11). 
A significant regression with respect to the dependent variable of Status Quo 
Preference Scale occurred in experiment 2 with political ideology as the moderator (see 
Figure 3). This regression produced a US x Moderator interaction, such that in the 
uncertainty condition, pre-existing attitudes again became polarized in the predicted 
fashion under priming. That is to say, right wing/conservatives’ exhibited more negative 
attitudes towards reformers, and left wing/conservatives exhibited less negative attitudes. 
Decomposition of this interaction revealed that the significant effect was driven by 
conservative participants at the statistically significant level. Additionally, the variable of 
Party Identification produced a pattern duplicate to that described above (US x Party). 
Decomposition of this interaction revealed that the significant effect was driven by 
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Republican identifying participants, though a polarization on both sides of the isle is 
evident. In each case described above, the magnitude and direction of the effect coincides 
with the a-priori predictions provided by H2(y). 
Hypothesis 2(z). Hypothesis 2(z) predicted that variables related to non-
ideological sociopolitical indicators would moderate H1 effects in such a way that those 
who generally feel more politically involved and efficacious should exhibit a 
magnification/polarization of their baseline response; though this set of hypotheses was 
relatively more exploratory and peripheral compared to H2(x, y). Let us now discuss the 
effects which emerged relevant to this hypothesis grouping. 
In study 1, a marginally significant US x Attention to politics effect emerged, 
such that those high in attention exhibited heightened negative attitudes towards 
reformers when primed with uncertainty. This effect was neither predicted by H2(z), 
statistically significant at the p < .05 level in the decomposition of simple slopes, or 
replicated across studies. Thus, we are inclined to consider this a spurious effect, or at 
least one which falls outside the theoretical scope of this dissertation. 
In study 2, a US x political self-efficacy (PSE) interaction emerged. This effect 
was such that when primed with uncertainty, those high in political self-efficacy 
exhibited heightened positive attitudes towards reformers, an effect consistent with 
H2(z). Also in study 2, a US x Trust in Government(TG) effect emerged such that, when 
primed with uncertainty, those highly trusting of government exhibited heightened 
attitudes towards reformers relative to baseline. This effect was not hypothesized, and the 
direction of the effect runs contrary to H2(z) (we would predict low trust to correlate with 
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more favorable attitudes toward reformers). Finally, a US x Trust in Government (TG) 
effect emerged with support for regime change as the dependent variable, such that those 
highly trusting of government became less supportive of regime change when primed 
with uncertainty relative to baseline. This effect is consistent with H2(z). We note, 
however, that the variable of Trust in Government was the one moderator variable not 
evenly distributed across conditions, and thus was correlated with the primed independent 
variable. Because of this, an assumption of interactive regression models was violated 
when employing this variable as a moderator (IV and moderator should be uncorrelated 
in such models), and thus conclusions with respect to this moderator should be met with 
caution. Overall, empirical support for the hypothesis 2(z) grouping is rather paltry. 
Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis 3 as described previously denotes a set of hypotheses broken down 
into three parts (x, y, z) corresponding to their respective moderator variable grouping 
discussed in the previous section. Hypothesis 3 posits that heightened uncertainty 
salience and the thirteen individual difference moderators should cause participants to 
exhibit an increased preference for the status quo and related constructs in an additive 
manner (producing independent, non-interacting effects). Since there were essentially no 
main effects of the manipulated independent variable in any of the studies contained 
herein, and the many predicted multiplicative effects were observed as described 
throughout, hypothesis 3 appears to have garnered no empirical support. 
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Hypothesis Summary 
The lack of main effects in either of the two studies suggests a refutation of 
hypothesis 1, without moderator interactions. This is theoretically interesting for a 
number of reasons. Studies within the uncertainty management literature (Hogg: 2000, 
2004, 2005) and also the terror management literature (see Greenberg et al. 2008, for a 
review) employed independent variable manipulations identical to those used herein, and 
consistently produced main effects of these manipulations upon dependent variables 
relevant to the overarching theme of cultural worldviews, norms and values in a manner 
consistent with Hypothesis 1 as described herein.  
The lack of replication of these established effects may be considered surprising. 
Even when an identical independent variable manipulation was utilized (the LEI in 
experiment 1), main effects failed to emerge. Thus, to some extent this could be 
considered a “fail to replicate” scenario. There are, however, notable differences between 
the present studies and the cited predecessors which may explain the non-replication. As 
noted earlier, the previous studies did not explicitly involve status quo preference related 
measures. Therefore, it is not altogether surprising that established effects of the 
independent variable manipulation did not translate to a new type of dependent variable. 
Moreover, the effects of transporting the experiment out of university psychology 
laboratories and into a remotely conducted internet survey should not be overlooked as a 
factor. Systematic research on the effects of taking surveys in-person vs. online is a 
fruitful area of future research which could prove both theoretically informative, as well 
as pragmatic. Recent reviews of the subject of differences in participant pool 
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characteristics between in-person college samples and Mturk participants, however, 
suggest that the populations behave more or less similarly (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). 
Thus, we are disinclined to the idea that such differences (in the processing of materials, 
and characteristics of participant samples) between those studies and my own are the 
primary reason for a lack of main effects in these two experiments; though with such a 
new method for obtaining participants (Mturk), there may be systematic differences yet 
to be detected between populations. 
Our dependent variables aimed to capture status quo preference and related 
manifestations (attitudes towards reformers, support for regime change), not preference 
for cultural worldviews or norms. We surmised that the findings pertinent to the latter 
would extend onto the former, but it was not a foregone conclusion. We expected the 
results regarding cultural worldviews and norms to extend to status quo preference type 
measures as a result of the high level of conceptual overlap among constructs in these 
categories. Namely, since the norms and worldviews espoused by a given culture 
represent the status quo of that culture, one might expect that similar effects might be 
achieved. On the other hand, a worldview or norm is different from an attitude, and 
indeed many participants (e.g. right leaning or Republican identifying participants during 
the current Obama administration) may feel that the political status quo as they 
understand it is directly counter to their worldviews. 
Caveats and Mitigating Factors 
Recent discussions within the social science community present a strong case for 
requiring multiple replications of an effect prior to making bold claims of causality. 
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Previously well-established priming effects have failed to produce effects in recent 
replication attempts, suggesting to some that unseen procedural idiosyncrasies may exert 
a larger influence on results than previously imagined, hindering successful replication 
attempts, highlighting the capricious nature of some results, and casting longstanding 
theoretical conclusions into doubt (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012; Stroebe & Strack, 
2014). The remedy to this problem is engaging repeated exact procedural replications, as 
well as varied conceptual replications. The corroboration of effects with respect to the 
moderator of political ideology across both studies mitigates some of these concerns, as 
the theoretically predicted effect emerged in an identical fashion across two different 
implementations of the independent variable manipulation. Additionally, similarly 
patterned interaction effects emerged with regards to several of the variables in the 
system justifying attitudes and worldviews category, suggesting that the discussed effects 
relevant to hypothesis H2(y) were not flukes, particularly for the key variable of political 
ideology and related variables. 
Experimentwise type I error presents itself as a concern here, as 13 Moderator 
Variables x 3 Dependent Variables (this is taking into account only the models with all 
controls) produces 39 comparisons in each experiment. The amount of statistical 
comparisons performed herein could be considered excessive, inevitably leading to some 
type I error. For each study, the likelihood of producing at least one false positive is 
governed by the formula, (Shaffer, 1995), where 1- (1-.05)^(39) = .86. In 
other words, it is approximately 86% likely that at least one false positive emerges in 
each study, due to the sheer volume of statistical models fielded. In study 1, the US x 
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Attention effect is unpredicted, not consistent with known theories, and does not emerge 
again in study 2. Such factors lead us to conclude that it is highly likely the effect is 
spurious. In study 2, a couple interaction effects relevant to H2(z) emerged, yet they were 
sparse and the significant US x TG effect with respect to attitudes towards reformers 
emerged contrary to H2(z). With respect to support for regime change, the significant US 
x TG interaction did support H2(z), however this is the only evidence throughout in 
support of this hypothesis, and due to the uneven distribution/random assignment of trust 
in government across conditions in experiment 2, any conclusions here should be met 
cautiously. 
H2(y) appears to have garnered support across studies with respect to political 
ideology as the moderator, and within experiment 2 among conceptually related variables 
in the system justifying attitudes and worldviews grouping. It could be said that drawing 
conclusions from study 2 with respect to H2(y) relevant effects should be approached 
cautiously, as they do not replicate in study 1. However, the characteristic predicted 
pattern of the effect among conceptually related moderator variables may be considered 
evidence supporting the robustness of this family of effects. If these effects were a result 
of experimentwise type I error, then it would be highly unlikely that a nearly identical 
pattern would manifest repeatedly, and that this pattern would happen by chance to 
manifest in accordance with the a-priori predictions of H2(y). Thus, for individuals high 
on system justifying attitudes and worldviews, exposure to mortality salience and/or 
uncertainty salience polarizes pre-existing attitudes. The case for this effect is most 
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evident with respect to the moderating variable of Political Ideology, with attitudes 
towards reformers as the dependent variable, as replicated across experiments. 
Terror Managements Versus Uncertainty Management 
In its initial conception, part of the intent of the present project was to corroborate 
findings such as those of Van den Bos et al. (2005) in demonstrating the greater strength 
and applicability of uncertainty salience manipulations relative to mortality salience 
manipulations. It is important to note that the formally hypothesized effects initially 
presented herein allowed for MS x Moderator interactions, yet the hypothesized effects 
specifically concerned the US manipulation. Four out of seven significant findings in the 
H2(y) family entailed a US x Moderator interaction, while three out of seven entailed a 
MS x Moderator interaction. In the strict sense of having predicted effects primarily for 
US (and not MS), one might feel justified in suggesting that support for the a-priori 
formal hypotheses was somewhat lacking; though, in the eyes of the author, all of the 
hypotheses were expected to manifest for both US and MS manipulations, as the previous 
research upon which the extant studies are based was known to establish this pattern for 
MS, though not with status quo preference relevant measures(status quo preference scale, 
attitudes towards reformers, support for regime change) as the larger dependent variable 
construct. The consistent pattern of MS/US x Moderator interactions speaking to H2(y) 
showcase a predicted re-occurring pattern, lending credence to this family of hypotheses. 
Across studies, the prime x political ideology interaction predicting attitudes 
towards reformers manifested itself in the pattern predicted a-priori, H2(y), producing 
what might be called an “extremity,” “magnification” or “polarization” effect, such that 
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pre-existing relations between the moderator and the dependent variable became more 
extreme under conditions of the prime. In each regression, either the MS x Moderator 
emerged significant, or the US x Moderator interaction did, but never did both 
interactions reach the threshold of statistical significance within the same model.  
Final Thoughts 
The results produced herein may be theoretically informative on a number of 
accounts speaking to related, yet distinct lines of research within social psychology. 
These findings could be seen as running somewhat contrary to the Van den Bos studies 
reported in which the uncertainty salience effect repeatedly outshined the mortality 
salience effect when using priming materials identical to those in experiment 1. In the 
current experiments, mortality salience is demonstrated to be more or less equally strong 
as uncertainty salience in producing significant effects. We found that out of the three 
dependent variables, it was participants’ attitude towards reformers (the person enacting 
change), which served as the dependent variable engendering most of the significant 
effects. We suggest that this is no coincidence, but rather a result of judgments regarding 
people themselves being characteristically different than those of abstract concepts or 
hypothetical futures. This, however, is mere speculation and further research would be 
needed to explore such an idea.  
When exposed to the experimental primes, participants’ pre-existing proclivities 
(on the moderating variables generally falling into the system justifying worldviews 
category) became more extreme/polarized/magnified. Previous theoretical work has 
discussed the idea that under conditions of high stress or cognitive load, both liberals’ 
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and conservatives’ attitudes become magnified, producing what have been in the past 
referred to as “extremity effects.” Other theoretical frameworks suggest that situational 
primes including those deployed herein should cause both liberals and conservatives to 
simply become more conservative, an idea sometimes referred to as the “conservative 
shift hypothesis.” The extant studies are thus informative with regards to this debate, 
demonstrating extremity effects across a variety of related variables in this hypothesis 
grouping H2(y), particularly that of political ideology. As far as the current author is 
aware of, experiment 2 is the first to use a word search type exercise as a successful 
method of concept priming. Many have heard the apocryphal tale of World War II 
propaganda being disseminated to citizens of various nations via word searchs. The 
extant results suggest that these kinds of word puzzles may indeed be quite an effective 
technique. We found that it was sometimes Liberals (or those low in system justifying 
worldviews and attitudes), and sometimes conservatives (or those exhibiting high levels 
on this variable grouping) who exhibited the more pronounced polarization effect in each 
specific case, as evidenced by the significance levels of the simple slopes analyses. It is 
important to note, however, that in all cases the hypothesized directional pattern of means 
was exhibited by both those on the left/liberal end of the spectrum and those on the 
right/conservative end of the spectrum. In no case did the patter of means appear to affect 
only one side of the continuum. 
This finding may be of interest to those studying the interactive influence of 
ideology and emotional processes on politically relevant attitudes. Some lines of research 
suggest that the achieved effects would be expected to occur primarily among 
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conservatives, as some studies find conservatives to be more emotionally reactive to 
negative stimuli (Inbar, 2009). An emerging counterpoint to this idea, however, suggests 
that those on the right are generally more “rigid” and less psychologically flexible; 
(Pliskin et al. 2014, see Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010 for a review), thus predicting the 
effects to be driven primarily by those low on system justifying views/liberals. In some 
cases of significant effects relevant to H2(y), the situational prime demonstrated lesser 
change/flexibility of attitudes among conservatives (and those who are high on system 
justifying attitudes and worldviews generally), while in other instances the reverse was 
true. In all cases, however, as evidenced by the figures, it appears that a 
magnification/polarization of pre-existing attitudes occurred for both those low and high 
on the moderator variable, even if one side (low or high) reached the threshold of 
statistical significance while the other did not.  
A diverse array of empirical research stemming from both psychology and 
economics suggests that there exists a general tendency for people to prefer the status quo 
over alternatives, all else being equal. This dissertation investigated such hypotheses 
from a motivated cognition perspective, with the drive to retreat from uncertainty and 
avoid death serving as the underlying motivating constructs. From the extant studies, we 
find evidence in favor of the idea that terror management and uncertainty management 
processes activate social cognitive mechanisms directly favoring the status quo (and, 
specifically the individuals who uphold it), an effect heretofore not established in the 
literature. 
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In the face of death and uncertainty, it appears that people tend to “stick to their 
guns.” According to Milburn & Conrad (1998), our reactions to such stimuli are shaped 
as part of our socio-political development, with conservatives being least likely to 
embrace change because they are less willing and motivated to believe that the world is 
innately unjust. The polarization effects uncovered in the extant studies may shed some 
light upon seemingly intractable conflicts in which escalation of hostilities appears 
inevitable. Interpersonal and intergroup hostilities often escalate in a climate of scarce 
resources and/or ongoing war, to the detriment of both belligerent parties. This study 
demonstrates that situational triggers of death and uncertainty cause individuals to 
polarize their attitudes; they do not relent, or shift in a unidirectional fashion (as 
suggested by the “conservative shift” hypothesis). Polarization of pre-existing political 
attitudes (or system justifying attitudes and worldviews more broadly) will likely 
exacerbate, rather than alleviate conflict situations. Thus, situational primes of death and 
uncertainty cause those already predisposed towards or against political reformers to 
become more extreme in their views. Future research is warranted to investigate whether 
or not the polarization effect holds for other kinds of primes by which a more ancestral 
causal mechanism for the effect may be pinpointed (e.g. only negative valence primes, 
only high arousal primes), or if the polarization effect occurs specifically within the 
framework of “existentially relevant” constructs. Regardless, the current experiments 
demonstrate that death and uncertainty fan the flames of pre-existing political views 
regarding the status quo and those who aim to change it. 
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APPENDIX 
SURVEY MEASURES
158 
 
Independent Measures. 
 
(Condition A) Uncertainty Condition: 
 
“INSTRUCTIONS: In this part of the study we are interested to see what people think 
and feel when they are uncertain. Please read carefully the following two questions and 
reply as honestly as you can. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers; we are 
interested in what YOU think and feel.  
 
1) Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your being uncertain 
arouses in you.  
[Free Response] 
 
2) Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think physically will 
happen to you as you feel uncertain.  
[Free Response]” 
 
(Condition B) Mortality Salience Condition: 
“INSTRUCTIONS: In this part of the study we are interested to see what people think 
and feel about death. Please read carefully the following two questions and reply as 
honestly as you can. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in 
what YOU think and feel.  
 
1) Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your death arouses in 
you. 
 [ Free Response] 
 
2) Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think physically will 
happen to you as you die. 
[Free Response]” 
 
(Condition C) Control Condition: 
“INSTRUCTIONS: In this part of the study we are interested to see what people think 
and feel when they watch TV. Please read carefully the following two questions and 
reply as honestly as you can. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers; we are 
interested in what YOU think and feel.  
 
1) Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your watching TV 
arouses in you.  
[ Free Response] 
2) Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think physically will 
happen to you as you watch TV.  
[Free Response]”  
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Scale: Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, short form) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: On this page there is a scale consisting of a number of words that 
describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate 
answer. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present 
moment.  
 
1 very slightly 
2 a little 
3 moderately 
4 quite a bit 
5 extremely 
 
______ 1. Alert      
______ 2. Afraid       
______ 3. Active       
______ 4. Upset        
______ 5. Attentive       
______ 6. Hostile         
______ 7. Determined         
______ 8. Nervous        
______ 9. Ashamed       
______ 10. Inspire 
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Dependent Measures.  
 
Scale: Preference for Change scale vs. Status Quo Scale (PFC). 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following 
statements 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
 7 = Strongly Agree 
1. Societal changes should be met with caution.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I like to do the same old things rather than try new and 
different ones.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I prefer having a stable routine to experiencing changes 
in my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 4. Making major changes in society is usually not worth the 
trouble. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I like things which are familiar, rather than that which is 
different and unknown. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Staying the course is in life is necessary for success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 7. Generally, change is a negative thing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Change in life usually comes with great costs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. When things don’t go according to plans, it stresses me 
out. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
        
 
Scale: Attitudes Toward Reformers. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following 
statements.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree slightly 
disagree 
Slightly  
agree 
agree strongly 
agree 
 
1. Those who attempt to reform the system usually have ulterior motives. 
2. Those who protest the political system are usually looking for handouts and 
unrealistic quick fixes. 
3. Protesters are often a bunch of brats looking for attention. 
4. Mass protests and reformation movements are rarely thought out. 
5. Revolutionaries usually end up being worse that those which they rail against. 
6. Reformers and protesters are society’s great heroes.* 
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Scale: Support for Regime Change 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following 
statements.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree slightly 
disagree 
Slightly  
agree 
agree strongly 
agree 
 
1. When the political rulers of a country become ineffective, they should be removed 
by any means necessary. 
2. Though governments around the world often cause many problems for their citizens, 
changing a political system through regime change usually ends badly.* 
3. Governments around the world should take a look at the “Arab Spring” and get out 
of the way for who is next. 
4. In politics, I tend to support the underdog/challenger rather than the already 
established candidate. 
 
5. People should stop complaining about the government because whatever would 
replace it will probably be worse.* 
6. I like to see government change their leaders often, rather than rarely. 
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Manipulation Check, Control and Potential Mediating Variables. 
 
Manipulation Check: 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Recall from earlier the writing exercise at the beginning of the 
survey. 
Please rate the extent to which you were thinking about the following topics while 
writing down your answers earlier. 
 (1 = did not think about at all, 7 = thought very much about) 
 
1. Uncertainty 
2. Watching T.V. 
3. Death 
 
Control and Potential Mediating Variables (aka Thoughts/Feeling Measures): 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Recall from earlier the writing exercise at the beginning of the 
survey. Please rate the extent to which you thought about or felt the following while 
writing down your answers earlier. 
(1  = did not feel at all, 7 = felt very much) 
 
1. I thought about or felt death and dying. ___ 
2. I thought about or felt anxious. ___ 
3. I thought about or felt insecure. ___ 
4. I thought about or felt threatened. ___ 
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Individual Difference Measures. 
 
Scale: IUS (Uncertainty Intolerance Scale) 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please select the answer that best corresponds to how much you agree 
with each item. 
 
       
 
 
Not at all 
characteri
stic of me 
A little 
characteri
stic of me 
Somewha
t 
characteri
stic of me 
Very 
characteri
stic of me 
Entirely 
characteristic 
of me 
1. Unforeseen events upset 
me greatly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. It frustrates me not 
having all the 
information I need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Uncertainty keeps me 
from living a full life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. One should always look 
ahead so as to avoid 
surprises. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. A small unforeseen event 
can spoil everything, 
even with the best of 
planning. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When it’s time to act, 
uncertainty paralyses 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. When I am uncertain I 
can’t function very well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I always want to know 
what the future has in 
store for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I can’t stand being taken 
by surprise. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The smallest doubt can 
stop me from acting. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I should be able to 
organize everything in 
advance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I must get away from all 
uncertain situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
164 
 
Scale: Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (IAS) 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following 
statements. 
1  2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
 disagree slightly 
disagree 
Slightly  
agree 
agree strongly 
agree 
 
1 An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably 
doesn't know too much. 
      
2. There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved.       
3. A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be 
done are always clear. 
      
4. In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, 
simple problems rather than large and complicated ones. 
      
5. What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.       
6. A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or 
unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for. 
      
7. I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones 
where all or most of the people are complete strangers. 
      
8. The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better.       
9. I would like to live in a foreign country for a while.*       
10. People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the 
joy of living.* 
      
11. It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a 
simple one. 
      
12. Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who 
don't mind being different and original. 
      
13. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how 
complicated things really are.* 
      
14. Many of our most important decisions are based upon 
insufficient information. 
      
15. Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give a 
chance for one to show initiative and originality.* 
      
16. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of 
looking at things. * 
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Scale: System Justification Scale (2013) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following 
statements. 
1  2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
 disagree slightly 
disagree 
Slightly  
agree 
agree strongly 
agree 
 
1. Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness in America.       
2. In general, I find American society to be fair.       
3. Most of America’s policies serve the greater good.       
4. In general, America’s political system operates as it should.       
 
Scale: SDO (Social Dominance Orientation) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements. 
1 = Strongly Disagree        
 7 = Strongly Agree        
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use 
force against other groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than 
others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on 
other groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer 
problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top 
and other groups are at the bottom. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for 
different groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Increased social equality is beneficial to society. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more 
equally. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. No group should dominate in society. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Scale: Belief in a Just World Scale (BJW) 
INSTRUCTIONS: Below you will find various statements. Most likely, you will 
strongly agree with some statements and strongly disagree with others. Sometimes you 
may feel more neutral.Read each statement carefully and decide to what extent you 
personally agree or disagree with it. Make the selection which best corresponds to this 
judgment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree slightly 
disagree 
Slightly  
agree 
agree strongly 
agree 
 
1. I think basically the world is a just place.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. I am convinced that in the long run people will be compensated 
for injustices.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g. 
professional, family, politics) are the exception rather than the 
rule. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
6. I think people try to be fair when making important decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Scale: (M10) Political Ideology 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions by choosing the answer 
which most closely represents you. 
 
1. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show 
you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged 
from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (please circle your answer) 
1- Extremely Conservative 
2- Conservative 
3- Slightly Conservative 
4- Moderate, Middle of the Road 
5- Slightly Liberal 
6- Liberal 
7- Extremely Liberal 
8- Haven’t Thought 
9- Don’t Know/Other/NA 
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Scale: Partisanship (Party ID) 
 
2. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? 
1. strong democrat 
2. weak democrat 
3. independent-democrat 
4. independent-moderate 
5. independent republican 
6. weak republican 
7. strong republican 
8. libertarian 
9. other, N/A 
 
Scale: Trust in Government 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Following is a survey of political attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, and 
values. Some of the items ask you to recall events from the past and so it is understood 
that the information depends on the “best of your recollection.” But whatever you can 
provide is greatly appreciated.  
 
1. If you took a complaint about your community to a local government elected official 
(i.e., city council member, county supervisor, school board member, etc.), do you 
believe that she or he would pay a lot of attention, some attention, very little attention, 
or no attention at all to your complaint? 
___ No attention 
___ Very little attention 
___ Some attention 
___ A lot of attention 
 
2. If you took a complaint about the national government to a representative of the 
national government, do you believe that she or he would pay a lot of attention, some 
attention, very little attention, or no attention at all to your complaint? 
___ No attention 
___ Very little attention 
___ Some attention 
___ A lot of attention 
___ A lot of attention 
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Scale: Political Self-Efficacy 
 
3. How much influence do you believe someone like you can have over decisions made 
by local government? 
___ No influence 
___ Very little influence 
___ Some influence 
___ A lot of influence 
 
4. How much influence do you believe someone like you can have over decisions made 
by the national government? 
___ No influence 
___ Very little influence 
___ Some influence 
___ A lot of influence 
 
 
Scale: Political Interest 
 
5. Thinking about your local community, how interested are you in local community 
politics and local community affairs? 
___ Not Interested 
___ Slightly Interested 
___ Somewhat Interested 
___ Very Interested 
 
6. How interested are you in national politics and national affairs? 
___ Not Interested 
___ Slightly Interested 
___ Somewhat Interested 
___ Very Interested 
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Scale: Political Attention 
 
7. Thinking about your local community, how much attention do you pay to local 
community politics and local community elections? 
___ No attention 
___ Not much attention 
___ Some attention 
___ A lot of attention 
 
8. How much attention do you pay to national politics and national elections? 
___ No attention 
___ Not much attention 
___ Some attention 
___ A lot of attention 
 
 
Scale: Political Knowledge 
 
9. In general, how knowledgeable do you consider yourself to be about local 
community politics? 
___ Not knowledgeable 
___ Not very knowledgeable 
___ Somewhat knowledgeable 
___ Very knowledgeable 
 
10. In general, how knowledgeable do you consider yourself to be about national 
politics? 
___ Not knowledgeable 
___ Not very knowledgeable 
___ Somewhat knowledgeable 
___ Very knowledgeable 
 
 
Scale: Voting Behavior 
 
11. Have you ever participated in a political action or activity? 
 Y/ N 
12. Do you anticipate voting in the general (November) elections? 
 Y/ N 
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Experiment 2 priming materials: 
 
(Condition A) Uncertainty Condition: 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: This is a word search puzzle. Please attempt to find (visually locate 
with your eyes) the following words in the puzzle: UNCERTAIN, DICEY, GAMBLE, 
SHAKY, WAVERING. Please time yourself using http://www.online-stopwatch.com or 
by your timing method of choice. Spend 2 MINUTES searching for the words in caps 
above, and then stop. 
When you locate the words, simply remember WHICH of the words you located and 
WHERE on the puzzle you saw them. When approximately 2 minutes have 
completed, click to the next page. 
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(Condition B) Mortality Salience Condition: 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: This is a word search puzzle. Please attempt to find (visually locate 
with your eyes) the following words in the puzzle: DEATH, MORTAL, GRAVE, 
TOMBS, DEMISE. Please time yourself using http://www.online-stopwatch.com or by 
your timing method of choice. Spend 2 MINUTES searching for the words in caps above, 
and then stop. 
When you locate the words, simply remember WHICH of the words you located and 
WHERE on the puzzle you saw them. When approximately 2 minutes have 
completed, click to the next page. 
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(Condition C) Control Condition: 
INSTRUCTIONS: This is a word search puzzle. Please attempt to find (visually locate 
with your eyes) the following words in the puzzle: TELEVISION, DUST, GOGGLES, 
AFTERNOON, SPOT. Please time yourself using http://www.online-stopwatch.com or 
by your timing method of choice. Spend 2 MINUTES searching for the words in caps 
above, and then stop. 
When you locate the words, simply remember WHICH of the words you located and 
WHERE on the puzzle you saw them. When approximately 2 minutes have 
completed, click to the next page. 
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